The Ho Chi Minh Trail, a maze of roads, trails, and waterways in eastern Laos, provided the conduit for supplies and replacements from North Vietnam to its forces fighting in South Vietnam. The supplies and people were infiltrated through passes in the mountains separating Laos and North Vietnam onto the Trail, which led into South Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia. Transportation on the Trail grew from porters and bicycles to a fleet of trucks. Infiltration began early in the war, and the United States began to interdict these supplies and people from the air to assist the South Vietnamese, using a variety of aircraft and weapons. As the United States increased its efforts to stop the trucks, the North Vietnamese increased their efforts to bring down U.S. aircraft, using larger and larger antiaircraft guns and, ultimately, surface to air missiles. The most effective truck killers were the gunships, cargo aircraft equipped with guns firing from the left side of the aircraft and optical and electronic sensors to detect targets. The ultimate gunship was the AC-130E, which carried a 105-mm Army howitzer that fired a 5.6-pound projective and could operate above 10,000 feet. In 1968, the United States began to operate a network of acoustic and seismic sensors in southern Laos that detected men and trucks transiting the Trail. Orbiting aircraft relayed signals from the sensors to a center in Thailand that analyzed the signals to determine numbers and location, then sent this information to controllers that dispatched attack aircraft. Sensors and methods improved over the years, increasing the accuracy of attacks. The invasion of South Vietnam in 1972 necessitated the use of most aircraft in direct support of combat troops there, effectively ending aerial interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.

Many thousands of different types of vehicles were used by the armies during the Second World War for various roles, including the fighting vehicles such as armoured cars and tanks. Today these are very popular with enthusiasts who restore these historic vehicles to their pristine state and attend specialist gatherings around the UK, Europe and the USA. This book explores original and reconstructed military vehicles from British, US, Russian, Italian and German forces using stunning colour photographs. It also provides a detailed history of each vehicle's development and use in the war, plus a wealth of technical information and rare internal shots. The range of vehicles includes trucks, ambulances, half-tracks, motorcycles, bulldozers, armoured cars and of course the impressive range of tanks, from tankettes to the fearsome German Tiger. Some vehicles are so rare that examples have been recreated using designs of the era and together with the original vehicles their fascinating wartime experiences are revealed. From the Moto Guzzi tricycle to the Schwimmwagen, the T-34 to the Austin ambulance, this is the perfect book for recreating, restoring and exploring the history of these classic military vehicles.

This history recounts an ambitious attempt by the Air Force to interdict traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail of southern Laos, as part of a plan to support the war in South Vietnam by impeding the flow of North Vietnamese troops and military supplies into South Vietnam. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara intended initially to establish a manned barrier guarding the demilitarized zone between the two Vietnams, while using electronic sensors and computers to detect and analyze movement on the Ho Chi Minh Trail so that aircraft couldattack the troops and cargo bound for the battlefields of South Vietnam. Only the electronic portion went into service, and the Ho Chi Minh Trail became the object of seven successive Commando Hunt operations, beginning in the fall of 1968 and lasting until the spring of 1972, when a North Vietnamese invasion of the South changed the nature of the war. Although aircraft of the other services participated in this extended campaign of aerial interdiction, the Air Forceassumed the greatest responsibility for both equipment and execution. This book tells that story.

The Air Force History and Museums Program has prepared accounts of the United States Air Force and the war in Southeast Asia according to a design that reflects the compartmentalized nature of the conflict itself. Besides the special studies like the illustrated history (The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973: An Illustrated Account) and the monographs, some of them quite lengthy, on topics like rescue or tactical airlift, the Air Force history program has published volumes on the air wars over South Vietnam and Cambodia, North Vietnam, and Laos. This book is the last of three recounting operations in Laos, one of them dealing with the war in the northern part of that kingdom and the other two with aerial interdiction in the south. This history covers the critical years from 1968 through 1972, when the Air Force carried out the Commando Hunt series of aerial interdiction campaigns against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos, trying, in conjunction with ground actions, to use air power and electronics to impede the movement of men and supplies from North Vietnam to the battlefields of South Vietnam. Conducted during the time the United States was withdrawing ground forces and turning the war over to the greatly strengthened armed forces of South Vietnam, Commando Hunt sought to prevent a North Vietnamese offensive that would take advantage of the declining U. S. presence. That attack did not come until March 1972 and not only stopped short of overrunning South Vietnam, but also was a setback for the Hanoi government and a cease-fire agreement. The invasion, however, signaled the end of Commando Hunt, for the South Vietnamese did not take over the electronic surveillance network-with its computer, sensors, and communications equipment-that made the series of aerial interdiction operations possible. "The real war," said Walt Whitman, "will never get in the books." Yet, even though they cannot conjure up the realities of death and suffering, heroism and sacrifice, books like this have a purpose, offering the counsel of the past to help today's policy makers. What useful principle can they derive from an account of the events of a few years in a unique part of the world? Stripped of all that links it to a particular time, place, and strategy, this narrative warns them that a determined enemy may be able to use geography, climate, and ingenuity to blunt the cutting edge of technology. Against such a foe, what seems flawless in theory or has succeeded brilliantly in tests may fail in actual combat, but what fails on one battlefield may succeed years later on another. In the last analysis, military genius does not reside in compiling lists of lessons learned, but in analyzing the past and applying its distilled wisdom in new, perhaps unique, circumstances.

A detailed, pictorial history of the 1 1/2-ton Chevy truck and its use by the U.S. Army during World War II. From 1940 to 1945, large numbers of trucks of all categories were delivered to the U.S. Army by the Chevrolet Motor Division of General Motors. Over 160,000 of these trucks were G-506 light four-wheel-drive trucks—which became the standard 1 1/2-ton, 4x4 truck for both the U.S. Army and Army Air Corps during the war. In addition, many more thousands were delivered to Allied forces as part of the Lend-Lease program, including nearly 50,000 delivered to the Soviet Union. Tough, well-built, and more agile than the deuce and a half, the Chevy 11⁄2 ton played a part in every theater of operations during the war. Its durability and mechanical reliability made it ideal for a wide range of missions. Not for nothing did Chevy advertise the trucks during the war as “Vehicles of Victory.” More than 75 years after it was designed, the small Chevrolet truck is still a favorite with collectors. This fully illustrated book details the different series of trucks and their many uses within the U.S. Army including cargo trucks, panel delivery trucks for the Signal Corps, dump trucks for engineers, telephone trucks, tractors, and bomb service trucks for the air force. It also covers their part in the Lend-Lease program, and their continued use after the war.

Throughout the War in Southeast Asia, Communist forces form North Vietnam infiltrated the isolated, neutral state of Laos. Men and supplies crossed the mountain passes and travelled along an intricate web of roads and jungle paths known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam. American involvement in Laos began which a photo-reconnaissance missions and, as the war in Vietnam intensified, expanded to a series of air-ground operations from bases in Vietnam and Thailand against fixed targets and infiltration routes in southern Laos. This volume examines this complex operational environment. United States Air Force. Center for Air Force History.

"The best book about politics ever written for children." —The Washington Post 50th Anniversary Edition, now in paperback DO YOU KNOW THE HISTORY OF THE PUSHCART WAR? THE REAL HISTORY? It’s a story of how regular people banded together and, armed with little more than their brains and good aim, defeated a mighty foe. Not long ago the streets of New York City were smelly, smoggy, sooty, and loud. There were so many trucks making deliveries that it might take an hour for a car to travel a few blocks. People blamed the truck owners and the truck owners blamed the little wooden pushcarts that traveled the city selling everything from flowers to hot dogs. Behind closed doors the truck owners declared war on the pushcart peddlers. Carts were smashed from Chinatown to Chelsea. The peddlers didn’t have money or the mayor on their side, but that didn’t stop them from fighting back. They used pea shooters to blow tacks into the tires of trucks, they outwitted the police, and they marched right up to the grilles of those giant trucks and dared them to drive down their streets. Today, thanks to the ingenuity of the pushcart peddlers, the streets belong to the people—and to the pushcarts. The Pushcart War was first published more than fifty years ago. It has inspired generations of children and been adapted for television, radio, and the stage around the world. It was included on School Library Journal’s list of One Hundred Books That Shaped the Twentieth Century, and its assertion that a committed group of men and women can prevail against a powerful force is as relevant in the twenty-first century as it was in 1964.

This history recounting operations in Laos covers the critical years from 1968 through 1972, when the Air Force carried out the Commando Hunt series of aerial interdiction campaigns against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos, trying, in conjunction with ground actions, to use air power and electronics to impede the movement of men and supplies from North Vietnam to the battlefields of South Vietnam. Conducted during the time the United States was withdrawing ground forces and turning the war over to the greatly strengthened armed forces of South Vietnam, Commando Hunt sought to prevent a North Vietnamese offensive that would take advantage of the declining U. S. presence. That attack did not come until March 1972 and not only stopped short of overrunning South Vietnam, but also was a setback for the Hanoi government and a cease-fire agreement. The invasion, however, signaled the end of Commando Hunt, for the South Vietnamese did not take over the electronic surveillance network -- with its computer, sensors, and communications equipment--that made the series of aerial interdiction operations possible.This history recounts an ambitious attempt by the Air Force to interdict traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail of southern Laos, as part of a plan to support the war in South Vietnam by impeding the flow of North Vietnamese troops and military supplies into South Vietnam. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara intended initially to establish a manned barrier guarding the demilitarized zone between the two Vietnams, while using electronic sensors and computers to detect and analyze movement on the Ho Chi Minh Trail so that aircraft could attack the troops and cargo bound for the battlefields of South Vietnam. Only the electronic portion went into service, and the Ho Chi Minh Trail became the object of seven successive Commando Hunt operations, beginning in the fall of 1968 and lasting until the spring of 1972, when a North Vietnamese invasion of the South changed the nature of the war. Although aircraft of the other services participated in this extended campaign of aerial interdiction, the Air Force assumed the greatest responsibility for both equipment and execution.The book begins by summarizing Secretary McNamara's reasons for substituting an interdiction campaign for the bombing of North Vietnam and then describes the early efforts at aerial interdiction, which were delayed by the need to shift resources for the defense of the Marine Corps outpost at Khe Sanh in northwestern South Vietnam, just south of the demilitarized zone. Because technology held the key to attacking the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the aircraft and other equipment used in the Commando Hunt series receive extensive treatment early in the narrative. Next come the air campaigns themselves, supplemented by ground operations from Laos and South Vietnam, that over the years, with varying success, engaged every component of the Ho Chi Minh Trail through southern Laos and in Cambodia--roads and trails, bivouacs and storage areas, waterways and pipelines, truck traffic, and for a brief time, troop movements. In addition to discussing this activity, the narrative addresses the unsuccessful attempt to Vietnamize interdiction without transferring the entire array of special equipment created or modified for that purpose. The volume also deals with the application of the technology that maintained surveillance over the trail and covers the problem of locating North Vietnamese artillery after the invasion of South Vietnam in 1972. A final chapter evaluates the effectiveness of the air-supported electronic barrier and concludes that the concealment readily afforded by the jungle, the resilience of the North Vietnamese and their control of the tempo of military operations, the limitations of the available technology, and the lack of adequate information about the trail complex combined to prevent the Commando Hunt operations from doing more than inconveniencing the enemy.