The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order is the third volume in Gilbert Rozman's trilogy on national identity. The first two volumes, edited by Gilbert Rozman, concerned the identities of three East Asian countries: China, Japan, and South Korea. These books analyzed how these countries' national identities suffered through their relation to modernization, and examined how the national identity of each differed from the other two and how those differences were shaped by the relation of each country to the United States. In this third volume, Rozman examines Russia together with China. The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order argues that China and Russia's national identities are much closer to each other than usually thought, and are growing even closer. Moreover, the closeness of their identities comes neither from their prerevolutionary pasts nor from today's practical politics, but rather from habits carried over from their communist periods, even though the ideological dimensions of their identities have weakened since 1990.

With many predicting the end of US hegemony, Russia and China's growing cooperation in a number of key strategic areas looks set to have a major impact on global power dynamics. But what lies behind this Sino-Russian rapprochement? Is it simply the result of deteriorated Russo–US and Sino–US relations or does it date back to a more fundamental alignment of interests after the Cold War? In this book Alexander Lukin answers these questions, offering a deeply informed and nuanced assessment of Russia and China’s ever-closer ties. Tracing the evolution of this partnership from the 1990s to the present day, he shows how economic and geopolitical interests drove the two countries together in spite of political and cultural differences. Key areas of cooperation and possible conflict are explored, from bilateral trade and investment to immigration and security. Ultimately, Lukin argues that China and Russia’s strategic partnership is part of a growing system of cooperation in the non-Western world, which has also seen the emergence of a new political community: Greater Eurasia. His vision of the new China–Russia rapprochement will be essential reading for anyone interested in understanding this evolving partnership and the way in which it is altering the contemporary geopolitical landscape.

This book examines how recent fundamental changes influence Sino-Russian relations and the wider long-term implications of the revolving Sino-Russian dynamic on international affairs. It brings together leading scholars to examine recent developments across the whole relationship – from grand strategy and global governance, to bilateral energy and military ties, and regional interaction in Central Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East. The Sino-Russian relationship boasts major achievements, but also reveals important differences and latent tensions. The project is intended for policy-makers, academics and students of strategic studies, diplomacy studies, Chinese politics, Russian politics and foreign policy.

The second of Gilbert Rozman's contributed volumes on East Asian national identity traces how efforts to draw a sharp divide between one country's identity and that of another shape relations in the post-Cold War era. It examines the two-way relations of Japan, South Korea, and China, introducing the concept of a national identity gap to estimate the degree to which the identities of two countries target each other as negative contrasts. This concept is then applied to China's reinterpretation from 2009-11 of the gap between its identity and that of the United States. Each pairing represents a key relationship through which an Asian country has historically shaped its identity, and is striving to reshape it. The volume begins with experts' analyses of how Japan, South Korea and China have changed their diplomatic environment in Asia in order to transform identity. In the second half of the book, Rozman reflects on the discomfort all three East Asian countries have from excessive dependence on the United States. He concentrates on Chinese discourse in particular, as analyzed through the ideological, temporal, sectoral, vertical, and horizontal dimensions of national identity. Even if foreign policy turns more cautionary for a time, Rozman argues that China's inflammatory identity discourse, which remains at an intensity unmatched in the other countries, will continue to have a chilling effect on prospects for pragmatic diplomacy with the U.S.

This book facilitates exchanges between scholars and researchers from around the world on China-Eurasia relations. Comparing perspectives and methodologies, it promotes interdisciplinary dialogue on China’s pivot towards Eurasia, the Belt and Road initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Beijing’s cooperation and arguments with India, the EU, Western Balkans and South Caucasus states and the Sino-Russian struggle for multipolarity and multilateralism in Eurasia. It also researches digitalization processes in Eurasia, notably it focuses on China's Silk Road and Digital Agenda of Eurasian Economic Union. Multipolarity without multilateralism is a dangerous mix. Great power competitions will remain. In the Asian regional system more multilateral cushions have to be developed. Scholars from different nations including China, India, Russia, Austria, Armenia, Georgia, United Arab Emirates and Montenegro introduce their own, independent research, making recommendations on the developments in China-Eurasia relations, and demonstrating that through joint discussions it is possible to find ways for cooperation and for ensuring peaceful coexistence. The book will appeal to policymakers and scholars and students in Chinese, Eurasian, International and Oriental Studies.

For more than a century, no US adversary or coalition of adversaries - not Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union - has ever reached sixty percent of US GDP. China is the sole exception, and it is fast emerging into a global superpower that could rival, if not eclipse, the United States. What does China want, does it have a grand strategy to achieve it, and what should the United States do about it? In The Long Game, Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades worth of party documents, leaked materials, memoirs by party leaders, and a careful analysis of China's conduct to provide a history of China's grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. Taking readers behind the Party's closed doors, he uncovers Beijing's long, methodical game to displace America from its hegemonic position in both the East Asia regional and global orders through three sequential "strategies of displacement." Beginning in the 1980s, China focused for two decades on "hiding capabilities and biding time." After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, it became more assertive regionally, following a policy of "actively accomplishing something." Finally, in the aftermath populist elections of 2016, China shifted to an even more aggressive strategy for undermining US hegemony, adopting the phrase "great changes unseen in century." After charting how China's long game has evolved, Doshi offers a comprehensive yet asymmetric plan for an effective US response. Ironically, his proposed approach takes a page from Beijing's own strategic playbook to undermine China's ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan.

While the “decline of the West” is now almost taken for granted, China’s impressive economic performance and the political influence of an assertive Russia in the international arena are combining to make Eurasia a key hub of political and economic power. That, certainly, is the story which Beijing and Moscow have been telling for years. Are the times ripe for a “Eurasian world order”? What exactly does the supposed Sino-Russian challenge to the liberal world entail? Are the two countries’ worsening clashes with the West drawing them closer together? This ISPI Report tackles every aspect of the apparently solidifying alliance between Moscow and Beijing, but also points out its growing asymmetries. It also recommends some policies that could help the EU to deal with this “Eurasian shift”, a long-term and multi-faceted power readjustment that may lead to the end of the world as we have known it.

The most significant challenge to the post-Cold War international order is the growing power of ambitious states opposed to the West. Iran, Russia and China each view the global structure through the prism of historical experience. Rejecting the universality of Western liberal values, these states and their governments each consider the relative decline of Western economic hegemony as an opportunity. Yet cooperation between them remains fragmentary. The end of Western sanctions and the Iranian nuclear deal; the Syrian conflict; new institutions in Central and East Asia: in all these areas and beyond, the potential for unity or divergence is striking. In this new and comprehensive study, Ariane Tabatabai and Dina Esfandiary address the substance of this `triple axis' in the realms of energy, trade, and military security. In particular they scrutinise Iran-Russia and the often overlooked field of Iran-China relations. Their argument - that interactions between the three will shape the world stage for decades to come - will be of interest to anyone looking to understand the contemporary international security puzzle.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system has been unipolar, centered on the United States. But the rise of China foreshadows a change in the distribution of power. Øystein Tunsjø shows that the international system is moving toward a U.S.-China standoff, bringing us back to bipolarity—a system in which no third power can challenge the top two. The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics surveys the new era of superpowers to argue that the combined effects of the narrowing power gap between China and the United States and the widening power gap between China and any third-ranking power portend a new bipolar system that will differ in crucial ways from that of the last century. Tunsjø expands Kenneth N. Waltz’s structural-realist theory to examine the new bipolarity within the context of geopolitics, which he calls “geostructural realism.” He considers how a new bipolar system will affect balancing and stability in U.S.-China relations, predicting that the new bipolarity will not be as prone to arms races as the previous era’s; that the risk of limited war between the two superpowers is likely to be higher in the coming bipolarity, especially since the two powers are primarily rivals at sea rather than on land; and that the superpowers are likely to be preoccupied with rivalry and conflict in East Asia instead of globally. Tunsjø presents a major challenge to how international relations understands superpowers in the twenty-first century.

A Financial Times Best Book of the Year The untold story of how Russian espionage in imperial China shaped the emergence of the Russian Empire as a global power. From the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire made concerted efforts to collect information about China. It bribed Chinese porcelain-makers to give up trade secrets, sent Buddhist monks to Mongolia on intelligence-gathering missions, and trained students at its Orthodox mission in Beijing to spy on their hosts. From diplomatic offices to guard posts on the Chinese frontier, Russians were producing knowledge everywhere, not only at elite institutions like the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg. But that information was secret, not destined for wide circulation. Gregory Afinogenov distinguishes between the kinds of knowledge Russia sought over the years and argues that they changed with the shifting aims of the state and its perceived place in the world. In the seventeenth century, Russian bureaucrats were focused on China and the forbidding Siberian frontier. They relied more on spies, including Jesuit scholars stationed in China. In the early nineteenth century, the geopolitical challenge shifted to Europe: rivalry with Britain drove the Russians to stake their prestige on public-facing intellectual work, and knowledge of the East was embedded in the academy. None of these institutional configurations was especially effective in delivering strategic or commercial advantages. But various knowledge regimes did have their consequences. Knowledge filtered through Russian espionage and publication found its way to Europe, informing the encounter between China and Western empires. Based on extensive archival research in Russia and beyond, Spies and Scholars breaks down long-accepted assumptions about the connection between knowledge regimes and imperial power and excavates an intellectual legacy largely neglected by historians.