As it became evident that the Allies were winning World War II, Turkish policy-makers struggled to achieve their objectives in the shifting circumstances of wartime diplomacy. Edward Weisband's detailed description of Turkish foreign policy from 1943 to 1945 reveals that it was complicated by the fact that its two principal aims dictated contradictory positions. The first aim was the priority of peace over expansionism—this implied a noninterventionist policy. On the other hand, the belief that the Soviet Union represented the primary threat to the security of the Republic often made intervention to contain Russia seem necessary for national defense. Turkish officials became determined to influence the postwar settlement towards an equilibrium among the great powers that would limit Soviet expansionism, which the Turks assumed they could not do alone. Consequently, they were among the first to envision the contours of the Cold War. After outlining the historical origins of the ideology that lay behind Turkish diplomacy, the first part of the book concentrates on the policy-making process in Ankara and assesses the relative influence of individual leaders and institutions. The second part analyzes both Turkey's responses to the exigencies of war and the general nature of small state diplomacy. Originally published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

An assessment of Turkey's wartime diplomacy and its role in preserving the nascent Turkish state.

A collection of German Foreign Office documents, now in possession of the Archives Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, relating to German policy in Turkey in the years 1941-1943.

The purpose of this thesis was to examine the role of the Iranian government from 1943 and the Turkish government from 1945 in their pursuits of economic and military aid from the U.S. government. The thesis examined the possibility that the U.S. foreign policy that became known as Containment was influenced by the Iranian and Turkish governments' description and interpretation of Soviet foreign policy. There is evidence to suggest that Iran and Turkey influenced U.S. strategic thinking. There is a need to further enhance our understanding of the origins of the Cold War by going beyond the simple construct of the U.S. versus the U.S.S.R.

The framework of Turkish foreign policy -- The defense aspect of Turkish foreign policy -- The Western connection of Turkish foreign policy -- The Eastern connection of Turkish foreign policy -- The Middle Eastern connection of Turkish foreign policy -- The Greek and Balkan connection of Turkish foreign policy -- The general appraisal of Turkish foreign policy -- Conclusion : the direction of Turkish foreign policy.

France and the Algerian War : strategy / Martin S. Alexander -- Operations and diplomacy / J.F.V. Keiger -- The French Army 'Centre for Training and Preparation in Counter-Gerrilla Warfare' (CIPCG) at Arzew / Frédéric Guelton -- A case of successful pacification : the 584th Bataillon du Train at Bordj de l'Agha (1956-57) / Alexander Zervoudakis -- Aerial intelligence during the Algerian War / Marie-Catherine Villatoux, Paul Villatoux -- The French Navy and the Algerian War / Bernard Estival-- The Gaullists, the French Army and Algeria before 1958 : common cause or marriage of convenience? / Stephen Tyre -- De Gaulle, the 'Anglo-Saxons' and the Algerian War / Irwin M. Wall -- France, the United States and the invisible Algerian outcome / Charles G. Cogan -- The British embassy in Paris and the Algerian War : an uncomfortable partner? / Christopher Goldsmith -- The British government and the end of French Algeria, 1958-62 / Martin Thomas.

Based on newly accessible Turkish archival documents, Onur Isci's study details the deterioration of diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union during World War II. Turkish-Russian relations have a long history of conflict. Under Ataturk relations improved – he was a master 'balancer' of the great powers. During the Second World War, however, relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union plunged to several degrees below zero, as Ottoman-era Russophobia began to take hold in Turkish elite circles. For the Russians, hostility was based on long-term apathy stemming from the enormous German investment in the Ottoman Empire; for the Turks, on the fear of Russian territorial ambitions. This book offers a new interpretation of how Russian foreign policy drove Turkey into a peculiar neutrality in the Second World War, and eventually into NATO. Onur Isci argues that this was a great reversal of Ataturk-era policies, and that it was the burden of history, not realpolitik, that caused the move to the west during the Second World War.

This book aims to take the reader on a journey along the intricate web of Turkish-American relations. It critically examines the process, during which the relations evolved from those of strangers into an occasionally troubled, yet resilient alliance. Through the extensive use of Turkish, American and British archival documents and numerous private paper and manuscript collections, the book examines Turkish-American relations from 1800 to 1952, starting with the earliest contacts and ending with the institutionalization of the alliance after Turkey’s entry into NATO. Its purpose is to provide a better understanding of the significant issues pertaining to Turkish-American relations such as the impact of international developments on foreign policy decisions, the role of key figures and organizations in shaping the relations, the interaction of political, economic, cultural and military factors in policy formation and the importance of mutual perceptions in shaping actual relations. The analysis also situates Turkish-American relations in the larger context of diplomatic history, through an evaluation of how the United States’ relations with Turkey fit into the general framework of American foreign policy and also through an examination of the conduct and changing priorities of Turkish foreign policy in this era. Such a study not only enhances our knowledge of Turkish-American relations for the period of 1800-1952, but also provides further insight into the relations during the Cold War and its aftermath.