The present essay is the result of multiple investigations. However, it is important to clarify the reasons on the base of its conception. The transformations operated in Angola allowed the emergence of a political system of liberal democracy. Although that was the case, in practical terms, there are several trends. Some tend to integration, others to disintegration, and the others are in an intermediate position. After all, everything gravitates around the fight to capture and maintain power, with a certain exacerbation and lack of knowledge of certain peculiarities of the pluralist system, as well as a lack of mastery of other aspects. In parallel, there is a trend to ignore common history, life in society, national conquests, etc. There are also many misunderstandings concerning the handling of state life. Some arise from lack of political-strategic culture, others from eagerness to take power promptly, and others still from scarce clarity of some aspects of the functional model and lack of state vision. Likewise, the country sees statements that do not help internal life at all and contribute to increased vulnerabilities, thus forming a potential threat to national interests. All in all, peace, stability, well-being, common good, and security require ways of thinking and acting that are more in line with a contemporary way of life. Still, we face a whole set of demands arising from present challenges, which require adaptation and the imperious need to help solve regional and international problems. But meanwhile, for this to happen, one must catapult to other levels of organization and strive mainly for clarity in the global operation of the state.

For over twenty years, the South African Border War was fought to counter the influence of Marxism-Leninism and to maintain control of Namibia. The South African people relied on cultural tools and adaptive strategies to protect their own interests. John S. McCain IV isn't interested in taking sides on this issue; instead, he analyzes the military's tactics, operational effectiveness, and strategy. Angola, Clausewitz, and the American Way of War explores the concept of strategy making in war within the context of the South African Border War. It describes the danger of leaning on middle-range theories over general theories and of starting the decision-making process in the middle rather than at the top. Wars should not be forced into a type as one thing or another-and then assumed to be all the same, based on that type. Each individual war should be seen for what it is, unique, and those in charge should be prepared to make changes and reevaluate every step of the way to account for all the moving pieces and the realities on the ground. In the same vein as The Direction of War by Hew Strachan, McCain recognizes that US wars since 9/11 have been poorly strategized. This heavily researched volume challenges traditional approaches to conflict and suggests ways they could be improved.

Angola, slowly recovering from a twenty-seven year civil war, is becoming a regional super-power in southern Africa. This rise can be attributed to oil, diamonds, a battle-tested armed forces and a political system that is dominated by one party – the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola – MPLA). Problems remain to be solved. The vast wealth is in the control of the elite while the vast majority of the people live on less than two dollars per day. Corruption is rife, the health and education system in shambles, landmines remain a festering problem and the opposition is intimidated and split into various factions. President Eduardo dos Santos, who has ruled Angola for almost thirty-eight years, has opted not to run for re-election in the August 2017 elections. Instead his hand-picked successor João Lourenço was elected president. Interestingly, dos Santos has not surrendered his presidency of the party. This third edition of Historical Dictionary of Angola contains a chronology, an introduction, appendixes, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has over 700 cross-referenced entries on important personalities, politics, economy, foreign relations, religion, and culture. This book is an excellent resource for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about Angola.

This book traces three decades of securitisation in Angola. As a governing strategy during war and peacetime, it muted the aspirations of those on opposing sides, distorted the state, emboldened elites and redefined the identity of Angolans. Through this lens, Paula Cristina Roque provides an original account of Angola’s post-conflict state-building. Securitisation protected the interests of President dos Santos, the ruling MPLA party and the elites supporting the regime. Angola’s array of security forces and infrastructure provided an alternative to a fully functioning executive, at national, provincial and local levels. The intrusive way in which any form of dissent or activism was crushed allowed the presidency to control the direction and narrative of the post-war years. But the façade of democracy, development and stability hid a very different reality for the majority of Angolans, who remained poor, disenfranchised and marginalised. Roque explores the inner workings of the intelligence services, army and presidential guard, explaining the trajectory of a survivalist and fearful regime presiding over scarcities and injustices. She shows that the survival of national security and governing elites was the highest priority. The ‘shadows’ held far more power than institutions, and weakened them–widening the gap between government and governed.

Angola Information Strategy, Internet and E-Commerce Development Handbook - Strategic Information, Programs, Regulations

This book on the national strategy of Angola targets several objectives. First, to attest that the newly independent Angolan state also formulated a national strategy in the light of its political and philosophical vision. The Angolan state, during the period under consideration, had its own structured vision, which prevented it from going adrift and playing second fiddle within the context of political and military confrontation in Southern Africa. Second, to demonstrate that the Angolan state structured its own strategic thought to tackle the regional armed confrontation and the different internal and external challenges.

In 1961, Portugal found itself fighting a war to retain its colonial possessions and preserve the remnants of its empire. It was almost completely unprepared to do so, and this was particularly evident in its ability to project power and to control the vast colonial spaces in Africa. Following the uprisings of March of 1961 in the north of Angola, Portugal poured troops into the colony as fast as its creaking logistic system would allow; however, these new arrivals were not competent and did not possess the skills needed to fight a counterinsurgency. While counterinsurgency by its nature requires substantial numbers of light infantry, the force must be trained in the craft of fighting a ‘small war’ to be effective. The majority of the arriving troops had no such indoctrination and had been readied at an accelerated pace. Even their uniforms were hastily crafted and not ideally suited to fighting in the bush. In reoccupying the north and addressing the enemy threat, Portugal quickly realized that its most effective forces were those with special qualifications and advanced training. Unfortunately, there were only very small numbers of such elite forces. The maturing experiences of Portuguese and their consequent adjustments to fight a counterinsurgency led to development of specialized, tailored units to close the gaps in skills and knowledge between the insurgents and their forces. The most remarkable such force was the flechas, indigenous Bushmen who lived in eastern Angola with the capacity to live and fight in its difficult terrain aptly named ‘Lands at the End of the Earth’. Founded in 1966, they were active until the end of the war in 1974, and were so successful in their methods that the flecha template was copied in the other theaters of Guiné and Mozambique and later in the South African Border War. The flechas were a force unique to the conflicts of southern Africa. A flecha could smell the enemy and his weapons and read the bush in ways that no others could do. He would sleep with one ear to the ground and the other to the atmosphere and would be awakened by an enemy walking a mile away. He could conceal himself in a minimum of cover and find food and water in impossible places. In short, he was vastly superior to the enemy in the environment of eastern Angola, and at the height of the campaign there (1966–1974) this small force accounted for 60 per cent of all enemy kills. This book is the story of how they came to be formed and organized, their initial teething difficulties, and their unqualified successes.

The book takes a hard look at internal developments and class formation in the region and explores the complex dynamics underlying the 'failure' of socialist transformation, demystifying the highly-simplified 'destabilisation' thesis and pointing to some of the problems that forces for change in South Africa itself may have to face in the 1990s. The chapters make significant reference to changing present and future relations with South Africa, and to the impact of internal changes on the development of neighbouring countries.

An investigation of the origins of the Angolan civil war of 1975-76. By looking at the interaction between internal and external factors, it reveals the domestic roots of the conflict and the impact of foreign intervention on the civil war. The formative influence of colonialism and anti-colonialism on the emergence of Angolan rivalry since 1961 is described, and the externalization of that power struggle is analysed from a perspective of both international and domestic politics.