Transcendental unity is a figure of thought of the Latin Middle Ages, which is indebted to Avicenna’s renewal of metaphysics and which is wrongly attributed to Aristotle. A specific interpretation of the demonstrable attribute determines the metaphysical reflection on ‘the one’ and turns it into a transcendental attribute of being. Notwithstanding the variety of epistemic constellations, however, this metaphysical relationship of being and unity always turns out to be a fundamental state of affairs. Transcendental unity identifies as a problem constellation, the principles of which are still effective in the critique of scholastic metaphysics in classical German philosophy.

Available on its own, or as part of a two-volume set, this German-English dictionary is the first comprehensive work in the field and an indispensible companion for students, academics, translators and linguists concerned with almost any area of philosophy.

Aus dem Inhalt: Die transzendentallogische Funktion des Ich (Klaus Hammacher). - Du formel au transcendental: remarques sur l'itineraire de Husserl et de Fichte (Therese Pentzopoulou-Valalas). - Fichte und das Problem des intelligiblen Fatalismus (Georg Wallwitz). - Die Philosophie in Freiheit setzen: Freiheitsbegriff und Freiheit des Begriffs bei Schelling (Felix Duque).

A new translation of Immanuel Kant’s 1787 Critique of Pure Reason(second edition) in modern American English with the original German in the back. This is Volume VII in The Complete Works of Immanuel Kant from Livraria Press. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason lays the foundation of his Systematic Metaphysics published across a dozen works with the singular aim of 'fixing' the field by reconciling Rationalism, Idealism, and Empiricism to move Metaphysics into a full form of Science, much, in the same manner, the Greeks did to Logic or The Renaissance logicians to the hard sciences. Kant sparked a metaphysical revolution which he understands as akin to the Copernican revolution. The question of how the iterations of the transcendent 'I' through time and space can 'know' anything (make synthetic a priori judgments) with any level of certainty takes the proscenium in the Critique. David Hume's fundamental error in Kant's view is that he assumes a Rationality which is Techne without Telos, a description only of what is, not what should be. To this end, he uses a Greek conception of Rationality as logos within a Platonic Ontology, splitting reality into two subdivisions between form and sense- perception, between Numinal and a phenomenological world. As physics is pure science, metaphysics is pure philosophy; "Pure knowledge of reason from mere concepts is called pure philosophy, or metaphysics... Metaphysics, then, both of nature and of morals, and especially the critique of reason venturing out on its own wings, which precedes it in a propaedeutic way, are actually the only things that we can call philosophy in the true sense of the word".

This volume examines (1) the philosophical sources of the Kantian concepts "apperception" and "self-consciousness", (2) the historical development of the theories of apperception and deduction of categories within the pre-critical period, (3) the structure and content of A- as well as B-deduction of categories, and finally (4) the Kantian (and non-Kantian) meaning of "apperception" and "self-consciousness".

In Fichte’s late philosophy, the concept of image becomes the central notion of the Science of Knowledge. Both the representational reference of consciousness to the objects of its experience and its relation to an absolute being which transcends all appearances are explained from the image-like character which consciousness acquires through its own activity. The present volume collects contributions which contextualize Fichte’s theory of image in various respects, focusing on its relation to pre-modern theories of image, its changing role in the development of Fichte’s thinking and its place within Fichte’s foundation of philosophy in the area between theory of truth or validity and ontology. Der Bildbegriff wird in Fichtes Spätphilosophie zum zentralen Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre. Sowohl der repräsentationale Bezug des Bewusstseins zu den Gegenständen seiner Erfahrung, als auch sein Verhältnis zu einem alle Erscheinungen übersteigenden absoluten Sein wird hierbei aus der von ihm selbst aktiv ausgebildeten Bildeigenschaft des Bewusstseins verstanden. Der vorliegende Band versammelt Beiträge, die Fichtes Bildtheorie in verschiedenen Hinsichten kontextualisieren, wobei ihr Verhältnis zu prä-modernen Bildtheorien, ihre wechselnde Rolle in der Entwicklung von Fichtes Denken und ihre im Spannungsfeld von Wahrheits- bzw. Geltungstheorie und Ontologie angesiedelte Stellung in Fichtes Grundlegung der Philosophie im Mittelpunkt stehen.