The story of the RAF, and in particular Fighter Command, during the Battle of Britain has been told many times. It is a tale of the gallant pilots of ‘The Few’, in their Hurricanes and Spitfires, with the nation’s back to the wall, fighting off the Luftwaffe’s airborne assault against enormous odds. But the story of Fighter Command’s operations immediately after the Battle of Britain is less well known. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Hugh Montague Trenchard commanded the Royal Flying Corps in the First World War. His policy then had been for his aircraft and men to be continually on the offensive, always over the German lines taking the fight to the enemy. After being promoted to command the RAF, Trenchard retired in 1930. In November 1940, Trenchard showed up again at the Air Ministry and proposed that the RAF should ‘Lean Towards France’ – that it should go on the offensive. The RAF would, claimed Trenchard, win the resulting battle of attrition. One of the main outcomes of the RAF’s new offensive stance was the introduction of the Circus sorties. These were attacks undertaken by a small force of bombers with a powerful fighter escort. They were intended to lure enemy fighters into the air so that they could be engaged by RAF fighters, the primary objective being the destruction of Luftwaffe fighters, followed by the protection of the bombers from attack. A further development of the Circus missions were Ramrods, Rhubarbs and Rodeos, all of which were variations on the same theme. A Ramrod was similar to a Circus, though in this instance the primary objective was the destruction of the target, the main role of the accompanying fighters being to protect the bombers from attack. A Rhubarb was a small-scale attack by fighters using cloud cover and/or surprise, the object of which was to destroy German aircraft in the air and/or striking at ground targets, while a Rodeo consisted of a fighter sweep over enemy territory with no bombers. Drawing on official documents and archive material, as well as accounts by many of those involved, James Starkey reveals just how Trenchard’s views won through and the RAF went on the offensive from late 1940 into 1941. Was it a failed strategy? If so, why was it not halted once the results began to be seen?

The story of the RAF, and in particular Fighter Command, during the Battle of Britain has been told many times. It is a tale of the gallant pilots of ‘The Few’, in their Hurricanes and Spitfires, with the nation’s back to the wall, fighting off the Luftwaffe’s airborne assault against enormous odds. But the story of Fighter Command’s operations immediately after the Battle of Britain is less well known. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Hugh Montague Trenchard commanded the Royal Flying Corps in the First World War. His policy then had been for his aircraft and men to be continually on the offensive, always over the German lines taking the fight to the enemy. After being promoted to command the RAF, Trenchard retired in 1930. In November 1940, Trenchard showed up again at the Air Ministry and proposed that the RAF should ‘Lean Towards France’ – that it should go on the offensive. The RAF would, claimed Trenchard, win the resulting battle of attrition. One of the main outcomes of the RAF’s new offensive stance was the introduction of the Circus sorties. These were attacks undertaken by a small force of bombers with a powerful fighter escort. They were intended to lure enemy fighters into the air so that they could be engaged by RAF fighters, the primary objective being the destruction of Luftwaffe fighters, followed by the protection of the bombers from attack. A further development of the Circus missions were Ramrods, Rhubarbs and Rodeos, all of which were variations on the same theme. A Ramrod was similar to a Circus, though in this instance the primary objective was the destruction of the target, the main role of the accompanying fighters being to protect the bombers from attack. A Rhubarb was a small-scale attack by fighters using cloud cover and/or surprise, the object of which was to destroy German aircraft in the air and/or striking at ground targets, while a Rodeo consisted of a fighter sweep over enemy territory with no bombers. Drawing on official documents and archive material, as well as accounts by many of those involved, James Starkey reveals just how Trenchard’s views won through and the RAF went on the offensive from late 1940 into 1941. Was it a failed strategy? If so, why was it not halted once the results began to be seen?

The story of the RAF, and in particular Fighter Command, during the Battle of Britain has been told many times. It is a tale of the gallant pilots of 'The Few', in their Hurricanes and Spitfires, with the nation's back to the wall, fighting off the Luftwaffe's airborne assault against enormous odds. But the story of Fighter Command's operations immediately after the Battle of Britain is less well known.Marshal of the Royal Air Force Hugh Montague Trenchard commanded the Royal Flying Corps in the First World War. His policy then had been for his aircraft and men to be continually on the offensive, always over the German lines taking the fight to the enemy. After being promoted to command the RAF, Trenchard retired in 1930.In November 1940, Trenchard showed up again at the Air Ministry and proposed that the RAF should 'Lean Towards France' - that it should go on the offensive. The RAF would, claimed Trenchard, win the resulting battle of attrition.One of the main outcomes of the RAF's new offensive stance was the introduction of the Circus sorties. These were attacks undertaken by a small force of bombers with a powerful fighter escort. They were intended to lure enemy fighters into the air so that they could be engaged by RAF fighters, the primary objective being the destruction of Luftwaffe fighters, followed by the protection of the bombers from attack.A further development of the Circus missions were Ramrods, Rhubarbs and Rodeos, all of which were variations on the same theme. A Ramrod was similar to a Circus, though in this instance the primary objective was the destruction of the target, the main role of the accompanying fighters being to protect the bombers from attack. A Rhubarb was a small-scale attack by fighters using cloud cover and/or surprise, the object of which was to destroy German aircraft in the air and/or striking at ground targets, while a Rodeo consisted of a fighter sweep over enemy territory with no bombers.Drawing on official documents and archive material, as well as accounts by many of those involved, James Starkey reveals just how Trenchard's views won through and the RAF went on the offensive from late 1940 into 1941. Was it a failed strategy? If so, why was it not halted once the results began to be seen?

Discusses the Allied invasion of Normandy, with extensive details about the planning stage, called Operation Overlord, as well as the fighting on Utah and Omaha Beaches.

Over the past 80 years, histories of the Battle of Britain have consistently portrayed the feats of 'The Few' (as they were immortalized in Churchill's famous speech) as being responsible for the RAF's victory in the epic battle. However, this is only part of the story. The results of an air campaign cannot be measured in terms of territory captured, cities occupied or armies defeated, routed or annihilated. Successful air campaigns are those that achieve their intended aims or stated objectives. Victory in the Battle of Britain was determined by whether the Luftwaffe achieved its objectives. The Luftwaffe, of course, did not, and this detailed and rigorous study explains why. Analysing the battle in its entirety in the context of what it was – history's first independent offensive counter-air campaign against the world's first integrated air defence system – Douglas C. Dildy and Paul F. Crickmore set out to re-examine this remarkable conflict. Presenting the events of the Battle of Britain in the context of the Luftwaffe's campaign and RAF Fighter Command's battles against it, this title is a new and innovative history of the battle that kept alive the Allies' chances of defeating Nazi Germany.

An examination of the relationship between the Royal Air Force and the French Fighter pilots who flew for the RAF during WWII.

"Whether you have feelings about Bader or not, this is an excellent book to gain insight into the summer of 1941 when, ready or not, the RAF went on the offensive."—The Journal of the Air Force Historical Foundation On 30 August 1940, at the height of the Battle of Britain, the pilots of RAF Fighter Command’s No.12 Group were requested to reinforce 11 Group and intercept a Luftwaffe raid on an aircraft factory at Hatfield. The events that day led the swashbuckling, legless, fighter pilot Douglas Bader to submit a report arguing that the more fighters he had at his disposal, the greater would be the execution of the enemy that could be achieved. It was a concept that received support from 12 Group’s Air Officer Commanding, Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory. In Bader’s proposal, Leigh-Mallory saw an opportunity for 12 Group to play a greater part in what was clearly an historic battle. Leigh-Mallory authorised Bader to lead three, then five, squadrons – a controversial formation that came to be known as the ‘Duxford Wing’ or ‘Big Wing’. For the rest of 1940, Bader and the ‘Big Wing’, then based at Duxford, played its part in the defense of Britain’s skies. Then, in March 1941, the role of ‘Wing Commander (Flying)’ was created. This was the fighter pilot’s dream appointment because the Wing Leader’s sole responsibility was leading his wing in action, unfettered by tedious administration and logistical matters. Needless to say, Douglas Bader was amongst the first wing leaders. He was even given the choice of which Wing he preferred. He chose to take command of that based at Tangmere on the South Coast – right at the fore of the RAF’s battle against the Luftwaffe. In Bader’s Spitfire Wing, Dilip Sarkar not only explores the full story of the men and machines of the Tangmere Wing in 1941, as well as the controversy that surrounds their use, he also fully investigates the part that they played in the RAF’s efforts to take the offensive to the Luftwaffe on the opposite side of the English Channel. It was in one such sortie in August 1941 that the Tangmere Wing lost its famous leader. Bader went on to spend the rest of the war in captivity.

It opens with a brief history of the service, followed by a chapter that reviews its situation on the outbreak of war. The chapters that follow look at the structure of the RAF, from the Air Ministry and Chief of the Air Staff down to squadron level, to include each of the Commands, including Transport Command (a creation of the war years). The main aircraft types used are listed, as well as a full listing of squadrons and airfields in the British Isles. The training of personnel, and such matters as uniforms, rank insignia, medals and life on a typical airfield, are also covered. The main battles or campaigns in which the service was involved are also described.

By the summer of 1943, the Third Reich’s fate seemed sealed. The combined might of Britain and the Commonwealth nations, the United States and the Soviet Union had made a Germany victory impossible. All that remained to decide was how the Allies should complete their victory. Would strategic bombing decide the outcome or would ground and air forces working together play the more significant role? Greg Baughen follows the air and land battles in Italy, France and Germany between 1943 and early 1944, as well as the equally bitter battles behind the scenes as army and air commanders debated and argued over how the war should be won. He charts the trials, tribulations, and successes of the bomber offensive and assesses whether, in the final analysis, the bomber strategy shortened or lengthened the war. He explains how army air support went backwards after the successes of the Desert Air Force, and how this led to a failure to support the troops landing on the D-Day beaches in Normandy. He also describes the subsequent revival of tactical air support and how it went on to play a key role in the subsequent campaigns but questions whether Eisenhower, Montgomery or Tedder ever fully understood how to make best use of the massive aerial forces available to them. Drawing on archive documents and accounts written at the time, the author tackles some fundamental defense issues. Was RAF independence a benefit or a hindrance to the Allied cause? To what extent was the War Office to blame for shortcomings in army air support? Did Britain understand the way the methods for waging war were evolving in the twentieth century? He takes a look at how the Air Ministry was interpreting the lessons being learned during the war. Were the defense policies of the twenties and thirties still valid? Had they ever been valid? This, then, is the story of the decisions and actions that the RAF followed in the months leading up to D-Day and the Normandy landings.