Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory. But he argues that it makes this error theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory and it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory. He then sketches how certain other philosophical theories can be defended in a similar way. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we need to make a sharp distinction between a theory's truth and our ability to believe it.

In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory says that these judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that these properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory, but he argues that it is not. Instead, he argues, our inability to believe this error theory makes the theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory, it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory, and it undermines revisionary alternatives to the theory. Streumer then sketches how certain other philosophical views can be defended in a similar way, and how philosophers should modify their method if there can be true theories that we cannot believe. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we should sharply distinguish the truth of a theory from our ability to believe it

Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.

Conversations matter. Yet, recently, good conversations about faith have been increasingly squeezed out of the public sphere. Seeking to reopen the debate, Justin Brierley began to invite atheists and sceptics on to Premier Christian Radio to air arguments for and against the Christian faith. But how has ten years of discussion with atheists affected the presenter’s faith? Reflecting on conversations with Richard Dawkins, Derren Brown and many more, Justin explains why he still finds Christianity the most compelling explanation for life, the universe and everything. And why, regardless of belief or background, we should all welcome the conversation. ‘Beautifully written, brilliantly argued, Justin’s book will thrill Christians and challenge atheists.’ R. T. Kendall, author and pastor ‘Justin has that happy knack of being able to get people of diametrically opposed opinions debating the big issues.’ John Lennox, Professor of Mathematics, University of Oxford

Moral skepticism is at present a vibrant topic of philosophical inquiry. Particularly since the turn of the millennium, the debates between moral skeptics of various stripes and their opponents have gained renewed force not only by taking account of innovative ideas in moral philosophy, but also by drawing on novel positions in epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of language as well as on recent findings in empirical sciences. As a result, new arguments for and against moral skepticism have been devised, while the traditional ones have been reexamined. This collection of original essays will advance the ongoing debates about various forms of moral skepticism by discussing such topics as error theory, disagreement, constructivism, non-naturalism, expressivism, fictionalism, and evolutionary debunking arguments. It will be a valuable resource for academics and advanced students working in metaethics and moral philosophy more generally.

Much of the primary research summarized here relates to Cambridge Genizah manuscripts, a thousand-year-old source that testifies to liturgical (as well, of course, as non-liturgical) developments that greatly predate other source material. When the research is concerned with pre-Genizah history, the Genizah evidence is also relevant since the historian of religious ideas must ultimately decide how to date, characterize, and conceptualize its contents and how to explain where they vary significantly from what became, or is regarded (rightly or wrongly) as having become, the standard rabbinic liturgy sanctioned by the Iraqi Jewish authorities from the ninth to the eleventh century.

The author, a computer science professor diagnosed with terminal cancer, explores his life, the lessons that he has learned, how he has worked to achieve his childhood dreams, and the effect of his diagnosis on him and his family.

This book contains twelve chapters by leading and up-and-coming philosophers on metaepistemology, that is, on the nature, existence and authority of epistemic facts. One of the central divides in metaepistemology is between epistemic realists and epistemic anti-realists. Epistemic realists think that epistemic facts (such as the fact that you ought to believe what your evidence supports) exist independently of human judgements and practices, and that they have authority over our judgements and practices. Epistemic anti-realists think that, if epistemic facts exist at all, they are grounded in human judgements and practices, and gain any authority they have from our judgements and practices. This book considers both epistemic realist and anti-realist perspectives, as well as perspectives that 'transcend' the realism/anti-realism dichotomy. As such, it constitutes the 'state of the art' with regard to metaepistemology, and will shape the debate in years to come.

The book that damned an entire town FERN FULTON: "I’m the only friend Gloria Wealdon has in this town. How could she write those dreadful things about me and my husband and our daughter?" VIRGINIA FULTON, age 15: "Mrs Wealdon’s a stinker and I’d like to murder her and write a sequel to her book. I’d call it Population 12,359." DR. JAY MANNERHEIM, psychologist: "Gloria Wealdon has simply touched off unpleasantries that in many cases would have exploded sooner or later anyway." MILO WEALDON: "I never realized my wife had such contempt, such loathing for me until I read her book." MIN STEWART: "My family has been here for generations. I consider Gloria Wealdon so vulgar as to be quite beneath contempt." GLORIA WEALDON: "The hell with everybody in this snotty town. They made my life miserable. Now we’re even."