A working paper from the Economics Division, Research School of Asian Studies, at the Australian National University, which looks at the concepts and theories of international technology transfer in order to explain that host countries can achieve technology capability, rather than adapting and upgrading imported technologies through technology transfer. The paper examines China's technology importation and its policies between 1988 and 1992. It concludes with some recommendations regarding future policies of China's technology importation.

Access to science and technology worldwide is achieved by active participation in open international scientific research, as well as through technological capability that is decisive in catching up with world developments in science and technology. In other words, it is the "national system of innovation" which determines a country's assimilation capacity. The universities, research institutions, the technological infrastructure, industrial training schemes, information networks and technical institutions in general provide the foundation for a solid, steady development. Therefore policies directed toward strengthening the national system of innovation are essential for a catching-up strategy. But even more important is the presence of skilled and experienced people with the necessary connections to the scientific and technological infrastructure of the world at large. this applies to China in particular. Whether or not the technological potential will be developed, depends on the technological and industrial strategies promoted by the Chinese leadership. In addition, the costs and benefits of technological development are affected by the prevalent evolutionary stage of a country's political framework and fiscal regime. There must be a strong coordination between overall economic policies and technology policy. A sucessful management of technology is only possible through a "technological package" including management, financial and marketing skills.

The global implications of China's rise as a global actor In 2005, a senior official in the George W. Bush administration expressed the hope that China would emerge as a “responsible stakeholder” on the world stage. A dozen years later, the Trump administration dramatically shifted course, instead calling China a “strategic competitor” whose actions routinely threaten U.S. interests. Both assessments reflected an underlying truth: China is no longer just a “rising” power. It has emerged as a truly global actor, both economically and militarily. Every day its actions affect nearly every region and every major issue, from climate change to trade, from conflict in troubled lands to competition over rules that will govern the uses of emerging technologies. To better address the implications of China's new status, both for American policy and for the broader international order, Brookings scholars conducted research over the past two years, culminating in a project: Global China: Assessing China's Growing Role in the World. The project is intended to furnish policy makers and the public with hard facts and deep insights for understanding China's regional and global ambitions. The initiative draws not only on Brookings's deep bench of China and East Asia experts, but also on the tremendous breadth of the institution's security, strategy, regional studies, technological, and economic development experts. Areas of focus include the evolution of China's domestic institutions; great power relations; the emergence of critical technologies; Asian security; China's influence in key regions beyond Asia; and China's impact on global governance and norms. Global China: Assessing China's Growing Role in the World provides the most current, broad-scope, and fact-based assessment of the implications of China's rise for the United States and the rest of the world.

An increase in global access to goods and knowledge is transforming world-class science and technology (S&T) by bringing it within the capability of an unprecedented number of global parties who must compete for resources, markets, and talent. In particular, globalization has facilitated the success of formal S&T plans in many developing countries, where traditional limitations can now be overcome through the accumulation and global trade of a wide variety of goods, skills, and knowledge. As a result, centers for technological research and development (R&D) are now globally dispersed, setting the stage for greater uncertainty in the political, economic, and security arenas. These changes will have a potentially enormous impact for the U.S. national security policy, which for the past half century was premised on U.S. economic and technological dominance. As the U.S. monopoly on talent and innovation wanes, arms export regulations and restrictions on visas for foreign S&T workers are becoming less useful as security strategies. The acute level of S&T competition among leading countries in the world today suggests that countries that fail to exploit new technologies or that lose the capability for proprietary use of their own new technologies will find their existing industries uncompetitive or obsolete. The increased access to information has transformed the 1950s' paradigm of "control and isolation" of information for innovation control into the current one of "engagement and partnerships" between innovators for innovation creation. Current and future strategies for S&T development need to be considered in light of these new realities. This book analyzes the S&T strategies of Japan, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Singapore (JBRICS), six countries that have either undergone or are undergoing remarkable growth in their S&T capabilities for the purpose of identifying unique national features and how they are utilized in the evolving global S&T environment.

With special reference to the reform policy and the encouragement of foreign direct investment, Chinese and British social scientists examine recent developments in the scientific policy, research and development, and technology transfer in the People's Republic. They consider case studies in Japanese technology transfer with implications for China, the experience of technical progress and technology transfer in the Soviet Union 1917-87, the adoption of innovations and the assimilation of improvements, Sino-Japanese technology transfer and its effects, export performance, and other topics. The 11 papers were presented at an April 1995 seminar in Beijing. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR