How much time is twenty years? Long enough to inspire, or short enough to be unnoticeable? Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ) was published for the first time in February 2002. We are celebrating its 20th anniversary with this issue. While much has changed since then, we believe the values that guide TPQ are as relevant and important as ever. There was then and there is now a chance for us all to contribute to a better world. TPQ has always adhered to and will continue to adhere to this ideal. In return, its global audiences have relied on TPQ since the very first day to provide them with credible, balanced, inter-disciplinary, and independent coverage. TPQ's evolution has been complex, involving constant efforts to understand new technologies and redefine fundamental concepts within the realm of policy. Over the last two decades, TPQ faced numerous challenges as the world experienced devastating depressions, wars, and economic and cultural changes as it became widely regarded as an influential journal. This really had nothing to do with luck. TPQ team and our great contributing writers have always been accountable for making TPQ's stories come alive. Yet, the question remains as to how long, or short, twenty years actually is. It wasn't difficult to choose the focus of TPQ’s 80th issue. Artificial intelligence has fast become part of everyday life, and we wanted to understand how it fits into democratic values. It was important for us to ask how we can ensure that AI and digital policies will promote broad social inclusion, which relies on fundamental rights, democratic institutions, and the rule of law. There seems to be no shortage of principles and concepts that support the fair and responsible use of AI systems, yet it's difficult to determine how to efficiently manage or deploy those systems today. Merve Hickok and Marc Rotenberg, two TPQ Advisory Board members, wrote the lead article for this issue. In a world where data means power, vast amounts of data are collected every day by both private companies and government agencies, which then use this data to fuel complex systems for automated decision-making now broadly described as “Artificial Intelligence.” Activities managed with these AI systems range from policing to military, to access to public services and resources such as benefits, education, and employment. The expected benefits from having national talent, capacity, and capabilities to develop and deploy these systems also drive a lot of national governments to prioritize AI and digital policies. A crucial question for policymakers is how to reap the benefits while reducing the negative impacts of these sociotechnical systems on society. Gabriela Ramos, Assistant Director-General for Social and Human Sciences of UNESCO, has written an article entitled "Ethics of AI and Democracy: UNESCO's Recommendation's Insights". In her article, she discusses how artificial intelligence (AI) can affect democracy. The article discusses the ways in which Artificial Intelligence is affecting democratic processes, democratic values, and the political and social behavior of citizens. The article notes that the use of artificial intelligence, and its potential abuse by some government entities, as well as by big private corporations, poses a serious threat to rights-based democratic institutions, processes, and norms. UNESCO announced a remarkable consensus agreement among 193 member states creating the first-ever global standard on the ethics of AI that could serve as a blueprint for national AI legislation and a global AI ethics benchmark. Paul Nemitz, Principal Adviser on Justice Policy at the EU Commission, addresses the question of what drives democracy. In his view, technology has undoubtedly shaped democracy. However, technology as well as legal rules regarding technology have shaped and have been shaped by democracy. This is why he says it is essential to develop and use technology according to democratic principles. He writes that there are libertarians today who purposefully design technological systems in such a way that challenges democratic control. It is, however, clear that there is enough counterpower and engagement, at least in Europe, to keep democracy functioning, as long as we work together to create rules that are sensible for democracy's future and confirm democracy's supremacy over technology and business interests. Research associate at the University of Oxford and Professor at European University Cyprus, Paul Timmers, writes about how AI challenges sovereignty and democracy. AI is wonderful. AI is scary. AI is the path to paradise. AI is the path to hell. What do we make of these contradictory images when, in a world of AI, we seek to both protect sovereignty and respect democratic values? Neither a techno-utopian nor a dystopian view of AI is helpful. The direction of travel must be global guidance and national or regional AI law that stresses end-to-end accountability and AI transparency, while recognizing practical and fundamental limits. Tania Sourdin, Dean of Newcastle Law School, Australia, asks: what if judges were replaced by AI? She believes that although AI will increasingly be used to support judges when making decisions in most jurisdictions, there will also be attempts over the next decade to totally replace judges with AI. Increasingly, we are seeing a shift towards Judge AI, and to a certain extent we are seeing shifts towards supporting Judge AI, which raises concerns related to democratic values, structures, and what judicial independence means. The reason for this may be partly due to the systems used being set up to support a legal interpretation that fails to allow for a nuanced and contextual view of the law. Pam Dixon, Executive Director of the World Privacy Forum, writes about biometric technologies. She says that biometric technologies encompass many types, or modalities, of biometrics today, such as face recognition, iris recognition, fingerprint recognition, and DNA recognition, both separately and in combination. A growing body of law and regulations seeks to mitigate the risks associated with biometric technologies as they are increasingly understood as a technology of concern based on scientific data. We invite you to learn more about how our world is changing. As a way to honor this milestone, we have assembled a list of articles from around the world from some of the best experts in their field. This issue would not be possible without the assistance of many people. In addition to the contributing authors, there were many other individuals who contributed greatly. TPQ's team is proud to present you with this edition.

Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, or the BRICS nations, are living proof of how power and influence are constantly changing in the world's politics and economy. Redefining their positions within the global system and laying the groundwork for a multilateral world order that aims to challenge the traditional dominance of Western economies and institutions, the BRICS countries have been active since the acronym was coined in the early 21st century and expanded to include South Africa in 2010. Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Argentina, Bolivia, Indonesia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Cuba, Gabon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Comoros, and Kazakhstan are among the more than 40 nations that have shown interest in becoming BRICS members. Now, after a huge expansion, the BRICS has grown into a more formidable club of nations with the recent addition of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE. Also, Saudi Arabia is still working on becoming a full member, even though Javier Milei, Argentina's newly elected president, turned down the invitation. Given that BRICS now includes over 40 percent of the world's population and 25 percent of the world's economy, it's easy to see why the organization is so essential to be better understood. Given this, the purpose of this TPQ special issue is to delve into the background, reality, and future prospects of the BRICS as well as the various reasons and motivations behind the accession of its member states.

As part of a new series of debates we hope to ignite on the evolving world order, TPQ’s Winter 2020/21 edition explores the question of how the US’s changing role amid ongoing tensions with global powers will shape the upcoming decade. Topics such as the Trump administration’s domestic and foreign policy decisions and its reflections on the global stage, as well as where post-9/11 American cultural values and principles stand today are discussed. This unique edition marks the first of discussions that we look forward to stimulating across our platform on where the US—and the liberal international order—is headed. Headlining this special issue, James Franklin Jeffrey, Chair of the Middle East program at Wilson Center, writes on the US’s foreign policy in the Middle East, in particular the Trump administration’s unique approach to the region. As a result of the success of the Trump administration’s strategies which focused on near peer competition and reliance on partners and allies, Ambassador Jeffrey argues that, with the exception of the Iranian nuclear file, the Middle East looks more secure now than it did at the end of the Obama administration. The question now is whether the Biden administration can expand on this success or return to the Obama administration’s now obsolete policies, he concludes. We extend our deepest thanks to our Advisory Board member Ambassador Jeffrey, as we are particularly honored to have had the opportunity to feature his views in this issue. In the first part of a special two-part contribution, TPQ’s Publisher, Kemal Köprülü, provides an intricate analysis of the US’s inner decay from a personal as well as professional standpoint. While reflecting on the US presidential election season, the demise of objective American media, and the year 2020 as a whole, Köprülü dives deep into systemic issues such as a lack of accountability that continue to plague the American political system. Noting that the US is in deep trouble, Köprülü asserts that the US needs to restructure its system with first and foremost transparency, accountability, political ethics, and the rule of law. Despite American fatigue with involvement in overseas wars, Assal Rad, Senior Research Fellow at the National Iranian American Council, writes that American leaders have continued to intervene abroad. It is within this context, Rad argues, the Obama administration’s efforts to broker a deal with Iran must be analyzed. After four years of attempts by President Trump to undermine these efforts, Rad concludes that the US is at a crossroads: the Biden administration can now either use its power to spearhead a renewed sense of global diplomacy by reviving the JCPOA, or use its power to trigger further conflict.

Since the early 2000s, almost every great, middle and even small power has developed a tendency to deepen their relations in the Asia-Pacific region. This tendency is also valid regarding international and regional organizations. In addition to state actors, non-state and even sub-state actors have assigned a certain value to this region in their strategic calculations. With such a tilt, Asia-Pacific actors have become a focal point of global politics. The increasing significance of the region has been boosted by the rising Asian powers, such as China, India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and Indonesia. With all this dynamism, extra-regional actors have increased their economic, political, strategic, and cultural investments in Asia-Pacific. This rise in the region’s multileveled value has led regionalism-oriented IR researchers to develop the concept of the Asian Century. Türkiye has a peculiar position and significance in this regard combining the West and the non-West in many respects. Unlike the Cold War and early-post Cold War times, the world, especially the Asia-Pacific “world” is not composed of only two vectors, the West and the non-West, but several spanning into a variety of directions. This multi-vectorial reality of inter-non/-state affairs fits into Türkiye’s ambitions in its foreign policy. The Cold War label of Türkiye, i.e., the staunch ally of the West, is no longer completely valid. Türkiye of today is much more than that. The Western alliance is only an aspect of Türkiye whose substance has been amalgamated by Ankara’s developing relations with other regions and sub-regions of the globe including Asia-Pacific. Türkiye’s search for political-strategic clout in other regions has led Ankara to conceptualize and announce the most comprehensive and official foreign policy approach towards the Asia-Pacific region yet, known as the Asia Anew Initiative. This shows that Türkiye is not an exception to the above-stated powers that gave this region a central place in their strategic calculations. The initiative is predominantly multifaceted at its core, which aims to eliminate the asymmetries between Türkiye and Asian actors in both strategic and commercial terms. By increasing the engagement and cooperation with these actors, Türkiye aims to utilize its advantage in the sectors that it has considerable advantages in, such as tourism, conventional defense technology, and construction together with the ones in which it has emerging improvement, such as high-tech, finance, infrastructure, and energy transport. Türkiye’s additional connotation regarding Asia-Pacific is in geocultural terms. Due to its historical and religious background, Türkiye has many ties with Pakistan, Bangladesh, South Korea, Muslim communities of India, and to an extent Afghanistan. This has been an important channel that Turkish state and non-state actors have experienced in deepening their relations in the region. Türkiye’s soft power and diplomacy have also utilized such cultural affinity. Links tracing back to the 15th century of the Ottoman era has aided Türkiye’s influence in South and Southeast Asia. A clear empirical indication of such influence is the popularity of Turkish culture/history-oriented television serials within these communities. Thus, geocultural impact not only boosts Türkiye’s visibility and weight in the region but also helps it to be relevant in the non-Western and multiple directional vectors of the Asia-Pacific politico-economic fabric. An additional element of Türkiye’s engagement in the region is that it tries to utilize almost any type of “-lateralism.” i.e., multilateralism, minilateralism, and bilateralism. Ankara is trying to be a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and has put forward its intention to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It has also created MIKTA, a transregional partnership grouping, with its like-minded partners from the region. More importantly, it has been developing a whole range of bilateralisms with Asia-Pacific countries regardless of their power statuses. Another very significant element of Türkiye’s engagement with the region is its focus on Asia-Pacific communities. Various Turkish state institutions, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), and the Türkiye scholarships program of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) have been developing Türkiye’s people-to-people links through strategic and sustainable communication and promoting the country’s national brand. Although there is an obvious increase in Türkiye’s engagement with Asia-Pacific it is still early to assert its prominence in the region. However, this is not only a result of Türkiye’s current capabilities but the parameters of competition that must be navigated, with the global powers competing and cooperating in the region. Türkiye in this sense would require more cooperative patterns with like-minded powers, to increase its influence and boost its partners’ strength. Asia-Pacific is not a hassle-free region and currently Türkiye has a limited impact in this challenging ecosystem. On the other hand, developing multifaceted relations, especially with culturally and historically proximate sub-regions, will increase Türkiye’s visibility and impact. With the above-stated awareness and engagements, Türkiye’s visibility and economic significance in the Asia-Pacific will significantly increase over time. One very formidable catalyst for this would be its cultural and historical ties with Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, which have already been transforming into commercial and political-strategic outcomes. The current edition of Insight Turkey is dedicated to the exploration of bilateral relations between Türkiye and Far Eastern countries, within the context of the Asia Anew Initiative. The winter issue features a commentary and six research articles on this subject, providing a comprehensive analysis of the topic. Moreover, the issue includes four off-topic comments and two research articles that lie outside the main theme. Among these, two articles shed light on the current Gaza genocide, ongoing since October 7. The commentary section opens with a perceptive analysis by Nuh Yılmaz on Türkiye’s foreign policy toward Asia. In his commentary, Yılmaz examines Türkiye’s general perspective on the Asian continent and discusses the basic dynamics of the initiative. According to his analysis, there has been a significant shift in the global balance of power, with Atlantic Asia emerging as a rising force in, politics, military, culture, and especially in economy. This transformation of the Asian continent prompted Türkiye to launch the Asia Anew Initiative in 2019, which presents a comprehensive and systematic vision for Asia. Yılmaz delves into Türkiye’s general perspective on the Asian continent and the key dynamics of this initiative. Furthermore, the initial research article, authored by Gürol Baba as the guest editor, centers on Türkiye’s strategies and its Asia Anew Initiative. Through his work, Baba endeavors to illustrate that within the Asian framework, Türkiye has the capability to not only be pragmatic but also achieve efficiency by implementing a diverse foreign policy approach. He argues that Türkiye’s application of multi-vectorism to its foreign policy in Asia is more successful than multilateralism or minilateralism policies. This is because there is much more than the two traditional vectors (West and non-West) due to the current intra-regional fragmentations and deviations in Asia. Baba embodied the success of bilateral relations in Asia by giving examples from some countries. Following Baba’s outline of Türkiye’s approach to its Asian policy, the second research article, penned by Mujib Alam, delves into the complex nature of Türkiye-India relations between 2000 and 2023. Alam’s analysis spans diplomatic, economic, scientific, and cultural exchanges, offering a comprehensive view of their bilateral engagements. Despite different stances on issues such as Kashmir and Cyprus, Alam points out a trend towards improvement in relations, especially economic relations and cultural exchanges, driven by the foreign policy trends of the ruling parties of the two countries. The third research article by Kohei Imai examines the bilateral relations between Türkiye and Japan, which will soon celebrate their 100th anniversary in 2024. Imai delves into the historical relationship between the two nations, which while positive, lacked a tangible cooperative partnership. He carefully considers the diplomatic challenges and public perspectives that Japan encounters, and identifies opportunities for both countries to pursue more practical collaborations moving forward. In the next research article, Alaeddin Tekin and Arshad Islam focus on Malaysia, shedding light on Türkiye’s relationship with another Southeast Asian country. In research articles based on primary sources, including Ottoman and Turkish archives as well as Bahasa Melayu and English materials, Tekin and Islam aim to investigate historical and current relations between Turks and Malays. Another research article on the subject, written by Yunhee Kim, tries to examine veteran diplomacy through the example of Türkiye and draws from the different historical examples of the Korean War. Claiming that veteran diplomacy can be used as an opportunity to expand South Korea’s soft power in the new public diplomacy era of the 21st century, Kim also argues that this diplomacy paves the way for security cooperation in the context of Türkiye-South Korea relations. Ali Akkemik, who deals with Türkiye’s relations with East Asia from the economic dimension, in the next research article, states that their economic relations have undergone a significant structural change in the last twenty years. According to Akkemik, while Japan previously dominated Türkiye’s trade with East Asia and the flow of direct foreign investment from East Asia to Türkiye, recently, both South Korea and China have surpassed Japan as Türkiye’s main trading partners in East Asia and have caught up with Japan in terms of foreign investments in Türkiye. Moreover, in this issue, we address the grave humanitarian crisis stemming from the conflict in Gaza. Specifically, two commentaries focus on the tragic events unfolding since October 7. Nkosi Zwelivelile Mandelsizwe Dalibhunga Mandela offers an analysis of South Africa’s response to Israel’s actions against the Palestinian people, focusing on their legal recourse at the International Court of Justice. He draws comparisons between Israel’s treatment of Palestinians and South Africa’s apartheid era, underscoring the deep ties of solidarity between these communities and the essential role of global unity, accountability, and concerted efforts in promoting justice and equality. Additionally, Norma Hashim provides a unique perspective by focusing on the plight of prisoners and hostages in Gaza, arguing that Palestinian prisoners are central to the narrative of the genocide initiated on October 7. She delves into their importance within the Palestinian national movement and shares the personal stories of some of these prisoners, highlighting their significance in the context of the ongoing crisis in Gaza. In other off-topic commentary, Sönmez Ateşoğlu has written a commentary as a continuation of the research article, “Economic Power and International Security,” he previously published in Insight Turkey. While Nancy Snow has provided a commentary in which she discusses the national brand of Japan, where she lived for many years. In his previously published research article, Ateşoğlu explains in detail the impact of economic power on international security and the connection between economic and military power, but claims that the security dimension is not sufficiently addressed. Therefore, in this commentary, the author aims to explain the impact of military power on international security, especially in the context of Türkiye, and how a state can achieve its security goals by using military force. On the other hand, Nancy Snow explores the evolution of Japan’s national brand, analyzing the transition from historical isolation to its current global recognition, especially under the influence of Shinzo Abe’s policies. The winter issue broadens its scope with two research articles that venture beyond the main theme. Blerim Sallahu’s contribution opens this segment with an in-depth exploration of the modalities for acquiring citizenship in Kosovo. Following this, Kemal İnat and Burhanettin Duran assess the Ukrainian war’s profound repercussions on the global order, scrutinizing the intricate position and consequential influence of Türkiye –situated uniquely as both a neighbor to Russia and an ally of the U.S.– within this complex geopolitical landscape. This latest special edition of Insight Turkey meticulously explores the evolving dynamics of Türkiye’s engagement with East Asia under the ambit of the Asia Anew Initiative. This edition is distinguished by a series of foundational articles that provide a thorough overview of the initiative, alongside in-depth analyses of Türkiye’s bilateral relationships with key Asian nations. We trust that the comprehensive discussions and diverse perspectives presented in this issue will offer our readers valuable insights and deepen their understanding of the intricate geopolitical landscape.

Turkey’s Neo-Ottomanist Moment, A Eurasianist Odyssey, is the most comprehensive account to date of the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy related to its regime change. With first-hand knowledge, Cengiz Çandar tells the story of the emergence of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s revisionist Turkey in global affairs. References from almost 90 different names from around 20 countries, he also reflects how the international expertise on Turkey viewed Turkey. “Cengiz Çandar has written a thought provoking and tremendously insightful book on contemporary Turkish foreign policy rooted in a deep understanding of Turkish history and politics. Çandar’s insights are grounded in experiences as a journalist and foreign policy advisor. This book goes a long way to explain Turkey’s strident foreign policy today. It is a wonderfully informative and enjoyable read!” - Lenore G. Martin, Co-Chair of the Study Group on Modern Turkey, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, USA “No one better understands and explains “Neo-Ottomanism” than Cengiz Çandar, who coined the term almost 30 years ago, long before it became a fashionable concept capturing the evolution of Turkish foreign policy. And very few writers can so beautifully weave professional insights, objective analysis and anecdotal flair. By transcending easy clichés and lazy analogies, Çandar has produced a definitive account. If you could only read one book on Turkish foreign policy , this is it.” - Ömer Taşpınar, ProfessorNational War College and The Johns Hopkins University (SAIS), USA “In his new book, Turkey’s Neo-Ottomanist Moment: A Eurasianist Odyssey, Cengiz Çandar, a veteran foreign policy analyst, advances a lucid explanation of his country’s increasingly assertive behavior. His seemingly paradoxical conclusion is aptly encapsulated in the book’s title. Çandar’s book is an intellectual tour de force and a must-read for anyone interested in the intertwined problem of contemporary Turkey’s identity and foreign policy.” - Igor Torbakov, Historian, former research scholar at the Russian Academy of Sciences. CONTENTS Preface A Revisionist Power on the International Stage The World’s Pandemic Year, Turkey’s Year of Belligerence Turkey: The Country to Watch Neo-Ottomanism: A Controversy A Kaleidoscope of Hostility Contestation Nostalgia or Restoring Imperial Glory Neo-Ottomanism: A Metamorphosis (From Özal to Erdoğan via Davutoğlu) Genesis of Neo-Ottomanism The Contours of Özalian Neo-Ottomanism Davutoğlu: Neo-Ottomanist or Not? Turkey-Centred Islamism or Arab Revenge on Turkey Davutoğlu versus Özal: Prelude to Erdoğan From Obscure Islamist Scholar to High-Profile Strategist “Shamgen” versus Schengen Neo-Ottomans versus Neo-Safavids Arab Spring, the Game Changer From Zero Problems with Neighbours to No Neighbours without Problems Sunni-Sectarian and Anti-Kurdish Impulses Turkey in Syria, Eurasianism in Action Erdoğanist Neo-Ottomanism in Play The Eurasianist Diversion: Turkey Marches to Syria Syria: The First Move on the Neo-Ottomanist Chessboard Blue Homeland: Turkish Mare Nostrum (Reaching North Africa, Gunboat Diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean) Expanding to Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean Interconnection Turkey and Greece: Dispute on Maritime Delimitation and EEZ’s Greek Resentment, German “Appeasement” Reasonable Propositions for Maritime Delimitation Blue Homeland: Turkish Maritime Claims Larger than Sweden Blue Homeland: “Eurasianism versus the Imperialist Powers of the West and Greece” In Russia’s Backyard: Turkey in the South Caucasus Turkey’s Entry into Russia’s “Near Abroad” Timid Turkey 1992: Assertive Turkey 2020–2021 Dual Corridor or the Road to Central Asia and China Competitive Cooperation or Adverserial Collaboration with Russia Erdoğan and Putin: Observing Realpolitik First Turkish Military Presence in Caucasus in over a Century Neo-Ottomanist Turkey: For How Long? Wars Cost Money Turkey: A “Sick Man” That Never Was Overturning Conventional History The Reckoning Searching for New Geopolitical Axes in a Multipolar World Turkey’s Hostile Dance with the West Differing Views on China and Russia The Old Overlord in the New Middle East Great Power Rivalries of the “Second Cold War” The Black Sea Dilemma The Uyghur Case: Moral Bankruptcy of Turkish Nationalism and Eurasianism CREDITS: Cover design by Nihal Yazgan PRODUCT DETAILS: ISBN: 978-1-80135-044-0 (Print) ISBN: 978-1-80135-049-5 (Digital) Publisher: Transnational Press London Published: 25 August 2021 Language: English Pages: 198 Binding: Paperback Interior Ink: Black & white Weight (approx.): 0.5 kg Dimensions (approx.): 15cm wide x 23cm tall

On May 14, 2023, Türkiye will hold both the presidential and the parliamentarian elections, in which the Turkish people will choose the president and all 600 members of the Turkish Parliament. This will be the second elections since the transition to the presidential system in 2017. After the first elections, held in June 2018, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected as the first president of the new governmental system, and AK Party received more than 42 percent of the total votes, winning almost half of the seats in parliament. As in the first elections, two major political blocs will compete, namely, the People’s Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı) and the Nation Alliance (Millet İttifakı). The People’s Alliance bloc consists of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AK Party) led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) led by Devlet Bahçeli, the Great Unity Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi, BBP) led by Mustafa Destici, the New Welfare Party (Yeniden Refah Partisi, YRP) led by Fatih Erbakan and the Free Cause Party (Hür Dava Partisi, HÜDA-PAR) led by Zekeriya Yapıcıoğlu. The second political bloc, the Nation Alliance also known as the Table of Six (Altılı Masa), is made up of six-plus-one political parties. The alliance, which was initially formed in May 2018 by four political parties, now consists of six parties, while one party supports the bloc from outside. The Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) led by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and the Good Party (İyi Parti, İP) led by Meral Akşener are the two main allies. They were/are officially supported by four smaller political parties. The Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) led by Gültekin Uysal represents the center right, while the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) led by Temel Karamollaoğlu is the continuation of Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamic political tradition. The two additional political parties, the Future Party (Gelecek Partisi, GP) led by Ahmet Davutoğlu and the Democracy and Progress Party (Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi, DEVA Party) led by Ali Babacan are breakaway groups from the ruling AK Party. They have recently joined the Nation Alliance in an attempt to overthrow the ruling party, which has been in power for the last two decades. In addition to these six political parties, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP) led by Pervin Buldan and Mithat Sancar, also supports the Nation Alliance. However, it did not become an official partner of the Nation Alliance, since some partners of the alliance, most notably the İP, generally representing the secular Turkish nationalists, oppose the alliance with HDP due to its close connections with PKK. Therefore, although HDP has declared its support for the candidacy of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, it has not joined the alliance. It has become obvious that two political alliances will dominate the election process, therefore there are effectively only two main presidential candidates. While the People’s Alliance has nominated Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Nation Alliance has nominated Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu for the presidential post. Concurrently, there are two additional candidates, Muharrem İnce and Sinan Oğan, supported by other small political parties that will no doubt influence the election results, however they are not expected to get more than a small percentage of the vote. The two opposing and conflicting political blocs represent an almost absolute mutual exclusive perspective about the future of Türkiye and the politics of the country, reflecting the increasing polarization of Turkish politics. These two alliances have two opposite and conflictual perspectives of Türkiye. The People’s Alliance emerged as a consequence of a domestic stance against the attacks Türkiye faced after the bloody coup attempt by FETÖ on July 15, 2016, which led to many major changes in the country. The alliance aims to maintain the current government, to consolidate the current presidential system, to continue the country’s transformation program, to protect the country against both internal and external threats, to increase its deterrent military power, to strengthen its economic development, and to globalize its diplomatic power. The Nation Alliance, on the other hand, was formed as a reaction to the People’s Alliance, since no one political party was/is able to challenge the power of AK Party and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The alliance is determined to reverse the course of politics in the country and to reverse many of the changes made by the AK Party governments. It claims that if it wins the elections, it will initiate a process of restoration, revive the old political system, change the regime, revive the old, and turn to the status quo ante. However, the Nation Alliance is quite a vulnerable and fractured opposition bloc. It seems that while the Nation Alliance agrees on what it does not want, specifically the rule of the AK Party, the bloc does not know what it wants instead. There is no real consensus among the fragmented opposition parties about the future of the country. Not only do different political parties expect different developments, even different wings within certain political parties make different suggestions. For example, some officials of the biggest partner of the Nation Alliance, the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), has declared that they will apologize (helalleşmek) to certain mistreated groups such as the women who were excluded from education and work because they chose to wear Islamic clothing. On the other hand, some other representatives and supporters emphasize that they will take revenge (hesaplaşmak) against other groups close to AK Party. Another important event that reflects the division within and the brittleness of the Nation Alliance is related to the announcement of their presidential candidate. Not only did it take more than ten meetings and several months for them to decide, but at the end of the process, the leader of İP, Akşener, left the block as she (and her party) did not approve the candidacy of Kılıçdaroğlu. Nevertheless, she came back to the table just one day later accepting Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy but adding two new names, Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş, CHP mayors of İstanbul and Ankara respectively, to the existing five vice-presidents. Indeed, for a long time, Akşener had been campaigning that one of these two men be selected for the presidential candidacy. The upcoming elections, which are held on the centennial anniversary of the Turkish Republic, put Türkiye at an important crossroads. It seems that two conflictual perspectives, the bloc that supports the consolidation of the presidential system and the bloc that supports a regime change, will collide. While the People’s Alliance emphasize autonomy in foreign policy and seeks to achieve regional leadership, the Nation Alliance promote an inward-looking political system and withdrawal from regional issues. Whatever the position of the bloc, one thing is for sure: The Turkish people want a strong leadership in foreign policy during this crucial global transition period. The turnout in Turkish elections is relatively high, generally over 80 percent, which is one of the highest in the world. Considering the politicization in the people’s daily lives, political polarization and the harsh political dialogue, it seems that the turnout in the upcoming elections will be even higher. Furthermore, the earthquake disaster of February 6 has further exacerbated and aroused the political fault lines. However, at the end of this high level of democratic competition and turnout in elections, Turkish democracy will be the winner, and it will be consolidated. Taking into consideration these developments and the importance of the elections -not only for Türkiye but for the regional and global affairs as well- this issue of Insight Turkey tackles some of the most important and determinative topics influencing the results. Disinformation has been one of the most noticeable ramifications we are experiencing of the digital revolution. At the same time, Türkiye, situated in a geopolitical hotspot, is one of the countries that is both a target and a hub of disinformation campaigns in the region. Within this context, Fahrettin Altun, the Presidency Communications Director has penned a commentary addressing misinformation and disinformation with a special focus on Türkiye and the initiatives undertaken by Communication Directorate. Within the same line of thought, Yenal Göksun provides an overview of Türkiye’s strategic communication policy and evolution of the Turkish communication model and the current strategic communication initiatives undertaken by the Directorate of Communications. According to Göksun, Türkiye’s evolving development and foreign policy agenda, which has developed rapidly in the last 20 years, has pushed it to undertake more ambitious efforts in the field of communication and public diplomacy, and as a result, innovations have been made in strategic communication policies. Turning to one of the most discussed issues in recent years in Türkiye’s politics, Cem Duran Uzun focuses on the country’s presidential system and the different government systems proposed by various parties before the 2023 elections. He specifically focuses on the differences between the U.S. presidential system and Türkiye’s administrative system, which overhauled its political system in 2017 and replaced the parliamentary system with a Turkish-style presidential system. Following up, Hamit Emrah Beriş evaluates the key issues in Turkish politics before the 2023 elections. Beriş argues that the 2023 elections are one of the most important in Türkiye’s history and four main topics determined the fate of the elections: refugees, the economy, rising nationalism, and the Kurdish question. The author focuses on serious differences of opinion between the ruling and opposition blocs on the solution to these problems. According to Beriş, the 2023 elections will show whether the approaches of the ruling or opposition wing are in line with the expectations of Turkish society. In our next research article, Ravza Altuntaş Çakır aims to investigate the relationship between ethnic Muslim minority identity and transnational Muslim solidarity, with emphasis on HÜDA-PAR, the most organized political Islamic organization and the second largest political party in Southeast Türkiye. In her paper, Çakır examines how the concept of ummah motivates the party’s domestic/ideological, national and transnational political discourses and initiatives, and also deals with the uncertainties that a mostly abstract and idealist ummahist approach to modern politics brings in the face of Kurdish nationalism, regional realpolitik, and democratic pluralism. As mentioned previously, refugees are another important issue for the forthcoming elections. In that respect, the article by Hatice Karahan and Öznur Gülen Ertosun examines the various dynamics that Syrian women under temporary protection face in the labor market in Türkiye. Technology has become a driving force in the global affairs and Türkiye has been taking all the necessary steps to take advantage of new developments. Within this line of thought, Serdal Temel in his commentary argues that Türkiye, an emerging economy, has been attempting to improve its socioeconomic strength through the promotion of research and development (R&D), innovation, and technological development activities. The author underlines that since the 2000s, the government has implemented support programs focused on developing the innovation capacity of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and universities, and emphasizes that these programs are diversified as support for ecosystem improvements as well as support for patenting, commercialization and entrepreneurship. In another article, Nurettin Akçay and Guo Changgang, discuss China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Türkiye’s Middle Corridor (MC) projects, which have a common goal of connecting Europe and Asia, as well as facilitating commercial, economic, political and socio-cultural interactions between the two continents. In this commentary, which aims to examine the history, objectives and stages of Türkiye’s MC, Akçay and Changgang harmonizes the BRI with the MC and examines the inherent risks and challenges of integration as well as opportunities for the region. Our final commentary by Şafak Oğuz, analyzes the possible consequences of the F-35 fighter crisis between the U.S. and Türkiye, particularly in terms of its effect on the tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) deployed in Türkiye as part of NATO’s nuclear sharing program. Three off-topic research articles enrich the scope of our special issue. Eldar Hasanoğlu and Oğuzhan Çağlıyan investigate, with the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, how the Israeli diplomacy initiative took on greater importance in maintaining its presence and reputation internationally. In their article, the authors analyze Israel’s approach to COVID-19 diplomacy, which involved providing medical teams, PPE, and surplus vaccines to approximately 20 countries, and examine the political and strategic calculations behind Israel’s decision to extend assistance to specific countries. Focusing on the religious conflicts in Kashmir, Resul Yalçın and Umair Gul seek to try to contextualize the search for the “secular” while examining the construction of Muslim identity, the institution of martyrdom, and its social basis in Kashmir. They define Kashmir as a festering political problem receiving little global attention. Lastly, Bashkim Rrahmani and Majlinda Belegu focus on the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue. They discuss the important issues linked with the dialogue that is being facilitated and negotiated by the EU, including essential activities, challenges, obstacles, antagonisms, the approach the EU facilitators/mediators undertake, as well as the reaction and the expected results that the parties involved in the process have regarding reaching a final solution to the dispute. As Türkiye is on the eve on one of the most important elections in its history, this issue of Insight Turkey addresses some of the issues that have been dominating the political agenda lately. Through this issue, we hope to provide our readers with a thorough analysis and the necessary foundations for a better understanding of some of the main issues that will influence the outcome of the May 14 elections.

Survival, the IISS’s bimonthly journal, challenges conventional wisdom and brings fresh, often controversial, perspectives on strategic issues of the moment. In this issue: Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry argue that liberal internationalism is more appropriate to contemporary global realities than the Quincy-coalition restraint James Crabtree explains why the West’s Build Back Better World partnership will be hard-pressed to compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative Joelien Pretorius and Tom Sauer contend that if states are serious about nuclear disarmament, they should ditch the NPT and join the Ban Treaty instead Sameer Lalwani and Tyler Sagerstrom analyse what the India–Russia defence partnership means for US policy And eight more thought-provoking pieces, as well as our regular Book Reviews and Noteworthy column. Editor: Dr Dana Allin Managing Editor: Jonathan Stevenson Associate Editor: Carolyn West Assistant Editor: Jessica Watson

After being the focal point of the regional and global power competition for centuries, the Eastern Mediterranean region has recently re-emerged as a point of convergence in international politics. Over the last two decades, especially, many regional and global powers have begun to develop strategies toward the Eastern Mediterranean leading to a fierce rivalry amongst them. There are several reasons for the increase in the political, strategic, and economic importance of the region. However, four are especially noteworthy, and while two are long-standing factors, there are two significant novel developments that have contributed to the re-emergence of the strategic importance of the region. First, the main deep-seated reason stems from its geostrategic and geopolitical importance. The Eastern Mediterranean hosts some of the most strategic seaways in the world, such as the Suez Canal and the Turkish Straits. While the Suez Canal has served as the main sea passage bridging the East to the West since its opening in 1869, the Turkish Straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles) has for centuries connected the Black Sea with the Mediterranean Sea and so the Atlantic Ocean. Second, due to its strategic importance the Eastern Mediterranean region has always been one of the most penetrated regions in the world. Many global and regional powers such as the U.S., Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Turkey, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt and Saudi Arabia continue to intervene into regional affairs resulting in power struggles. While the U.S. is trying to maintain its superiority in the region following the Cold War period, Russia aims to reach the warm seas, its long-time strategic objective. On the other hand, the UK, France, and Turkey are working to protect their historical and imperial links with the region. Starting with President Obama, the U.S. has followed a retrenchment policy which has resulted in power vacuums in different regions including the Eastern Mediterranean. Under these circumstances the Western-dominated regional system and political stability has changed dramatically, and the power vacuum created after the U.S. downsized its regional role is filled by many other challenger states. One of these states is Russia which seems to have settled itself into the region permanently. From now on, it will be quite difficult to extricate Russia from the region and without doubt it will continue to pose a threat from the south to European countries. China is another actor that has gained a foothold in the region lately by improving its relations with some regional countries and by investing in the control of significant seaports. Furthermore, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have also started trying to influence the regional balance of power. Consequently, all the cards are reshuffled in the Eastern Mediterranean and a new great game is underway in the region. Third, as the most significant novel development, the exploration of natural gas in the region has contributed to its geostrategic importance. Considered as one of the richest deposits with approximately 4.5 percent of the total natural gas reserves in the world, the Eastern Mediterranean has become of great interest to the energy market. The drilling activities performed to date show that essential portions of the reserves range from the Tamar and Leviathan gas fields, where the coasts of Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel meet, to the West Nile Delta field along the Egyptian coast. Within this framework, the regional and global powers have turned their attention to the region once again as the newly discovered rich energy resources have entered into the equation as a new parameter. Israel is the first state that discovered natural gas in Tamar (318 billion cubic meter) and Leviathan (605 billion cubic meter) fields and began to use and export it to other countries. Egypt and the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC) also discovered natural gas in the Zohr (850 billion cubic meter) field and Aphrodite (129 billion cubic meter) field, respectively. Furthermore, lately, a considerable amount of gas reserves was discovered in the Calypso and Glaucus fields located in the South of Cyprus. As new discoveries continue, other countries such as Turkey have been conducting offshore drilling activities to explore natural gas. All these activities have defrosted the longtime frozen problems of the region. The region is not rich only in terms of offshore natural gas reserves. It is known that some areas within the boundaries of Egypt and Libya are also rich in natural gas. Having the Wafa and Bouri gas fields, Libya is ranked 22nd in the world with around 1.5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves. Egypt ranks as 16th in the world, with the Zohr, West Nile Delta, and Atoll fields yielding a total of around 2.2 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. It must be said that the reason many global and regional players have become involved in the Libyan civil war is closely related to its abundant energy resources. Furthermore, it is important to state that the Eastern Mediterranean is quite rich in terms of crude oil as well. Considering onshore and offshore reserves together, the region possesses nearly 3.7 percent of the world’s total oil reserves with around 64 billion barrels discovered to date. Libya alone has nearly 3.2 percent of the world’s oil reserves, with roughly 48.4 billion barrels, and Egypt has around 3.3 billion barrels of known oil reserves. Fourth, besides the three protracted crises, namely the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the political crisis in Lebanon, and the Cyprus question, two more recent regional political issues, the Syrian and Libyan crises, have been attracting the attention of many regional and global powers. The external involvement of some new actors in these crises has led to a new power struggle. Turkey and Russia are the two main states that have increased their presence in the region lately by becoming the two main powers involved in the Syrian and Libyan crises. Needless to state, their military intervention in these crises has undermined the status of the traditional Western colonial powers, such as France. As a country that has the longest shores in the Eastern Mediterranean and as one of the main players in regional geopolitics, Turkey has begun to increase its military presence in the region in order to deter anti-Turkish developments. The geography has begun to occupy a critical role in Turkey’s political, security, and economic policies, and eventually has become one of the most featured parameters in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey’s regional policy is shaped by a number of factors. First of all, the Eastern Mediterranean has long-standing importance for Turkey, which has historical ties with almost all regional states. For centuries the region was ruled by Turkey’s predecessor, the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Turkey’s involvement in regional crises such as Libya, Syria, and Palestine can be partially explained by the historical ties between Turkey and these states. Second, the Eastern Mediterranean plays a crucial role in Turkey’s security and as a result Turkey’s foreign policy towards the region is highly shaped by its security concerns. Therefore, the policies of global powers such as the U.S., the European Union, and Russia towards the region are intrinsically linked to Turkey’s security. As all these actors pursue their own national interests, it has resulted in the U.S., EU, and Russia conflicting with Turkey’s policies and expectations in the region. This has become clear on issues such as the Cyprus problem and the attempts of the Greek side to sign international agreements regarding the maritime jurisdiction zones. Both of these developments aim at eliminating Turkey’s influence over the island and the region altogether. However, Turkey has made it clear that this is not something that it will accept, and has responded by signing agreements with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Libya, in 2011 and 2019 respectively. Third, the Eastern Mediterranean is critical both for its abundant energy resources and for the bilateral economic relations between Turkey and the countries of the region; therefore, the economy is another factor determining Turkish policy towards the region. Turkey, an energy-dependent country that expects to discover new resources in its continental shelf, considers the rich hydrocarbon potential of the region as an alternative source of meeting its energy demands. Turkey seeks to both decrease its foreign dependence on energy and to increase its trade, first with neighboring countries and then with the world. In this regard, when forming its Eastern Mediterranean policy, Turkey is, on the one hand, intensely searching for natural gas and oil on its continental shelf and following policies towards transferring the resources found in other countries’ maritime zones to the Western markets through Turkey, and, on the other hand, trying to improve its relations with the countries in the region. The developments that threaten Turkey’s economic and security interests have urged Ankara to a closer involvement with the region. Tensions have risen with Greece’s eagerness to give its islands maritime jurisdiction zones beyond their territorial waters, which will cut into Turkey’s continental shelf and the GASC’s licensing of maritime blocks to international companies for energy research activities. Violating the TRNC and Turkey’s rights, and, with the aim of making their illegal actions permanent, their signing of agreements in close cooperation with Israel, Egypt, and the U.S., as well as conducting joint military operations will not contribute to the resolution of the problems. Within this framework, this issue of Insight Turkey highlights different affairs regarding the Eastern Mediterranean region. A number of leading and well-known intellectuals and academicians have contributed to this issue focusing on political, legal, and energy dimensions of maritime tensions and the rise of a new geopolitics in the region. This issue includes pieces that look at the Eastern Mediterranean tensions through the lens of international law. Ayfer Erdoğan’s research article examines the legal and political dimensions of the disputes by analyzing the standpoints of the main actor’s in the region. Meanwhile, the commentary written by Sertaç Hami Başeren reviews their justifications with reference to international law, with particular reference to Turkey’s actions. Furthermore, based on the principle that maritime delimitation should be carried out to reach an equitable solution by taking all the relevant circumstances into account, Yücel Acer argues that Turkey has developed a comprehensive legal approach as to the maritime delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean and even submitted a map to the UN to demonstrate Turkey’s claimed continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) areas. While keeping up with the recent developments in the United States, Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney and Vişne Korkmaz’s research article examines how and why Washington has come to embrace the logic of ‘Alliance Axis’ to shape the Eastern Mediterranean and explores the projected impact of the U.S.-initiated Abraham Accords on regional geopolitics. Meanwhile, Muhammad Soliman Alzawawy’s commentary aims to forecast the route and different scenarios that the new American President Joe Biden will take in his foreign policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean region through investigating the content of his speeches and rhetoric before and shortly after taking office. Galip Emre Yıldırım highlights the stance of another actor in the region by arguing that France’s identification of Turkey as an ‘external enemy’ reflects the former’s political and economic concerns with regard to the Mediterranean gas reserves. Sohbet Karbuz gives an overview of the key commercial, technical, legal, and political challenges the East Mediterranean gas faces, with a critical eye and proposes possible ways to overcome them. Karbuz discusses the challenges facing the monetization of the discoveries by looking at both the commercial challenges hampering the exploration and field development activities and the technical challenges for exporting gas to the immediate and distant markets. In addition to these eight pieces focusing on the Eastern Mediterranean, there are some insightful manuscripts on a range of topics regarding the recent developments in the international political arena. With regard to the recent changes at the level of the white house, Inderjeet Parmar analyses President Donald Trump’s attempted coup. Parmar also questions the political will of the new President to extirpate Trumpism and white supremacy from the U.S. body politic. After three-and-a-half-years into the crisis that struck the heart of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Marwan Kabalan sheds light on how the 41st Gulf Summit in the Saudi city of al-Ula, brought the blockade of Qatar to an end. From our off-topic research articles, Nikolay Kozhanov tries to prove the importance of the economic factors for the current development of Russia’s relations with the Gulf States. He also assesses the prospects for continued economic cooperation between the GCC states and Moscow. Ramazan Erdağ’s article concludes this issue with a discussion on why Russia replaced the South Stream project with the TurkStream by changing its route and name, and why Turkey is involved in a project on the North-South line although it plays a vital role in the Trans-Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline Project in the southern gas corridor. While the importance of the region certainly is going to increase in the following years as more regional and global actors will be included in the power struggle, it is necessary to analyze and understand the issue from geopolitical, economic and legal standpoints. With that said, we are confident that this issue of Insight Turkey entitled “New Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean” will provide timely studies regarding the Turkish perspective on a complex and increasingly important issue in the global power struggle.

Presenting the Middle East peace process as an extension of US foreign policy, this book argues that ongoing interventions justified in the name of ‘peace’ sustain and reproduce hegemonic power. With an interdisciplinary approach, this book questions the conceptualisation and general understanding of the peace process. The author reinterprets regional conflict as an opportunity for the US through which it seeks to achieve regional dominance and control. Engaging with the different stages and components of the peace process, he considers economic, military and political factors which both changed over time and remained constant. This book covers the US role of mediation in the region during the Cold War, the history and present state of US-Israel relations, Syria’s reputation as an opponent of ‘peace’ compared with its participation in peace negotiations, and the Palestinian-Israel conflict with attention to US involvement. The End of the Middle East Peace Process will primarily be of interest to those hoping to gain an improved understanding of key issues, concepts and themes relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict and US intervention in the Middle East. It will also be of value to those with an interest in the practicalities of peacebuilding.

The book considers the main arms exporting countries, including China, Russia, and the US, as well as several European states, and the policies each employs in deciding advanced weapons sales to key regions of the world. It examines whether such sales are inherently stabilising or de-stabilising regarding regional security. Regions reviewed in detail include the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. Combat aircraft sales are a focus for the volume given both their practical and symbolic importance. The volume focuses on the behaviour and policies of the main arms exporting nations since the end of the Cold War, shifts in their arms export policies, and the tensions that can emerge within or between countries over proposed arms sales. It also considers the impact of countries that were previously only recipients of advanced weapons moving to develop their own defence industrial base.