This book is a study of time, particularly of the nature of subjective time-that is, time as subjectively experienced and lived in contrast with time as measured objectively as, for example, by a clock. The argument first addresses the development of the time experience, its origins in infantile experience, and traces its variations and modifications during the course of the life cycle. As the life course advances, concerns about and preoccupations with death play an increasingly important role in attitudes toward and involvement in temporally related contexts. The next step is an examination of the phenomenology of time experience itself and its dependence on biorhythms and affective influences. An important aspect of this discussion is the relation between time experience as a conscious phenomenon and the functioning of unconscious determinants of the time experience. This leads to the question: given these conclusions regarding the nature of time experience, what implications can we draw for the understanding of the nature and functioning of the self within psychoanalysis? The book's final section applies these understandings to the analytic process, focusing particularly on the meaning of the time experience in the patient's psychic reality and patterns of enactment around issues of time and time management in the analytic situation.

Time, Self, and Psychoanalysis has two theoretical foci: the first is the nature of time experience and the second is the implications of the understanding of time for conceptualizing the nature and functioning of the self. The result is a result is a rethinking of the self-concept and its engagement in the analytic process. The book pragmatically explores patterns of enactment in analysis through three extensive cases in which chronic and significant lateness characterized the analysis.

This comprehensive, introductory text makes the concepts of self psychology accessible for students and clinicians. It begins with an overview of the development of Kohut's ideas, particularly those on narcissism and narcissistic development and explains the self object concept that is at the core of the self psychological vision of human experience. It also includes brief overviews, of the allied theoretical perspectives of intersubjectivity and motivational systems theory. Numerous clinical vignettes are furnished to illustrate theoretical concepts as well as one continuous case vignette that is woven throughout the book.

"Psychoanalysis and Buddhism" pairs Buddhist psychotherapists together with leading figures in psychoanalysis who have a general interest in the role of spirituality in psychology. The resulting essays present an illuminating discourse on these two disciplines and how they intersect. This landmark book challenges traditional thoughts on psychoanalysis and Buddhism and propels them to a higher level of understanding.

Karen Horney is regarded by many as one of the most important psychoanalytic thinkers of the 20th century. This book argues that Horney's inner struggles, in particular her compulsive need for men, induced her to embark on a search for self-understanding.

The Austro-American psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut was one of the foremost leaders in his field and developed the school of self-psychology, which sets aside the Freudian explanations for behavior and looks instead at self/object relationships and empathy in order to shed light on human behavior. In How Does Analysis Cure? Kohut presents the theoretical framework for self-psychology, and carefully lays out how the self develops over the course of time. Kohut also specifically defines healthy and unhealthy cases of Oedipal complexes and narcissism, while investigating the nature of analysis itself as treatment for pathologies. This in-depth examination of “the talking cure” explores the lesser studied phenomena of psychoanalysis, including when it is beneficial for analyses to be left unfinished, and the changing definition of “normal.” An important work for working psychoanalysts, this book is important not only for psychologists, but also for anyone interested in the complex inner workings of the human psyche.

Change Through Time in Psychoanalysis presents a new stage of the work done through the IPA Committee on Clinical Observation between 2014 and 2020—the advances in our method, the Three Level Model (3-LM), and our clinical thinking. In this new volume, ideas on observational research, clinical narratives based on 3-LM group discussions, and adaptations of the model for training candidates show more experience, more depth, more answers, and, of course, new questions. Contributors from three regions of the IPA have written extended case studies of 10 psychoanalyses, rich in verbatim session material, focusing on the main dimensions of the patient’s psychic functioning, specific changes in the analytic process, and related interventional strategies. The reader will find, in the method and in the clinical narratives, new and clarifying points of view in the observation of transformations in patients in psychoanalysis and of the analysts’ techniques, useful both in professional development and in teaching candidates.

Adrian Johnston and Catherine Malabou defy theoretical humanities' deeply-entrenched resistance to engagements with the life sciences. Rather than treat biology and its branches as hopelessly reductive and politically suspect, they view recent advances in neurobiology and its adjacent scientific fields as providing crucial catalysts to a radical rethinking of subjectivity. Merging three distinct disciplines—European philosophy from Descartes to the present, Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis, and affective neuroscience—Johnston and Malabou triangulate the emotional life of affective subjects as conceptualized in philosophy and psychoanalysis with neuroscience. Their experiments yield different outcomes. Johnston finds psychoanalysis and neurobiology have the potential to enrich each other, though affective neuroscience demands a reconsideration of whether affects can be unconscious. Investigating this vexed issue has profound implications for theoretical and practical analysis, as well as philosophical understandings of the emotions. Malabou believes scientific explorations of the brain seriously problematize established notions of affective subjectivity in Continental philosophy and Freudian-Lacanian analysis. She confronts philosophy and psychoanalysis with something neither field has seriously considered: the concept of wonder and the cold, disturbing visage of those who have been affected by disease or injury, such that they are no longer affected emotionally. At stake in this exchange are some of philosophy's most important claims concerning the relationship between the subjective mind and the objective body, the structures and dynamics of the unconscious dimensions of mental life, the role emotion plays in making us human, and the functional differences between philosophy and science.

By integrating principles from her background as a movement psychotherapist and movement analyst with key concepts from contemporary psychoanalysis, the author offers a new perspective on exploring the interrelationships between nonverbal and verbal 'articulation' in any therapy setting. The Embodied Self provides a practical and experi