Japanese and Chinese immigrants in the United States have traditionally been characterized as hard workers who are hesitant to involve themselves in labor disputes or radical activism. How then does one explain the labor and Communist organizations in the Asian immigrant communities that existed from coast to coast between 1919 and 1933? Their organizers and members have been, until now, largely absent from the history of the American Communist movement. In Japanese and Chinese Immigrant Activists, Josephine Fowler brings us the first in-depth account of Japanese and Chinese immigrant radicalism inside the United States and across the Pacific. Drawing on multilingual correspondence between left-wing and party members and other primary sources, such as records from branches of the Japanese Workers Association and the Chinese Nationalist Party, Fowler shows how pressures from the Comintern for various sub-groups of the party to unite as an “American” working class were met with resistance. The book also challenges longstanding stereotypes about the relationships among the Communist Party in the United States, the Comintern, and the Soviet Party.

A mosaic of lives and voices illustrating the history of the Chinese Communist Party over the last hundred years.

This book provides an historical overview of the Japanese Communist Party from its foundation to the present. It outlines the development of the party, explores its stance on key issues and discusses how the party has set a high moral tone, avoiding compromising coalitions with other parties, being intolerant of corruption within its own ranks, and frequently and consistently opposing the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. The book also considers the internal nature of the party, which continues to have a mass membership, and which in recent years has softened its former somewhat rigid approach. The book emphasizes the importance for Japan of this moral approach as the conscience of the nation, especially as the present Abe government moves Japan to the right, even though the Japanese Communist Party has never gained power and is never likely to.

Drawing on a wealth of new sources, this work documents the evolving relationship between Moscow and Peking in the twentieth century. Using newly available Russian and Chinese archival documents, memoirs written in the 1980s and 1990s, and interviews with high-ranking Soviet and Chinese eyewitnesses, the book provides the basis for a new interpretation of this relationship and a glimpse of previously unknown events that shaped the Sino-Soviet alliance. An appendix contains translated Chinese and Soviet documents - many of which are being published for the first time. The book focuses mainly on Communist China's relationship with Moscow after the conclusion of the treaty between the Soviet Union and Kuomingtang China in 1945, up until the signing of the treaty between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party in 1950. It also looks at China's relationship with Moscow from 1920 to 1945, as well as developments from 1950 to the present. The author reevaluates existing sources and literature on the topic, and demonstrates that the alliance was reached despite disagreements and distrust on both sides and was not an inevitable conclusion. He also shows that the relationship between the two Communist parties was based on national interest politics, and not on similar ideological convictions.

In the quarter century after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Beijing assisted Vietnam in its struggle against two formidable foes, France and the United States. Indeed, the rise and fall of this alliance is one of the most crucial developments in the history of the Cold War in Asia. Drawing on newly released Chinese archival sources, memoirs and diaries, and documentary collections, Qiang Zhai offers the first comprehensive exploration of Beijing's Indochina policy and the historical, domestic, and international contexts within which it developed. In examining China's conduct toward Vietnam, Zhai provides important insights into Mao Zedong's foreign policy and the ideological and geopolitical motives behind it. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, he shows, Mao considered the United States the primary threat to the security of the recent Communist victory in China and therefore saw support for Ho Chi Minh as a good way to weaken American influence in Southeast Asia. In the late 1960s and 1970s, however, when Mao perceived a greater threat from the Soviet Union, he began to adjust his policies and encourage the North Vietnamese to accept a peace agreement with the United States.

The collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance was one of the defining events of the Cold War, revealing that the supposedly monolithic socialist camp was riddled with internal conflicts. This book examines the causes of the split, in particular the divisive role of Marxist-Leninist ideology.