In this book a rigorous, systematic, mathematical analysis is presented for oligopoly with multi-product firms in static as well as dynamic frameworks in the light of recent developments in theories of games, oligopoly and industrial organization. The general results derived in this book on oligopoly with multi-product firms contain, as special cases, all previous results on oligopoly with single product as well as oligopoly with product differentiation and single product firms. A constructive nu- merical method is given for finding the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, which may be extremely valuable to those who are interested in numerical analysis of the effects of various industrial policies. A sequential adjustment process is also formulated for finding the equilibrium. Dynamic adjustment processes have two versions, one with a discrete time scale and the other with a continuous time scale. The stability of the equilibrium is thoroughly investigated utilizing powerful mathematical results from the stability and linear algebra literature. The methodology developed for analyzing stability proves to be useful for dynamic analysis of economic models.

This state-of-the-art collection of papers on the theory of Cournotian competition focuses on two main subjects: oligopolistic Cournot competition and contests. The contributors present various applications of the Cournotian Equilibrium Theory, addressing topics such as equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and welfare. Special emphasis is placed on the aggregative nature of the games that are relevant to such theory. This contributed volume was written to celebrate the 80th birthday of Prof. Koji Okuguchi, a pioneer in oligopoly theory.

In this book a rigorous, systematic, mathematical analysis is presented for oligopoly with multi-product firms in static as well as dynamic frameworks in the light of recent developments in theories of games, oligopoly and industrial organization. The general results derived in this book on oligopoly with multi-product firms contain, as special cases, all previous results on oligopoly with single product as well as oligopoly with product differentiation and single product firms. A constructive nu- merical method is given for finding the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, which may be extremely valuable to those who are interested in numerical analysis of the effects of various industrial policies. A sequential adjustment process is also formulated for finding the equilibrium. Dynamic adjustment processes have two versions, one with a discrete time scale and the other with a continuous time scale. The stability of the equilibrium is thoroughly investigated utilizing powerful mathematical results from the stability and linear algebra literature. The methodology developed for analyzing stability proves to be useful for dynamic analysis of economic models.

This is the first book to comprehensively examine the asymptotic behavior of dynamic monopolies, duopolies, and oligopolies where firms face information and implementation delays. It considers discrete and continuous timescales, continuously distributed delays, as well as single and multiple delays. It also discusses models with linear and hyperbolic price functions in three types of oligopolies: Cournot competition with quantity-adjusting firms, Bertrand competition with price-adjusting firms, and mixed oligopolies with both types of firms. In addition to the traditional Cournot-Nash equilibria, it introduces cases of partial cooperation are also introduced, leading to the analysis of cartelizing groups of firms and possible governmental actions against antitrust behavior. Further, the book investigates special processes for firms learning about the uncertain price function based on repeated market information. It addresses asymptotic properties of the associated dynamic systems, derives stability conditions, identifies stability switching curves, and presents in global analyses of cases of instability. The book includes both theoretical results and computer studies to illustrate and verify the theoretical findings.

This book presents the latest trends, methods and results in nonlinear dynamics with a special focus on oligopolies. It contains a number of technical appendices that summarize techniques of global dynamics not easily accessible elsewhere.

This book reflects the state of the art in nonlinear economic dynamics, providing a broad overview of dynamic economic models at different levels. The wide variety of approaches ranges from theoretical and simulation analysis to methodological study. In particular, it examines the local and global asymptotical behavior of both macro- and micro- level mathematical models, theoretically as well as using simulation. It also focuses on systems with one or more time delays for which new methodology has to be developed to investigate their asymptotic properties. The book offers a comprehensive summary of the existing methodology with extensions to the more complex model variants, since considerations on bounded rationality of complex economic behavior provide the foundation underlying choice-theoretic and policy-oriented studies of macro behavior, which impact the real macro economy. It includes 13 chapters addressing traditional models such as monopoly, duopoly and oligopoly in microeconomics and Keynesian, Goodwinian, and Kaldor–Kaleckian models in macroeconomics. Each chapter presents new aspects of these traditional models that have never been seen before. This work renews the past wisdom and reveals tomorrow's knowledge.

This book presents a variety of advanced research papers in optimization and dynamics written by internationally recognized researchers in these fields. As an example of applying optimization in sport, it introduces a new method for finding the optimal bat sizes in baseball and softball. The book is divided into three parts: operations research, dynamics, and applications. The operations research section deals with the convergence of Newton-type iterations for solving nonlinear equations and optimum problems, the limiting properties of the Nash bargaining solution, the utilization of public goods, and optimizing lot sizes in the automobile industry. The topics in dynamics include special linear approximations of nonlinear systems, the dynamic behavior of industrial clusters, adaptive learning in oligopolies, periodicity in duopolies resulting from production constraints, and dynamic models of love affairs. The third part presents applications in the fields of reverse logistic network design for end-of-life wind turbines, fuzzy optimization of the structure of agricultural products, water resources management in the restoration plans for a lake and also in groundwater supplies. In addition it discusses applications in reliability engineering to find the optimal preventive replacement times of deteriorating equipment and using bargaining theory to determine the best maintenance contract. The diversity of the application areas clearly illustrates the usefulness of the theory and methodology of optimization and dynamics in solving practical problems.

This book has its focus on the dynamics of oligopoly games. Several contributions show how easily the unique Nash equilibria in some most traditional oligopoly models may lose stability, giving way to complex phenomena, such as periodic/chaotic processes, and to multi stability of coexistent attractors. The bifurcations producing these phenomena are studied by means of recently accumulated global methods, based on the use of critical curves. These tools are explained in a separate methodological chapter. The book also contains some historical background of the present theory. In this way the book becomes suitable also as an advanced text for industrial organisation courses. The various models presented in the book focus both classical Cournot types, and Hotelling`s "ice cream vendor" problems, including location choice. The author list comprises some of the most prolific contributors to current dynamic oligopoly modelling.

My interest in microsimulation started to develop when I was exposed to the works of Guy Orcutt and his associates on microsimulation of households in the USA, and those of Gunnar Eliasson and his associates on simulatio~ of Swedish firms. Their approaches promised the exciting possibility to represent an by simulating the behaviour of individual microeconomic entire economic system units on a computer. The construction of a large scale microsimulation model seemed to be a worthwhile adventure which could yield much more detailed results than existing models. It was also evident that microsimulation of firms is a relatively underdeveloped area, in spite of the large number of operational microsimulation models of households in the USA and Europe. Developing the computer implementation has been an integral part of the research. Translating initially vague ideas into mathematical formulae and subsequently into a structured computer language provides a testing ground for 10Bical consistency of ideas. When writing this book I have purposefully abstained from describing the computer program and dedicated solution algorithms. The reason is that the book is primarily directed towards readers interested in economics and therefore uses the language of economics and not that of computer science. The simulation model has been programmed for the personal computer in Turbo Pascal. Sophisticated memory management techniques have lifted constraints on the number of firms which can be simulated on the PC.

This thesis is a theoretical study of the optimal dynamic policies of a, to some extent, slowly adjusting firm that faces an exogeneously given technological progress and an exogeneously given business cycle. It belongs to the area of mathematical economics. It is intended to appeal to mathematical economists in the first place, economists in the second place and mathematicians in the third place. It entails an attempt to stretch the limits of the application of deterministic dynamic optimisation to economics, in particular to firm behaviour. A well-known· Dutch economist (and trained mathematician) recently stated in 1 a local university newspaper that mathematical economists give economics a bad reputation, since they formulate their problems from a mathematical point of view and they are only interested in technical, mathematical problems. At the same time, however, "profound as economists may be, when it comes to extending or modifying the existing theory to make it applicable to a certain economic problem, an understanding of optimal control theory (which is the mathematical theory used in this thesis, ovh) based solely on heuristic arguments will often turn out to be inadequate" (SydS