The Persian Gulf, important because of its vast energy resources, emerged into the limelight of geopolitics at the time of the British Labour government’s policy of withdrawal from East of Suez in 1968. Before 1968 it had been recognised that the Gulf lay in the legitimate sphere of influence of Britain, while the United States exerted its influence in the two pivotal littoral states of Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Soviets had been gaining influence in Iraq ever since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 and the Chinese were also fishing for influence by their support of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Gulf. This book examines the political axes of the various super-powers with Iran and the Persian Gulf and discusses the implications of these problems for the issue of security in the region.

This volume provides a broadly comparative and historical re-examination of the fundamental strategic dilemmas that confront the Western world in the Persian Gulf region. This systematic study of how the West has defined and dealt with its security interests in this region reveals three central strategic dilemmas: strategy versus capability, globalism versus regionalism, and unilateralism versus collectivism. The first part of the book focuses on US policy with particular emphasis on the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The author explains why there has been a persistent gap between American perceptions of the Middle East and the political and strategic realities of the region. The second part of the book examines the frustrated efforts of NATO members to form a cooperative response to their collective interests in the region.

In the first years of the Soviet regime there was little, if any, Soviet interest in Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Over the last fifty years relations between Russia and this part of the world have become more complex; this book traces their intricate history in a full analysis of Soviet policy towards the Arabian Peninsula. It opens with a review of events from the beginning of the Soviet regime until 1975. The author goes on to consider the period between 1975 and 1978, concentrating especially on Soviet relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and South Yemen. The impact of the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Republic in 1979 is examined in detail, with the emphasis on the situation in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and both North and South Yemen. Finally the author examines the effect on Soviet policy of the Iran-Iraq war and the subsequent insecurity in the Gulf region. This study is based on mainly primary sources of Soviet, Arab, Iranian and Western origins.

This book is a fascinating critical examination of the characteristics and development of the armed forces in Iran, their role under the Shah and their re-creation in the war against Iraq as the fighting forces of Islam. The author examines the contradictory accounts, including the Shah’s own Answer to History, as well as newly available accounts by highly placed ex-officials, and interviews with exiled army officers. He examines in detail the apparent shift of allegiance within the forces from the Shah to Imam and the ways in which this was accomplished. Major Iranian offensives, changing strategies from human wave assault to the Tankers War, and the delicate balance between the regular Army and the Revolutionary Guards, are also extensively examined. The book concludes with an analysis of the potential role of the armed forces in a succession crisis.

In this book experts examine the main features of Iran’s foreign policy from 1980 – 1990, assessing relations with the UN, the superpowers, Europe, the GCC and Iraq. Although the Islamic revolution made Iran a significant force in the international arena, it is argued that the ending of the Cold War and the rise of Iraq as the dominant power in the Gulf are now creating a very different set of foreign policy challenges and options.

This book analyses the distant and proximate causes of the 1978 revolution in Iran as well as the dynamics of power which it set in motion. The volume explains the complex and far-reaching processes which produced the revolution, beginning in the late nineteenth century. In explaining the more proximate causes of the revolution, the book analyses the nature of the old regime and its internal contradictions; the emergence of some fundamental conflicts of interest between the state and the upper class; the economic crisis of 1975-8 which made possible a revolutionary mass immobilisation; and the emergence of a new religious interpretation of political authority and the unusual spread of the ideology of political Islam among a segment of the modern intelligentsia. The volume relates the diverse aspects of class, ideology and economic structure in order to provide an understanding of the political processes.

Since the turn of the century Iran has experienced three major political upheavals in the struggle to democratize her political systems. The last revolution inaugurated an era of unprecedented turmoil and instead of fulfilling its democratic aim, paved the way for an even more despotic theocracy. To put the revolution in a proper perspective, some attempt is made to explain the reasons for Khomeini’s success in acquiring first, the symbolic leadership of the anti-Shah revolution, and then, the monopolistic control of power in Iran. How and why the other claimants to power were shunted aside and later brutally repressed is a further theme for discussion. The domestic and external ramifications of the revolution are examined in detail; in particular the rise of the anti-American feeling which culminated in the hostage crisis. In conclusion, an analysis is offered of the instrumentalities of power available to the Islamic Republic, and several scenarios are explored in which Iran’s competing forces may converge to determine whether this third revolution will finally succeed in subordinating political authority to popular democratic consent.

Relations between the USSR and Iran during the period from the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic up to early 1983 are reviewed in this book. It begins with a brief survey of Russian-Persian relations in earlier years, with a focus on the developments that served as a background to the current events. It examines Soviet attitudes and reactions to Iran’s foreign and internal policy and highlights the way in which the Soviets often raise events of which they do not approve in order to draw Iran closer to them. In particular, the book discusses the Soviet response to the Iran-Iraq war and the position of the Tudeh Party and the other leftists within Iran. Iran’s policy towards the USSR is treated at length and it is shown that it is suspicious of a tacit USA-USSR agreement over the fate of Iran. Khomeini’s attempts to isolate Iran from both East and West are also reviewed. This book was one of the first to discuss this crucial dimension in Middle East politics and it makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the forces driving the Iranian Revolution.