An empirically rich account of how the West's main war-fighting armies have transformed since the end of the Cold War.

This book investigates how states in both the West and Asia have responded to multi-dimensional security challenges since the end of the Cold War, focusing on military transformation. Looking at a cross-section of different countries, this volume assesses how their armed forces have responded to a changing international security context. The book investigates two main themes. First, how the process of military ‘transformation’- in terms of technological advances and new ways of conducting warfare - has impacted on the militaries of various countries. These technologies are hugely expensive and the extent to which different states can afford them, and the ability of these states to utilise these technologies, differs greatly. Second, the volume investigates the social dimensions of military transformation. It reveals the expanding breadth of tasks that contemporary armed forces have been required to address. This includes the need for military forces to work with other actors, such as non-governmental agencies and humanitarian organisations, and the ability of armed forces to fight asymmetric opponents and conduct post-conflict reconstruction tasks. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan exemplified how important the relationship between technological and social transformation has become. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, military innovation, Asian politics, security studies and International Relations.

This book grew out of the need to describe the culture and structure of the uniformed services to students studying defense policy in the context of a graduate program in American government at Johns Hopkins University. The need to transform U.S. military forces was readily apparent in the 1989-1991 time frame as the Cold War came to an abrupt end. The industrial-age force of the 1980s designed to fight the military forces of another great power needed to be transformed into a force designed to intervene into the affairs of lesser powers. Instead, expensive programs were pursued to transform the industrial-age force into an information-age force to fight an unknown great power threat at an unknown future date at an unknown place. The many interventions of the Clinton and Bush administrations have exposed the failure of leadership to provide the armed forces organized, trained, and equipped for the real wars of a period between eras of great power conflict.

explains how the US military transformation failed in the post-Cold war era Harvey Sapolsky is a leading defence scholar in the US will be of interest to students of strategic studies, defence studies, military studies, US politics and security studies in general

The current process of military transformation will enable the Armed Forces to do better what they already do superbly well. It is important to excel at decisive maneuver and in the application of precise, yet overwhelming firepower. But those attributes, though key in warfare against regular enemies, tend to be less valuable in conflict with irregulars. In war after war, the United States has been surprised by the poor political reward it has earned for its military effort. The IT-led transformation will do nothing to help correct the persisting American difficulty in functioning strategically and politically in its conduct of war. The author develops a cumulative seven-point argument.

In Finding the Target, Frederick W. Kagan describes the three basic transformations within the U.S. military since Vietnam. First was the move to an all-volunteer force and a new generation of weapons systems in the 1970s. Second was the emergence of stealth technology and precision-guided munitions in the 1980s. Third was the information technology that followed the fall of the Soviet Union and the first Gulf War. This last could have insured the U.S. continuing military preeminence, but this goal was compromised by Clinton's drawing down of our armed forces in the 1990s and Bush's response to 9/11 and the global war on terror. The issue of transformation leads Kagan to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's vision of a ''new ''military; the conduct of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars; and the disconnect between grand strategic visions such as the Bush Doctrine's idea of ''preemption ''and the underfunding of military force structures that are supposed to achieve such goals.

Military transformation can be understood as comprising three overlapping and sometimes competing layers—the conventional-force dominated revolution in military affairs, a more recent irregular warfare emphasis, and a wider dimension including homeland defense, space and nuclear policy. The Western world is currently focusing its attention on transformation's middle layer, while China and Russia are focusing on the RMA and transformation's wider aspects. This dynamic indicates the United States and its allies should continue to prepare for the full range of conflicts. This book establishes the meaning of military transformation, assesses the manner in which certain countries are transforming their military forces, discusses the relevancy of transformation efforts to modern conflict and, in drawing out the key areas of emphasis on the part of various countries, provides a window on the future global security environment. It is divided into seven chapters, plus a conclusion. The first chapter focuses on the meaning of military transformation, establishing a framework through which national militaries can be examined. This comprises transformation's revolution in military affairs components, its newer special operations forces, counterinsurgency, and stabilization and reconstruction aspects, and its wider homeland defense, space and deterrence dimensions. The book devotes two chapters to the United States and one each to China, Russia, and NATO. It also has a chapter that looks individually at each of Australia, Britain, Canada, France and Germany. An assessment of the relevancy of force transformation to modern warfare is integrated into the discussion of what transformation means, how the United States is responding, and the concluding chapter. The book contains a biographical sketch of Andrew Marshall, Andrew Krepinevich, William Owens, Arthur Cebrowski, Donald Rumsfeld, and Thomas Barnett, all of whom have been involved in some aspect of military transformation.

Are there limits to military transformation? Or, if it seems obvious that there must be limits to transformation, what are they exactly, why do they arise, and how can we identify them so that we may better accomplish the transformation that the U.S. military is capable of? If limits to military change and transformation exist, what are the broader implications for national policy and strategy? The author offers some answers to these questions by analyzing the efforts of the French, British, and Americans to deal with irregular threats after World War II.

This book studies the changes that have marked war in the Western World since the thirteenth century.

This is the story of how the United States Army responded to the challenges of the end of the Cold War by transforming itself into the most capable ground force in the world today. It argues that from 1989 through 2005 the U.S. Army attempted, and largely achieved, a centrally directed and institutionally driven transformation relevant to ground warfare that exploited Information Age technology, adapted to post?Cold War strategic circumstances, and integrated into parallel Department of Defense efforts. The process not only modernized equipment, it also substantially altered doctrine, organization, training, administrative and logistical practices, and the service culture. Kevlar Legions further contends that the digitized expeditionary Army has withstood the test of combat, performing superbly with respect to deployment and high-end conventional combat and capably with respect to low-intensity conflict and the counterinsurgency challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan.