What are the most fundamental differences among the political economies of the developed world? How do national institutional differences condition economic performance, public policy, and social well-being? Will they survive the pressures for convergence generated by globalization and technological change? These have long been central questions in comparative political economy. This book provides a new and coherent set of answers to them. Building on the new economics of organization, the authors develop an important new theory about which differences among national political economies are most significant for economic policy and performance. Drawing on a distinction between 'liberal' and 'coordinated' market economies, they argue that there is more than one path to economic success. Nations need not converge to a single Anglo-American model. They develop a new theory of 'comparative institutionaladvantage' that transforms our understanding of international trade, offers new explanations for the response of firms and nations to the challenges of globalization, and provides a new theory of national interest to explain the conduct of nations in international relations. The analysis brings the firm back into the centre of comparative political economy. It provides new perspectives on economic and social policy-making that illuminate the role of business in the development of the welfare state and the dilemmas facing those who make economic policy in the contemporary world. Emphasizing the 'institutional complementarities' that link labour relations, corporate finance, and national legal systems, the authors bring interdisciplinary perspectives to bear on issues of strategic management, economic performance, and institutional change. This pathbreaking work sets new agendas in the study of comparative political economy. As such, it will be of value to academics and graduate students in economics, business, and political science, as well as to many others with interests in international relations, social policy-making, and the law.

How do the environments, in which businesses operate, condition their success or failure? Such questions have long been of interest in the fields of business, economics and politics. This book thoroughly examines the main claims of the most important contribution - the Varieties of Capitalism paradigm - to this debate in recent years.

This Element reviews varieties of capitalism (VoC) developed by Hall and Soskice and subsequent extensions to emerging markets. The author suggests that by reinvigorating existing ideal types and creating new ones through an analysis of its five variables in a variety of countries VoC can be used to evaluate the viability of economic reforms in each country, based on lessons from other countries belonging to their ideal type. It illustrates the utility of VoC in understanding how reforms will differ across countries by examining how the future of work is likely to differ across nations depending on the degree to which the five institutions explored in this approach promote the standardization of tasks. It analyzes how these institutions shape degrees of standardization in the United States, Germany, and Brazil, offering suggestions for reforms in each of them.

Though the emerging sub-discipline of comparative political economy is now rich in studies of different advanced capitalisms, it still lacks a systematic consideration of the organizing frameworks and methodologies underpinning those studies. This definitive volume outlines the two great debates currently shaping the analysis of advanced capitalism. It makes the case for a greater awareness of underlying theoretical issues in the design of empirical research, and demonstrates the value of exploring the interconnections between competing intellectual approaches.

This book identifies and explores the mechanisms linking political institutions and variation in capitalist systems. A strong correlation exists between varieties of political regimes and varieties of capitalism: majoritarian political regimes are correlated with liberal market economies (LMEs) and consensus political regimes are correlated with coordinated market economies (CMEs). Still, correlation is not causation. Empirical findings illustrate that partisanship and policy legacies, the number of political parties, electoral rules, and constitutional constraints are significant indicators of LMEs and CMEs. Arsenault finds that majoritarian institutions create an environment of adversarial politics and strong competition between actors, which makes credible commitment to nonmarket coordination mechanisms unlikely. Consensus institutions, on the other hand, promote an atmosphere of cooperation and coordination between actors, thus encouraging credible commitment to nonmarket coordination mechanisms. Qualitative case studies of Germany, Britain, and New Zealand confirm the quantitative findings and suggest that political regimes were instrumental in shaping the economic adjustment paths of these countries during the era of liberalization in the 1980s.

What are the most fundamental differences among the political economies of the developed world? How do national institutional differences condition economic performance, public policy, and social well-being? Will they survive the pressures for convergence generated by globalization and technological change? These have long been central questions in comparative political economy. This book provides a new and coherent set of answers to them. Building on the new economics of organization, the authors develop an important new theory about which differences among national political economies are most significant for economic policy and performance. Drawing on a distinction between 'liberal' and 'coordinated' market economies, they argue that there is more than one path to economic success. Nations need not converge to a single Anglo-American model. They develop a new theory of 'comparative institutional advantage' that transforms our understanding of international trade, offersnew explanations for the response of firms and nations to the challenges of globalization, and provides a new theory of national interest to explain the conduct of nations in international relations. The analysis brings the firm back into the centre of comparative political economy. It provides new perspectives on economic and social policy-making that illuminate the role of business in the development of the welfare state and the dilemmas facing those who make economic policy in the contemporary world. Emphasizing the 'institutional complementarities' that link labour relations, corporate finance, and national legal systems, the authors bring interdisciplinary perspectives to bear on issues of strategic management, economic performance, and institutional change. This pathbreaking work sets new agendas in the study of comparative political economy. As such, it will be of value to academics and graduate students in economics, business, and political science, as well as to manyothers with interests in international relations, social policy-making, and the law.

Peter Hall and David Soskice's Varieties of Capitalism has become a seminal text and reference point across the social sciences, generating debate and research around political-economic models. Here, Bob Hancké presents the key readings on 'Varieties of Capitalism', including the original Hall and Soskice introduction, which encompass the key issues in the study of capitalism and capitalist diversity, its origins, and the debates that followed it. Beginning with the broad theoretical arguments around the idea of 'Varieties of Capitalism', the book then goes on to focus on specific empirical controversies, before finally considering recent attempts at rethinking this influential framework. The Debating Varieties of Capitalism Reader is the perfect guide to understanding this set of ideas that have changed the way we look at comparative political economy.

Our article presents an index of institutional complementarity for 27 postcommunist economies, and evaluates a key claim of the Varieties of Capitalism paradigm. The empirical novelty of the index lies in its integration of informal institutions as well as its combination of macro-level and firm-level dimensions. Theoretically, we use the index to propose two boundary conditions for the theory of comparative institutional advantage whose empirical support has been mixed in the literature. We find that (1) the link between institutional complementarity and the measures of income, employment, and inflation is contingent on the quality of governance, and (2) institutional complementarity has no impact on life expectancy in the respective economies. We theorize the importance of governance quality as a crucial factor in the analysis of capitalist systems.

Based on a timely reassessment of the classic arguments of Weber, Schumpeter, Hayek, Popper, and Parsons, this book reconceptualizes actually-existing capitalism. It proposes capitalism as an impersonal procedural solution to the problems of spontaneously coordinating public institutions that enable durable market-based wealth generation and social order. Few countries have achieved this. A novel contribution of the book is that it identifies a practical sequence of economic and institutional shortcuts to real capitalism. The book challenges current orthodoxies about varieties of capitalism and relativist recipes for economic growth, and it criticizes culturalist and incrementalist viewpoints in institutional economics. It calls on the social sciences to help in constructing dynamic and prosperous open societies of the twenty-first century by reclaiming older ideas of ‘social economics’. Better and faster solutions will emphasize crisis-induced change, rational leadership, ideological persuasion, institutional engineering, rules-based market freedom, and the universalistic formal-procedural impersonality of optimal regulatory systems.