Contents: (1) History of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR): Establishment of the SPR; (2) The Drawdown Authorities: Proposals in the 111th Congress to Amend the Authorities; (3) Acquisition of Crude Oil for the SPR: Resumption of Fill (2009); Royalty-in-Kind Acquisition; (4) When Should the SPR Be Used?: The Debate Over the Years; Use of the SPR in the Persian Gulf War (1990); Hurricanes and Changes in the Market Dynamics (2005-2008); The Call for an SPR Drawdown: Summer 2008; (5) Establishment of a Regional Home Heating Oil Reserve.

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) was created in 1975 to help insulate the U.S. economy from oil supply disruptions and currently holds about 700 million barrels of crude oil. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the Dept. of Energy (DoE) to increase the SPR storage capacity from 727 million barrels to 1 billion barrels, which it plans to accomplish by 2018. Since 1999, oil for the SPR has generally been obtained through the royalty-in-kind program, whereby the gov¿t. receives oil instead of cash for payment of royalties on leases of fed. property. This testimony focuses on: (1) factor that DoE should consider when filling the SPR; and (2) the cost-effectiveness of using oil received through the royalty-in-kind program to fill the SPR.

In 1973, the United States and other western countries were shocked by the Arab oil embargo. Lines formed at gasoline pumps; fuel stations ran out of supply; prices skyrocketed; and the nation realized its vulnerability to decisions made by leaders of countries half a world away. In response, the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), which was signed into law by President Gerald Ford in 1975, has become the nation?s primary tool of energy policy. Following its first major use during the Persian Gulf War of 1991, officials and policy makers at the highest levels increasingly turned to the SPR to stave off shortages and mitigate rising energy prices. Author and historian Bruce A. Beaubouef examines, for the first time, the interactions that have shaped the development of the SPR. He argues that the SPR has survived because it is a passive regulatory tool that serves to protect energy consumers and petroleum consumption and does not compete with the American oil industry. Indeed, by the late twentieth century, as American import dependency reached new heights, refiners and transporters increasingly relied upon the SPR as a ready resource to help maintain feedstock when supplies were tight or disrupted. In a time of continued vulnerability, this definitive work will be of interest to those concerned with the history, economy, and politics of the oil and gas industry, as well as to historians and practitioners of oil and energy policy.