This important new study focusing on the ultranationalist regimes in Germany and Japan during the 1930s and 1940s examines in biographical format the roles played by individuals significantly involved in the drive for global hegemony. Employing a considerable range of new source materials and eyewitness testimony on the German side, it highlights the roles of the Nazi Party ‘enforcer’ and Gestapo representative in East Asia, Josef Albert Meisinger, and of the officer commanding German naval forces in the Pacific region, Admiral Paul Werner Wenneker, agent Richard Sorge as whose relations with the Japanese Navy in the 1930s were observed and recalled by Engineer-Commander George C. Ross, the UK assistant naval attaché in Japan. The reactions of the German aero-engineer, Willi Foerster, a client of the Soviet radio operator, Max Clausen, to both Meisinger and Wenneker in the 1940s are also documented. On the Japanese side, new evidence is employed which examines the influence of the right-wing business and political figure, Sasagawa Ryôichi, on domestic events during the era of ‘Tennô-fascism’ and its aftermath. Similarly, an analysis of the role of the head of wartime Japanese military intelligence in eastern Europe, General Onodera Makoto, based in Stockholm, indicates the extent of opposition within the Japanese army to factional groups wedded to Nazi ideology and strategy and the ongoing support in Japan for anti-Soviet and anti-communist policies in the post-war era.

Christoph Kimmich's German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945: A Guide to Current Research and Resources is a comprehensive guide to archival resources and published materials on the foreign policy of Weimar and Nazi Germany. It catalogues the archives, libraries, and research institutes, both public and private, that house important collections, especially in Germany but also elsewhere in Europe and in the United States, and describes their holdings, terms of access and use, and guides and inventories available. German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945 also includes a substantial annotated bibliography of published sources, ranging from documentary series to significant contemporary accounts, from memoirs to secondary works. The bibliography reflects current scholarship and draws attention to works that are innovative and accessible, It also describes the various series of the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial Records and the original trial documents available in archives and libraries. The guide canvasses the vast and growing offering of materials on the Web- digitized print materials, archival inventories, and source materials. In order to expedite work in the archives, the guide also explains the organization and functioning of the German foreign ministry between 1918 and 1945 and how it kept and stored its records. This third edition offers new information on German archives, many of which were consolidated and relocated after German reunification, on recently discovered archival holdings, and on materialsposted on the Web. It is a reference source for both established scholars and young researchers, offering quick and efficient access to the voluminous research and research materials that are now available.

Showcasing moments of convergence between the German and Japanese cultures towards common points of interest over the last one hundred fifty years, the chapters in this book cover such topics as culture, diplomacy, geography, history, law, literature, philosophy, politics, and sports. From the creation of two similar modern nation-states, to the aggressive struggle for national supremacy and subsequent total defeat in 1945, the necessity of coping with their earlier militarism and parallel economic miracles in the postwar era, Germans and Japanese look back on a remarkably similar past.

The first English-language study of German-Japanese interwar relations to employ sources in both languages.

The biography of Thomas Brown,who provided the template for a successful search by the German navy for oil access. Thomas Brown is an unknown figure of Scottish origin who played a significant role in the onset and development of both world wars in the first half of the 20th century. In the First World War he contributed to the Anglo-German conflict in the Middle East particularly in his switch from UK to German nationality in 1914 by contributing directly to the expansion of German imperialism in the Persian Gulf and Ottoman Empire. His most important role was in providing logistical support to German and Turkish forces in support of the Turkish jihad in November 1914. Despite his arrest by MI5 as a suspected traitor in 1919, he returned to Germany as a business middleman aided by former political and military colleagues in the Weimar Republic. After promoting German interests in Iran, he was able as a company director to represent German steel manufacturers who bought into the Anglo-Italian British Oil Development Company (BOD) in Iraq. He helped to obtain an oil concession from independent in Iraq in 1932, and used his skills as a negotiator with British, German and Arab speakers to promote a large oil strike and major expansion of the company in 1935. It is here that the German-Italian axis comes to center-stage. Brown initially rejected Italian approaches to take over the company - exactly when Mussolini was trying to conquer Abyssinia - in favor of support for the UK investors, Lord Glenconner and Sir Percy Hunting. Brown was not fully aware of the maneuvering by the Hitler regime since autumn 1933 to promote alliances with Britain, Italy and Japan against the USSR and France, which ended in December 1935 with Hitler's preference for Italy. This was accelerated by Gestapo investigations into Italian involvement and Hitler's calculation that it would promote divisions among former allies and decrease German dependence on the world oil economy they dominated. Access to oil was key to military and political success. Brown belatedly understood that Britain was opposed to permitting Italy and Germany access to to key raw materials. Brown reported directly to Berlin even though he was mistakenly identified as a 'Scottish Jew' but he failed to recognize that Hitler's support for Italy enabled access to Italian oil while maintaining domestic sources of fuel for rearmament of the army and air force. Brown was terminally ill by 1936 but had provided the template for a successful search by the German navy for access to oil, independent of the Anglo-American dominance of the world oil industry.

This latest volume of leading figures in the history of Anglo-Japanese relations offers a classic menu of personalities, themes and events (in all 25 contributions). Contents include the writings of the Cambridge scholar Carmen Blacker and leading historian William Beasley; British military observer and Times reporter of the Russo-Japanese War General Sir Ian Hamilton; philosophers Arnold Toynbee, Bertrand Russell and George Bernard Shaw; the Chosu students Inoue Kaoru and Yamao Yozo who were later key figures in the Meiji period modernization of Japan; and Walter Dening, scholar and missionary. Subjects treated include horse breeding and horse-racing, the Japanese influence on British architects, the beginnings of golf in Japan and Japanese gardeners in Britain.

This book employs a comparative approach to explore the decision-making processes behind the Japanese and Italian foreign policies concerned with East Asia, Africa, Europe and the Mediterranean. It explores these policies in relation to the Axis powers and Britain in the 1930s. Both Japan and Italy shared significant similarities in their decision-making processes, which help to illustrate the workings of ultra-nationalist and fascist foreign policy. The work examines the mechanism of decision-making in the foreign ministries, rather than the personalities of leaders, in order to understand why and how both countries finally chose unexpected partners. The Tripartite Alliance has often been perceived through the diplomatic motives and arbitrary manners of dictatorial leadership in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and ultra-nationalist Japan individually. This book compares the foreign policies of Italy and Japan and looks outwards to their diplomatic relations with Britain, a key imperial factor in their expansions into East Asia and Africa, contrasting these Axis powers with Germany, usually thought to typify fascist diplomacy.

A groundbreaking history that considers the attack on Pearl Harbor from the Japanese perspective and is certain to revolutionize how we think of the war in the Pacific. When Japan launched hostilities against the United States in 1941, argues Eri Hotta, its leaders, in large part, understood they were entering a war they were almost certain to lose. Drawing on material little known to Western readers, and barely explored in depth in Japan itself, Hotta poses an essential question: Why did these men—military men, civilian politicians, diplomats, the emperor—put their country and its citizens so unnecessarily in harm’s way? Introducing us to the doubters, schemers, and would-be patriots who led their nation into this conflagration, Hotta brilliantly shows us a Japan rarely glimpsed—eager to avoid war but fraught with tensions with the West, blinded by reckless militarism couched in traditional notions of pride and honor, tempted by the gambler’s dream of scoring the biggest win against impossible odds and nearly escaping disaster before it finally proved inevitable. In an intimate account of the increasingly heated debates and doomed diplomatic overtures preceding Pearl Harbor, Hotta reveals just how divided Japan’s leaders were, right up to (and, in fact, beyond) their eleventh-hour decision to attack. We see a ruling cadre rich in regional ambition and hubris: many of the same leaders seeking to avoid war with the United States continued to adamantly advocate Asian expansionism, hoping to advance, or at least maintain, the occupation of China that began in 1931, unable to end the second Sino-Japanese War and unwilling to acknowledge Washington’s hardening disapproval of their continental incursions. Even as Japanese diplomats continued to negotiate with the Roosevelt administration, Matsuoka Yosuke, the egomaniacal foreign minister who relished paying court to both Stalin and Hitler, and his facile supporters cemented Japan’s place in the fascist alliance with Germany and Italy—unaware (or unconcerned) that in so doing they destroyed the nation’s bona fides with the West. We see a dysfunctional political system in which military leaders reported to both the civilian government and the emperor, creating a structure that facilitated intrigues and stoked a jingoistic rivalry between Japan’s army and navy. Roles are recast and blame reexamined as Hotta analyzes the actions and motivations of the hawks and skeptics among Japan’s elite. Emperor Hirohito and General Hideki Tojo are newly appraised as we discover how the two men fumbled for a way to avoid war before finally acceding to it. Hotta peels back seventy years of historical mythologizing—both Japanese and Western—to expose all-too-human Japanese leaders torn by doubt in the months preceding the attack, more concerned with saving face than saving lives, finally drawn into war as much by incompetence and lack of political will as by bellicosity. An essential book for any student of the Second World War, this compelling reassessment will forever change the way we remember those days of infamy.

Japan’s Holy War reveals how a radical religious ideology drove the Japanese to imperial expansion and global war. Bringing to light a wealth of new information, Walter A. Skya demonstrates that whatever other motives the Japanese had for waging war in Asia and the Pacific, for many the war was the fulfillment of a religious mandate. In the early twentieth century, a fervent nationalism developed within State Shintō. This ultranationalism gained widespread military and public support and led to rampant terrorism; between 1921 and 1936 three serving and two former prime ministers were assassinated. Shintō ultranationalist societies fomented a discourse calling for the abolition of parliamentary government and unlimited Japanese expansion. Skya documents a transformation in the ideology of State Shintō in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth. He shows that within the religion, support for the German-inspired theory of constitutional monarchy that had underpinned the Meiji Constitution gave way to a theory of absolute monarchy advocated by the constitutional scholar Hozumi Yatsuka in the late 1890s. That, in turn, was superseded by a totalitarian ideology centered on the emperor: an ideology advanced by the political theorists Uesugi Shinkichi and Kakehi Katsuhiko in the 1910s and 1920s. Examining the connections between various forms of Shintō nationalism and the state, Skya demonstrates that where the Meiji oligarchs had constructed a quasi-religious, quasi-secular state, Hozumi Yatsuka desired a traditional theocratic state. Uesugi Shinkichi and Kakehi Katsuhiko went further, encouraging radical, militant forms of extreme religious nationalism. Skya suggests that the creeping democracy and secularization of Japan’s political order in the early twentieth century were the principal causes of the terrorism of the 1930s, which ultimately led to a holy war against Western civilization.

Japan was a party to the Axis Alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. However, it ignored repeated German demands to harm the 40,000 Jews who found themselves under Japanese occupation during World War Two. This book attempts to answer why they behaved in a relatively humane fashion towards the Jews.