This military history offers a provocative take on the “Special Relationship” between the UK and the USA from the close of WWI into the Cold War. After the Great War, the American government contemplated what it would mean to pursue global superpower status. One potential consequence might have been conflict with Great Britain. And so, the US drew up War Plan Red: a scheme by which American forces invaded Canada and the Caribbean, drawing the Royal Navy into North American waters—and leaving the rest of the British Empire vulnerable to attack. In 1939, the American military created an intelligence-gathering machine within their Embassy in London under Ambassador Joe Kennedy. Two years later, the US Army Special Observer Group traveled to Britain to plan for Anglo-American cooperation should the United States enter World War II. Their intelligence-gathering activities spread out as far as the Middle East, Africa, South America, Russia, and Asia—far beyond the terms of the original brief. At the start of the Cold War, a whole new range of subterfuge was initiated by the CIA. So, were the Americans allies or spies? In this enlightening study, acclaimed military historian Graham M. Simons examines how two of history’s greatest allies could find themselves in bitter conflict.

This book examines the interplay between sanctions and nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The volume aims to tackle three separate but closely intertwined issues: It aims to revisit the debate on, and deconstruct the concept of, sanctions; to provide a working theoretical framework; to differentiate between positive sanctions (or incentives or carrots) and negative sanctions; to identify the actors who may initiate sanctions (i.e. states, regional, and/or international organizations); to ascertain the legality and legitimacy of such sanctions taking place; to problematize and discuss the utility of sanctions; and so on. It aims to disentangle the concepts of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, particularly in light of the most recent geopolitical global shifts on nuclear powers-interplay taking place in the background of the war in Ukraine and rising tensions in Southeast Asia, and so on. Finally, it aims to conjoin the cause-and-effect cases between the application of sanctions, on the one hand, and the decision by states to pursue nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, on the other. By doing so, the volume helps to update and stimulate the academic and policy debate on the inter-relation between sanctions and nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear non-proliferation, economic sanctions, security studies, and International Relations.

An award-winning author tells the stories of the audacious American politicians, military commanders, and business executives who took it upon themselves to depose monarchs, presidents, and prime ministers of other countries with disastrous long-term consequences.

The story of the Consolidated B-36 is unique in American aviation history. The aircraft was an interesting blend of concepts proven during the Second World War combined with budding 1950s high-tech systems. The program survived near-cancellation on six separate occasions during an extremely protracted development process. It was also the symbol of a bitter inter-service rivalry between the newly-formed US Air Force and the well-established US Navy over which of which of the two organizations would control the delivery of atomic weapons during the early years of the Cold War. Entering service in 1948, the B-36 was a remarkable design. It was the largest mass-produced piston-engine aircraft ever built, having the longest wingspan of any combat aircraft in history. Importantly, in terms of the developing Cold War at least, the B-36 was the first bomber capable of delivering any of the weapons in America’s nuclear arsenal without modification. To achieve this part of its role, the Peacemaker had an operational range of 10,000 miles, being capable of intercontinental flight without refueling. It is difficult to imagine a modern aircraft remaining airborne for two days without refueling – but such missions were relatively routine for the B-36 crews. while there were, at the time of its service, questions around its flight speed, the Peacemaker flew so high that this was considered of little concern – few fighters of its era could reach the same altitudes, and operational surface-to-air missiles were still in the future. The B-36, despite its seemingly conventional appearance, pushed the state-of-the-art technology further than any other aircraft of its era. Its sheer size brought with it structural challenges, while its high-altitude capabilities led to engine cooling and associated problems. However, all of these were finally overcome, and the B-36 served well as the first ‘Big Stick’ of the Cold War.

Uncovers and examines Britain's counter-subversive policies and security measures implemented in the post-war Middle East, Middle Eastern affairs make headlines. Not only are they politically volatile, but the cultural and religious contexts complicate Western involvement in the region. This book reveals secret British intelligence liaisons with Middle Eastern regimes during the early Cold War. It shows how Britain tried to influence regional intelligence and security services and shape their approach to countering communist subversion. Analysing newly declassified documents alongside extensive archival research and historiography, the book pieces together the intelligence culture build by the British Empire in the Middle East in the post-war era.

For more than a century, no US adversary or coalition of adversaries - not Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union - has ever reached sixty percent of US GDP. China is the sole exception, and it is fast emerging into a global superpower that could rival, if not eclipse, the United States. What does China want, does it have a grand strategy to achieve it, and what should the United States do about it? In The Long Game, Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades worth of party documents, leaked materials, memoirs by party leaders, and a careful analysis of China's conduct to provide a history of China's grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. Taking readers behind the Party's closed doors, he uncovers Beijing's long, methodical game to displace America from its hegemonic position in both the East Asia regional and global orders through three sequential "strategies of displacement." Beginning in the 1980s, China focused for two decades on "hiding capabilities and biding time." After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, it became more assertive regionally, following a policy of "actively accomplishing something." Finally, in the aftermath populist elections of 2016, China shifted to an even more aggressive strategy for undermining US hegemony, adopting the phrase "great changes unseen in century." After charting how China's long game has evolved, Doshi offers a comprehensive yet asymmetric plan for an effective US response. Ironically, his proposed approach takes a page from Beijing's own strategic playbook to undermine China's ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan.

In this riveting memoir, bestselling author Perkins details his former role as an economic hit man. This stunning, behind-the-scenes expos reveals a conspiracy of corruption that has fueled instability and anti-Americanism around the globe.

A century ago, the Theodore Roosevelt administration believed building an American empire was the only way the U.S. could ensure its role in the world, but came to see the occupation of the Philippines as America's "heel of Achilles." Woodrow Wilson, shocked by the failure of American intervention in Mexico and by the outbreak of World War I, came to see imperialism as the underlying cause of war and set about trying to create an international system to eliminate empires. But, the current Bush administration, despite the lessons of the past, has revived the older dreams of American empire--under the guise of democracy--even touting the American experience in the Philippines as a success upon which the United States could build in attempting to transform the Middle East. With The Folly of Empire, John B. Judis shows that history can teach us lessons and allow political leaders, if sensitive to history, to change their strategy in order to avoid past mistakes. Judis shows how presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to Bill Clinton drew upon what Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson learned about the pitfalls of using American power unilaterally to carve out a world in America's image. Exercising leadership through international institutions and alliances, the United States was able to win the Cold War and the first Gulf War. But by ignoring these lessons, the Bush administration has created a quagmire of terror and ethnic conflict. By examining America's role in the international community--then and now--The Folly of Empire is a sharp and compelling critique of America's current foreign policy and offers a direct challenge to neo-conservatives.

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