Originally published in 1978, the laws and procedures governing person identification parades, photofit pictures and the forms of questions asked to obtain a description, had been increasingly called into question. The problem had been highlighted by several well publicised court cases, and considered by the Devlin Committee. This book reviews the status of psychological knowledge at the time concerning the many aspects of person identification and scientifically evaluates the methods and procedures used. Contrary to the popular belief that identification is a simple affair, the authors use the theory and method of psychology to reveal the sources of the difficulties involved in recognising a once-seen person. Estimates of just how good a witness can be are drawn from laboratory studies using face photographs, from mock crime incidents, and from actual criminal cases, for reliability varies markedly in each of these three situations. Both an individual and a social perspective is taken of the eye-witnesses, and research into perception and memory, together with individual differences in such things as cognitive style, personality, suggestibility, age, sex, and ability to form both eidetic and memory images, are examined. The social aspects of stereotypes, the presence of other witnesses and the desire to be a ‘good witness’ are all discussed at length. Finally an extended examination of the possibility of voice parades and changes in identification procedures, together with man-machine interaction techniques, is undertaken.

This edited volume features cutting-edge work in moral psychology by pre-eminent scholars in moral self-identity, moral character, and moral personality.

Today, political claims are increasingly made on the basis of experienced trauma and inherent vulnerability, as evidenced in the growing number of people who identify as a "survivor" of one thing or another, and also in the way in which much political discourse and social policy assumes the vulnerability of the population. This book discusses these developments in relation to the changing focus of social movements, from concerns with economic redistribution, towards campaigns for cultural recognition. As a result of this, the experience of trauma and psychological vulnerability has become a dominant paradigm within which both personal and political grievances are expressed. Combining the psychological, social, and political aspects of the expression of individual distress and political dissent, this book provides a unique analysis of how concepts such as "vulnerability" and "trauma" have become institutionalised within politics and society. It also offers a critical appraisal of the political and personal implications of these developments, and in addition, shows how the institutionalisation of the survivor identity represents a diminished view of the human subject and our capacity to achieve progressive political and individual change. This book will be of interest to researchers, postgraduate and undergraduate students of critical psychology, sociology, social policy, politics, social movements and mental health.

'Identity' as a concept has many faces, and its very versatility in different contexts can make it hard to define. Florian Coulmas discusses the many meanings of this slippery concept, considering why individual and collective identities are important to us, and discussing the problems asserting individual identities can create.

The second edition of The Oxford Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology beautifully captures the history, current status, and future prospects of personality and social psychology. Building on the successes and strengths of the first edition, this second edition of the Handbook combines the two fields of personality and social psychology into a single, integrated volume, offering readers a unique and generative agenda for psychology. Over their history, personality and social psychology have had varying relationships with each other-sometimes highly overlapping and intertwined, other times contrasting and competing. Edited by Kay Deaux and Mark Snyder, this Handbook is dedicated to the proposition that personality and social psychology are best viewed in conjunction with one another and that the synergy to be gained from considering links between the two fields can do much to move both areas of research forward in order to better enrich our collective understanding of human nature. Contributors to this Handbook not only offer readers fascinating examples of work that cross the boundaries of personality and social psychology, but present their work in such a way that thinks deeply about the ways in which a unified social-personality perspective can provide us with a greater understanding of the phenomena that concern psychological investigators. The chapters of this Handbook effortlessly weave together work from both disciplines, not only in areas of longstanding concern, but also in newly emerging fields of inquiry, addressing both distinctive contributions and common ground. In so doing, they offer compelling evidence for the power and the potential of an integrated approach to personality and social psychology today.

This volume provides a tutorial review and evaluation of scientific research on the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness identification. The book starts with the perspective that there are a variety of conceptual and empirical problems with eyewitness identification as a form of forensic evidence, just as there are a variety of problems with other forms of forensic evidence. There is then an examination of the important results in the study of eyewitness memory and the implications of this research for psychological theory and for social and legal policy. The volume takes the perspective that research on eyewitness identification can be seen as the paradigmatic example of how psychological science can be successfully applied to real-world problems.

Many philosophers believe that normative ethics is in principle independent of psychology. By contrast, the authors of these essays explore the interconnections between psychology and moral theory. They investigate the psychological constraints on realizable ethical ideals and articulate the psychological assumptions behind traditional ethics. They also examine the ways in which the basic architecture of the mind, core emotions, patterns of individual development, social psychology, and the limits on human capacities for rational deliberation affect morality.

The book argues for an understanding of the person where the social world is not a set of variables that affect a pre-existing individual, but is instead the arena where the person becomes formed.

Most philosophers writing about personal identity in recent years claim that what it takes for us to persist through time is a matter of psychology. In this groundbreaking new book, Eric Olson argues that such approaches face daunting problems, and he defends in their place a radically non-psychological account of personal identity. He defines human beings as biological organisms, and claims that no psychological relation is either sufficient or necessary for an organism to persist. Rejecting several famous thought experiments dealing with personal identity, he instead argues that one could survive the destruction of all of one's psychological contents and capabilities as long as the human organism remains alive.