In Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear ‘Crisis’: Theoretical Approaches, Halit M.E. Tagma and Paul E. Lenze, Jr. analyze the ‘crisis’ surrounding Iran’s nuclear program through a variety of theoretical approaches, including realism, world-systems theory, liberal institutionalism, domestic politics, and multi-level games. Through these theories, Tagma and Lenze use established academic perspectives to create a more objective understanding and explanation of the debates and issues. Introducing the concept of eclectic pluralism to the study of international relations, Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear ‘Crisis’ presents theoretical approaches side by side to explore a complex and evolving international dispute.

Examines Iran's current nuclear potential while charting America's future course of action, recounting the prolonged clash between both nations to outline options for American policymakers.

The first detailed Iranian account of the diplomatic struggle between Iran and the international community, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir opens in 2002, as news of Iran's clandestine uranium enrichment and plutonium production facilities emerge. Seyed Hossein Mousavian, previously the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and spokesman for Tehran's nuclear negotiating team, brings the reader into Tehran's private deliberations as its leaders wrestle with internal and external adversaries. Mousavian provides readers with intimate knowledge of Iran's interactions with the International Atomic Energy Agency and global powers. His personal story comes alive as he vividly recounts his arrest and interrogations on charges of espionage. Dramatic episodes of diplomatic missions tell much about the author and the swirling dynamics of Iranian politics and diplomacy—undercurrents that must be understood now more than ever. As intense debate continues over the direction of Iran's nuclear program, Mousavian weighs the likely effects of military strikes, covert action, sanctions, and diplomatic engagement, considering their potential to resolve the nuclear crisis. Contents 1. The Origin and Development of Iran's Nuclear Program 2. The First Crisis 3. From Tehran to Paris 4. From the Paris Agreement to the 2005 Presidential Election 5. The Larijani Period 6. To the Security Council 7. Back to the Security Council and a New Domestic Situation 8. Iran Alone: The Jalili Period 9. U.S. Engagement 10. The Crisis Worsens 11. Conclusion

Iran's nuclear program is one of this century's principal foreign policy challenges. Despite U.S., Israeli, and allied efforts, Iran has an extensive enrichment program and likely has the technical capacity to produce at least one nuclear bomb if it so chose. This study assesses U.S. policy options, identifies a way forward, and considers how the United States might best mitigate the negative international effects of a nuclear-armed Iran.

What does it mean for Iran to have nuclear weapon capabilities? And what should the United States do about this threatening situation?

This book provides an international legal analysis of the most important questions regarding Iran's nuclear program since 2002. Setting these legal questions in their historical and diplomatic context, this book aims to clarify how the relevant sources of international law - including primarily the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and IAEA treaty law - should be properly applied in the context of the Iran case. It provides an instructional case study of the application of these sources of international law, the lessons which can be applied to inform both the on-going legal and diplomatic dynamics surrounding the Iran nuclear dispute itself, as well as similar future cases. Some questions raised regard the watershed diplomatic accord reached between Iran and Western states in July, 2015, known as the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action. The answers will be of interests to diplomats and academics, as well as to anyone who is interested in understanding international law's application to this sensitive dispute in international relations.

There have been five central crises in America's post World War II encounter with the Middle East, and the Obama administration now faces a sixth. Iran's progress toward a nuclear weapons capability, and the prospect of Israel launching air strikes to stop it, are ingredients for a conflict that could ruin any residual hopes for fostering peace in the region. The Sixth Crisis explores the fraught linkages between the Iranian nuclear challenge, the increasing likelihood of an Israeli preventive strike, the continuing Israel-Palestine tragedy, and President Barack Obama's efforts to recast America's relations with the world's Muslims. It is the first full account of the situation since Obama took office. The authors, a former senior official on President Clinton's National Security Council Staff and a leading authority on international politics, lay out in clear and accessible detail the technical and political dimensions of Iran's nuclear program, and the ongoing diplomacy to stop it. They show how Israel's panic about Iran's nuclear threat--combined with its policy toward the Palestinians--is undermining Jerusalem's alliance with America. Tehran, meanwhile, is exploiting tensions between Arab regimes fearful of a nuclear Iran and an Arab public that is both angry about the plight of the Palestinians and resentful of Israel's nuclear monopoly in the region. The Sixth Crisis brilliantly illuminates this fateful juncture. The status quo is on an incline to disaster, and the hopes that President Obama has inspired are threatened by the toxic mixture of Israeli-Palestinian stalemate and Iran's nuclear ambitions. The time bomb of Iran's defiance and Israel's panic has the potential to spark a firestorm that would imperil US interests in the Middle East and engulf Obama's presidency. With the outcome of this unfolding crisis far from certain, The Sixth Crisis is required reading not only for policymakers, but also for anyone interested in world politics.

Considering the latest Iranian nuclear developments, one might question whether a study now on how best to restrain Tehran is simply one that's come too late. To be sure, estimates vary as to when Iran could build its first bomb. Some believe Tehran could do it before the end of 2005; others think Iran would only be able to do so by the end of the decade. In either case, though, the die seems cast: If Iran wants, it has all that it needs eventually to build a bomb on its own. Certainly, trying to deny Iran further nuclear technology in the hopes that this will prevent it from getting nuclear weapons is no longer a credible strategy. The questions this edited volume addresses are whether or not any strategy can prevent Iran from going nuclear, what the proper goals of such a strategy might be (deterring use, keeping Tehran from deploying weapons, getting it to dismantle its nuclear program, etc.), and what other nonproliferation goals ought to be attempted (including trying to dissuade other nations from following Iran's example). The answers this volume offers are: 1) in the long-run Iran will gain little from going nuclear, and 2) much can be gained by enforcing the nonproliferation rules Iran agreed to and spelling out the costs to Iran of its continuing acquisition of nuclear weapons- related capabilities.

Manufactured Crisis provides unique and timely background to the current negotiations over Iran's nuclear technology program. In it, award-winning investigative journalist Gareth Porter offers a well documented critique of the official Western account of what the Iranian government has been doing, and why. In Manufactured Crisis, Porter brings together the results of his many years of research into the issue-including numerous interviews with former insiders. He shows that the origins of the Iran nuclear "crisis" lay not in an Iranian urge to obtain nuclear weapons but, rather, in a sustained effort by the United States and its allies to deny Iran its right, as guaranteed in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to have any nuclear program at all. The book highlights the impact that the United States' alliance with Israel had on Washington's pursuit of its Iran policy and sheds new light on the US strategy of turning the International Atomic Energy Agency into a tool of its anti-Iran policy.

U.S.-Iran relations continue to be an international security problem in the Middle East. These two countries could have been friends, but instead they have become enemies. Stating this thesis raises the following questions: Why are the United States and Iran enemies? How and when did this relationship come to be? When the relationship began to deteriorate, could it have been reversed? What lessons can be learned from an analysis of past U.S.-Iranian relations and what are the implications for their present and future relations? Akan Malici and Stephen G. Walker argue that the dynamics of U.S.-Iran relations are based on role conflicts. Iran has long desired to enact roles of active independence and national sovereignty in world politics. However, it continued to be cast by others into client or rebel roles of national inferiority. In this book the authors examine these role conflicts during three crucial episodes in U.S.-Iran relations: the oil nationalization crisis and the ensuing clandestine coup aided by the CIA to overthrow the Iranian regime in 1950 to 1953; the Iranian revolution followed by the hostage crisis in 1979 to 1981; the reformist years pre- and post- 9/11 under Mohammad Khatami from 1997 to 2002. Their application of role theory is theoretically and methodologically progressive and innovative in illuminating aspects of U.S.-Iran relations. It allows for a better understanding of the past, navigating the present, and anticipating the future in order to avoid foreign policy mistakes. Role Theory and Role Conflict in U.S.-Iran Relations is a useful resource for international relations and foreign policy scholars who want to learn more about progress in international relations theory and U.S. relations with Iran.