Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008¿2013 reviews the experience of the FDIC during a period in which the agency was confronted with two interconnected and overlapping crises¿first, the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, and second, a banking crisis that began in 2008 and continued until 2013. The history examines the FDIC¿s response, contributes to an understanding of what occurred, and shares lessons from the agency¿s experience.

Two leading financial experts undercut the doomsayers and show how the recent turmoil in banks, S&Ls, Wall Street, junk bonds, and bad real estate loans are all symptoms of a more profound change and part of a massive global restructuring of America's financial institutions.

After an unprecedented number of banks suspended operations during the Panic of 1893, the head regulator of banks chartered by the United States government allowed about 100 banks to reopen after certifying their solvency. We evaluate whether actions by bank owners to change management, contract with depositors to extend liability maturity structure, write off bad assets, and/or inject capital affected bank survival and deposit retention. This historical episode is particularly informative because there was no expectation of government intervention. We find that contracting with depositors provided short-term benefits while dealing with bad assets was key for long-run viability.

One of the major financial market events of the 1980s was the precipitous rise of depository institution failures including banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions. Not since the 1930s has there been a similar period of turmoil in these industries. The events of the 1980s have inspired a renewed interest in the causes and cost of financial institution failure and several questions that had seldom been asked in the post-World War II economics literature have resurfaced Why do financial institutions fail? What are the costs of their failure? How do they differ from other firms and industries? What are the implications for financial market regulation? The Causes and Costs of Depository Institution Failures critically surveys and extends previous analyses of these questions. Audience: Scholars and researchers in the areas of money and banking, financial institutions, and financial markets, as well as regulators and policymakers.

On Oct. 3, 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act was signed into law. The act established the Office of Financial Stability (OFS) and authorized the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). This report reviews: (1) the activities that have been undertaken through TARP as of Nov. 25, 2008; (2) the structure of OFS, its use of contractors, and its system of internal controls; and (3) preliminary indicators of TARP¿s performance. Plans are to continue to monitor these and other issues including future and ongoing capital purchases, other transactions undertaken as part of TARP (e.g., capital purchases in Citigroup and AIG), and the status of other aspects of TARP. Includes recommendations. Tables and graphs.

Deals with the result of a study conducted by the FDIC on banking crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s. Examines the evolution of the processes used by FDIC and RTC to resolve banking problems, protect depositors and dispose of the assets of the failed institutions.

"A Brookings Institution Press and Nomura Institute of Capital Markets Research publication It has been four years since the financial crisis of 2008, and the global financial system still is experiencing malaise caused by high rates of unemployment; a lingering, unresolved supply of foreclosed properties; the deepening European debt crisis; and fear of a recurrence of the bank turmoil that brought about the Great Recession. All of these factors have led to stagnant economic growth worldwide. In Rocky Times, editors Yasuyuki Fuchita, Richard J. Herring, and Robert E. Litan bring together experts from academia and the banking sector to analyze the difficult issues surrounding troubled large financial institutions in an environment of economic uncertainty and growing public anger. Continuing the format of the previous Brookings-Nomura collaborations, Rocky Times focuses largely on developments within the United States and Japan but looks at those in other nations as well. This volume examines two broad areas: the Japanese approach to regulating financial institutions and promoting financial stability and the U.S. approach in light of the Dodd-Frank Act. Specific chapters include ""Managing Systemwide Financial Crises: Some Lessons from Japan since 1990,"" ""The Bankruptcy of Bankruptcy,"" ""The Case for Regulating the Shadow Banking System,"" ""Why and How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement,"" and ""Governance Issues for Macroprudential Policy in Advanced Economies."" Contributors: Gavin Bingham (Systemic Policy Partnership, London), Charles W. Calomiris (Columbia Business School), Douglas J. Elliott (Brookings Institution), Kei Kodachi (Nomura Institute of Capital Markets Research), Morgan Ricks (Vanderbilt Law School)."