Nancy Bernkopf Tucker confronts the coldest period of the cold warÑthe moment in which personality, American political culture, public opinion, and high politics came together to define the Eisenhower AdministrationÕs policy toward China. A sophisticated, multidimensional account based on prodigious, cutting edge research, this volume convincingly portrays EisenhowerÕs private belief that close relations between the United States and the PeopleÕs Republic of China were inevitable and that careful consideration of the PRC should constitute a critical part of American diplomacy. Tucker provocatively argues that the Eisenhower AdministrationÕs hostile rhetoric and tough actions toward China obscure the presidentÕs actual views. Behind the scenes, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, pursued a more nuanced approach, one better suited to ChinaÕs specific challenges and the stabilization of the global community. Tucker deftly explores the contradictions between Eisenhower and his advisorsÕ public and private positions. Her most powerful chapter centers on EisenhowerÕs recognition that rigid trade prohibitions would undermine the global postwar economic recovery and push China into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. Ultimately, Tucker finds EisenhowerÕs strategic thinking on Europe and his fear of toxic, anticommunist domestic politics constrained his leadership, making a fundamental shift in U.S. policy toward China difficult if not impossible. Consequently, the president was unable to engage congress and the public effectively on China, ultimately failing to realize his own high standards as a leader.

This book examines the contours of the Sino-American confrontation and its future trajectories. It delineates the two major causes of the friction in Sino-American relations—change in the balance of power in China’s favor and the conf licting ideologies of the two states—and emphasizes why it is imperative for the U.S. to hold on to its ideological principles. It demonstrates the ultimate and irreconcilable gap in the visions the two competitors have for international politics and consequently why conf lict—certainly cold, and very possibly hot—is inevitable. The authors also suggest measures which the U.S. can adopt to sustain its leadership and deter China’s ideology and vision for the future of global politics. A significant contribution to the study of Sino-American relations, the volume will be of interest to scholars and researchers of international relations, foreign policy, and U.S. and Chinese politics. It will be of great interest to think tanks, public policy professionals, and the interested general reader.

What was the reason for the first real armed encounter between Indian and Chinese troops on Chinese soil in the town of Dinghai on Chusan Island in July 1840? Were the orders for the invasion of Aksai Chin issued by Mao from Moscow in December 1949, at Stalin's behest? Was the pluck and raw courage of Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh to hold Nathu La first in 1965 and then again in 1967 the basis for General K. Sundarji's bold moves at Sumdorong Chu in 1986 and 1987? Red Fear: The China Threat catalogues, evaluates and infers the consequences of the political and military confrontations between India and China from the 15th to the 21st century. Contrary to the glowing accounts in popular imagination of a congruence of values and interests between these two nations, the relationship has been confrontational and antagonistic at many levels throughout these last six centuries. The lessons of history are hard to learn. Nevertheless, China seems to have learnt them better than India. It bided its time well and positioned itself to humiliate and denigrate India whenever possible as retribution for the perceived harm India and Indians did to its society and economy during the infamous Chinese century of humiliation between 1839 to 1940. For India, today's post-Galwan situation is reminiscent of the challenge India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru faced in 1962 and the identical challenge India's 14th Prime Minister Narendra Modi faces in 2020. Vedic philosophy argues that time is cyclical, and not linear, and by this argument, the year 2020 completes a 60-year cycle that began in 1960. How Modi responds to this challenge will define India's relationship with China as well as its position in the world through the rest of the 21st century.

"Modernizing the Western world's approach to China"--Front jacket flap.

Although every country seeks out information on other nations, China is the leading threat when it comes to the theft of intellectual assets, including inventions, patents, and R&D secrets. Trade Secret Theft, Industrial Espionage, and the China Threat provides an overview of economic espionage as practiced by a range of nations from around the world—focusing on the mass scale in which information is being taken for China's growth and development. Supplying a current look at espionage, the book details the specific types of information China has targeted for its collection efforts in the past. It explains what China does to prepare for its massive collection efforts and describes what has been learned about China's efforts during various Congressional hearings, with expert advice and details from both the FBI and other government agencies. This book is the product of hundreds of hours of research, with material, both primary and secondary, reviewed, studied, and gleaned from numerous sources, including White House documentation and various government agencies. Within the text, you will learn the rationale and techniques used to obtain information in the past. You will see a bit of history over centuries where espionage has played a role in the economy of various countries and view some cases that have come to light when individuals were caught. The book supplies an understanding of how the economy of a nation can prosper or suffer, depending on whether that nation is protecting its intellectual property, or whether it is stealing such property for its own use. The text concludes by outlining specific measures that corporations and their employees can practice to protect their information and assets, both at home and abroad.

Han-centrism, a virulent form of Chinese nationalism, asserts that the Han Chinese are superior to other peoples and have a legitimate right to advance Chinese interests at the expense of other countries. Han nationalists have called for policies that will allow China to reclaim the prosperity stolen by foreign powers during the “Century of Humiliation.” The growth of Chinese capabilities and Han-centrism suggests that the United States, its allies, and other countries in Asia will face an increasingly assertive China—one that thinks it possesses a right to dominate international politics. John M. Friend and Bradley A. Thayer explore the roots of the growing Han nationalist group and the implications of Chinese hypernationalism for minorities within China and for international relations. The deeply rooted chauvinism and social Darwinism underlying Han-centrism, along with China’s rapid growth, threaten the current stability of international politics, making national and international competition and conflict over security more likely. Western thinkers have yet to consider the adverse implications of a hypernationalistic China, as opposed to the policies of a pragmatic China, were it to become the world’s dominant state.

The devastating terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and America's first domestic bio-terrorism mail attacks have shifted America's attention and resources to the immediate threat of international terrorism. But we shouldn't be fooled. Since the publication of the hardcover edition of The China Threat in November of 2000, one thing remains very much the same: the People's Republic of China is the most serious long-term national security challenge to the United States. In fact, after the events of September 11, the China threat should seem all the more real, for Communist China is one of the most important backers of states that support international terrorism. —From the new introduction by the author

"China threat" has been one of hotly debated topics since the early 1990s, and this book is an effort to test the China threat thesis. The author argues that a test of the China threat thesis requires addressing two fundamental questions: whether China has the capabilities to challenge the international system and whether China has the motivations to do so. This book will offer a systematic study of China's foreign policy motivations by resorting to an image approach. The conclusion as to whether China is a status quo or a revisionist country will be reached by exploring how consideration of national interests and how China's perceptions of key characters of the U.S. affect China's foreign policy orientation. A summary of the dominant Chinese images of the U.S. will also contribute to understanding China's motivations vis-a-vis the U.S.

The Chinese Air Force (also known as the People's Liberation Army Air Force - PLAAF) is the third largest air force in the world, with an inventory of almost 2,200 combat aircraft. Against this, the Indian Air Force has a strength of about 860 combat aircraft. Does this make the PLAAF a giant in front of the IAF? The PLAAF may be having an advantage in terms of numbers but mere numbers do not tell the full story. The Chinese Air Force cannot deploy all these aircraft against India. In a meticulously researched analysis, the author argues that PLAAF will have serious limitations in achieving air superiority against the IAF. The limitations of airfield infrastructure and terrain in Tibet severely restrict PLAAF's capabilities to carry out a sustained air campaign against India. Since the 1990s, the Chinese Air Force has been modernising at a rapid pace. The large numbers of obsolete Soviet era fighter aircraft is being replaced by increasing numbers of fourth generation fighters of the SU-27/SU-30/J-10/J-11 class, but the IAF continues to maintain its technological lead, with the SU-30MKI of the IAF being more advanced than the SU-30MKK of PLAAF. India must continue to maintain its technological lead in the coming years. Another advantage the IAF has is in its superior training, but the Chinese are catching up in this field, with greater exposure to international exercises. The main advantage that the PLA has is in its second artillery's conventional capability. The author discusses the second artillery's capabilities and says that China's ballistic and cruise missiles will be a major threat to India, but they cannot incapacitate us. To counter the Chinese missile threat, India must develop similar capabilities with its Agni, Brahmos and Nirbhay missiles. The IAF needs to develop its capabilities in critical areas and exploit PLAAF's limitations, because unlike in 1962, this time, the contest is going to be in the air.

For more than a century, no US adversary or coalition of adversaries - not Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union - has ever reached sixty percent of US GDP. China is the sole exception, and it is fast emerging into a global superpower that could rival, if not eclipse, the United States. What does China want, does it have a grand strategy to achieve it, and what should the United States do about it? In The Long Game, Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades worth of party documents, leaked materials, memoirs by party leaders, and a careful analysis of China's conduct to provide a history of China's grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. Taking readers behind the Party's closed doors, he uncovers Beijing's long, methodical game to displace America from its hegemonic position in both the East Asia regional and global orders through three sequential "strategies of displacement." Beginning in the 1980s, China focused for two decades on "hiding capabilities and biding time." After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, it became more assertive regionally, following a policy of "actively accomplishing something." Finally, in the aftermath populist elections of 2016, China shifted to an even more aggressive strategy for undermining US hegemony, adopting the phrase "great changes unseen in century." After charting how China's long game has evolved, Doshi offers a comprehensive yet asymmetric plan for an effective US response. Ironically, his proposed approach takes a page from Beijing's own strategic playbook to undermine China's ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan.