Paul Samuelson once noted that "Abba Lerner has been a great theoretical economist in a vintage epoch for theorists. This last third of a century he has poured out one brilliant paper after another-in micro theory and macro, in pure thought, and in the realms of policy."Lerner's colleagues at Queens College have assembled these essays on issues of considerable importance in the world economy, particularly in areas of social welfare, as "a tribute to a great economist who has made significant and long-lasting contributions to many fields of economic theory and policy."

This book gathers a collection of multidisciplinary essays by Jess Huerta de Soto, examining the dynamic processes of social cooperation which characterize the market, with particular emphasis on the role of both entrepreneurship and institutions.

Walter J. Schultz illustrates the deficiencies of theories that purport to show that markets alone can provide the basis for efficiency. He argues that markets are not moral-free zones, and that achieving the economic common good does indeed require morality. He demonstrates that efficient outcomes of market interaction cannot be achieved without moral normative constraints and then goes on to specify a set of normative conditions that make these positive outcomes possible.

Economic analysis of law is an interesting and challenging attempt to employ the concepts and reasoning methods of modern economic theory so as to gain a deeper understanding of legal problems. According to Richard A. Posner it is the role of the law to encourage market competition and, where the market fails because transaction costs are too high, to simulate the result of competitive markets. This would maximize economic efficiency and social wealth. In this work, the lawyer and economist Klaus Mathis critically appraises Posner’s normative justification of the efficiency paradigm from the perspective of the philosophy of law. Posner acknowledges the influences of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, whom he views as the founders of normative economics. He subscribes to Smith’s faith in the market as an ideal allocation model, and to Bentham’s ethical consequentialism. Finally, aligning himself with John Rawls’s contract theory, he seeks to legitimize his concept of wealth maximization with a consensus theory approach. In his interdisciplinary study, the author points out the possibilities as well as the limits of economic analysis of law. It provides a method of analysing the law which, while very helpful, is also rather specific. The efficiency arguments therefore need to be incorporated into a process for resolving value conflicts. In a democracy this must take place within the political decision-making process. In this clearly written work, Klaus Mathis succeeds in making even non-economists more aware of the economic aspects of the law.

Beyond the Market launches a sociological investigation into economic efficiency. Prevailing economic theory, which explains efficiency using formalized rational choice models, often simplifies human behavior to the point of distortion. Jens Beckert finds such theory to be particularly weak in explaining such crucial forms of economic behavior as cooperation, innovation, and action under conditions of uncertainty--phenomena he identifies as the proper starting point for a sociology of economic action. Beckert levels an enlightened critique at neoclassical economics, arguing that understanding efficiency requires looking well beyond the market to the social, cultural, political, and cognitive factors that influence the coordination of economic action. Beckert searches social theory for the components of an alternative theory of action, one that accounts for the social embedding of economic behavior. In Durkheim and Parsons he finds especially useful approaches to cooperation; in Luhmann, a way to understand how people act under highly contingent conditions; and in Giddens, an understanding of creative action and innovation. Together, these provide building blocks for a research program that will yield a theoretically sophisticated understanding of how economic processes are coordinated and the ways that markets are embedded in social, cultural, and cognitive structures. Containing one of the most fully informed critiques of the neoclassical analysis of economic efficiency--as well as one of the most thoughtful blueprints for economic sociology--this book reclaims for sociology the study of one of the most important arenas of human action.

Economic Efficiency in Law and Economics is an interesting and worthwhile book. Megan Richardson, Economic Record Zerbe s new book is high-powered and potentially important. Bill Goodman, Monthly Labor Review In this path-breaking book, Richard Zerbe introduces a new way to think about the concept of economic efficiency that is both consistent with its historical derivation and more useful than concepts currently used. He establishes an expanded version of Kaldor Hicks efficiency as an axiomatic system that performs the following tasks: the new approach obviates certain technical and ethical criticisms that have been made of economic efficiency; it answers critics of efficiency; it allows an expanded range for efficiency analysis; it establishes the conditions under which economists can reasonably say that some state of the world is inefficient. He then applies the new analysis to a number of hard and fascinating cases, including the economics of duelling, cannibalism and rape. He develops a new theory of common law efficiency and indicates the circumstances under which the common law will be inefficient. The book will be of great interest to scholars, students, and practitioners interested in the concept of economic efficiency and how it should be applied to law and economics.

It has been suggested that national economic policies should focus on taxation to achieve social equity and interest rates for economic efficiency; wealth distribution can balance efficiency and equity through tax rates, interest rates, and exchange rates. Additionally, while the economic system seeks efficiency and the social system pursues equity, common interest modifications with elastic exchange and tax rates should be applied for balancing efficiency and equity. Wealth Expanding Theory Under the Principle of Efficiency-Equity Equilibrium is a comprehensive reference source that considers economic philosophy for extending economic cognition, balancing economic efficiency and social equity, and future interstellar economics. Covering key topics such as poverty, fiscal policy, and macroeconomics, this reference work is ideal for policymakers, government officials, business owners, economists, managers, researchers, scholars, academicians, practitioners, instructors, and students.

My interest in X-Efficiency (XE) dates back to 1978. At the time, I was writing the dissertation for my Ph. D. at Washington State University. My dissertation was concerned with the role of attitudes in the school-to-work transition among young men. I was advised by Professor Millard Hastay (a member of my committee) to look at Leibenstein's "new" book, Beyond Economic Man. One of the things that caught my attention was his be havioral description of (selective) rationality. It seemed that Leibenstein's behavioral description of a (selectively) rational individual was very similar to what psychologists such as Abraham Maslow were reporting as being the product of a particular motivational system. In other words, I was im pressed with the idea that what Leibenstein was referring to as X-ineffi ciency was being discussed by psychologists as "the way it (often) is. " So from the beginning I always considered the concept of X-(in)efficiency to be a valuable one for understanding human behavior. I have since come to believe that this is particularly true when considering behavior in non market environments, i. e. , within the firm. Work on this book, however, can most realistically said to have started with work which I began in 1982 while I was a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University. Professor Leibenstein suggested that I consider how some em pirical evidence which was being cited as evidence for the role of property rights might also be consistent with XE theory.

First published in 1981, Professor Mishan’s Economic Efficiency and Social Welfare: Selected Essays on Fundamental Aspects of the Economic Theory of Social Welfare is a collection of 22 pioneering essays written while the author was teaching at the London School of Economics and chosen to indicate landmarks in the development of his own thought. Professor Mishan, who also enjoys an international reputation as a popular writer on the impact of modern economic growth on social welfare, is among the foremost authorities in the field of resource allocation, and his influence in his subject area has been profound. Mishan’s essays, while generally accessible to the layman due to the author’s lucidity, his economy in the use of mathematical notation and his concern with perspective, are invaluable reading for the economics undergraduate. The essays are particularly relevant to upper level students of project appraisal, welfare economics and cost benefit analysis requiring a coherent survey of their field of study.

Provides a comprehensive approach to productivity and efficiency analysis using economic and econometric theory.