"Through a combination of text, quotations, cartoons, tables, charts, and graphs, Bhagwati ... looks at the forces for and against protection."--Jacket.

The contribution of the American School of Political Economy (1848 to 1914) to America's wildly successful industrial development has disappeared from today's history books. American protectionists and technology theorists of the day were concerned with securing an economic competitive advantage and conversely, with offsetting the soil depletion of 19th century America's plantation export agriculture. They also emphasized the positive effect of rising wage levels and living standards on the productivity that made the American economic takeoff possible. The American School's "Economy of High Wages" doctrine stands in contrast to the ideology of free traders everywhere who accept low wages and existing productivity as permanent and unchanging "givens," and who treat higher consumption, health and educational standards merely as deadweight costs. Free trade logic remains the buttress of today's financial austerity policies imposed on debtor economies by the United States, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. By contrast, the lessons of the American School of Political Economy can provide a more realistic and positive role model for other countries to emulate - what the United States itself has done, not what its condescending "free-trade" diplomats are telling them to do. The lesson is to adopt the protectionist policies of the late 19th and early 20th centuries that made America an economic superpower. Michael Hudson (Distinguished Professor of Economics, University of Missouri, Kansas City) is a frequent contributor to The Financial Times, Counterpunch, and Global Research.

Conventional wisdom holds that free trade is economically beneficial to nations. But this does not prevent industries and interest groups from lobbying their governments for protection, which creates a fear of electoral backlash among politicians hoping to promote free trade. The Limits of Protectionism demonstrates how governments can attain those economic benefits while avoiding the political costs.Michael Lusztig's theoretical model focuses on a process by which protectionists can be pushed to restructure and compete in a global economy. In this process, a small cutback in domestic protection leads to lost market shares at home; producers must then turn to overseas exports, and, as the size of foreign profits grow, former protectionists become active advocates for more and greater free trade opportunities.In a wide-ranging array of case studies—from nineteenth-century Britain to Depression-era United States to contemporary New Zealand, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, and Mexico—Lusztig reveals that, if skillfully handled, governments can eliminate the obstacles to free trade and enjoy continued economic growth without fear of protectionist groups seeking revenge at the ballot box.

Milner explores the similarities between the economic conditions of the 1920s and the 1970s, where both Western Europe and the U.S. had high unemploymnet rates and sizeable agricultural and industrial overcapacity. She draws on evidence from six U.S. industries in the 1920s, six U.S. firms in the 1970s, and six French industries in the 1970s, and concludes that in the 1970s both nations had corporations with international market interests than they had in the 1920s. She believes that in modern industrial nations, the corporate sector plays an important role in policy determination, and that any move toward protectionism would be at the behest of large corporations with international interests. ISBN 0-691-05670-6: $29.50.

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Over the course of his professional life, John Maynard Keynes altered his views from free trade in the classical tradition to restricted foreign trade, and ultimately, at the end of his career, back to his original position. There is no general agreement among economists as to whether Keynes ended his career in the camp of the free traders or aligned himself with the protectionists. John Maynard Keynes: Free Trader or Protectionist? seeks an answer to this question by analyzing Keynes’ own views on this issue, as stated in his major publications, letters, speeches, testimony before government bodies, newspaper articles, participation in conferences, and other sources. Through this detailed review of what Keynes himself had to say on the issue as opposed to what others have alleged, this book strives to make a significant contribution to the resolution of this issue.

A history of America's most infamous tariff The Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, which raised U.S. duties on hundreds of imported goods to record levels, is America's most infamous trade law. It is often associated with—and sometimes blamed for—the onset of the Great Depression, the collapse of world trade, and the global spread of protectionism in the 1930s. Even today, the ghosts of congressmen Reed Smoot and Willis Hawley haunt anyone arguing for higher trade barriers; almost single-handedly, they made protectionism an insult rather than a compliment. In Peddling Protectionism, Douglas Irwin provides the first comprehensive history of the causes and effects of this notorious measure, explaining why it largely deserves its reputation for combining bad politics and bad economics and harming the U.S. and world economies during the Depression. In four brief, clear chapters, Irwin presents an authoritative account of the politics behind Smoot-Hawley, its economic consequences, the foreign reaction it provoked, and its aftermath and legacy. Starting as a Republican ploy to win the farm vote in the 1928 election by increasing duties on agricultural imports, the tariff quickly grew into a logrolling, pork barrel free-for-all in which duties were increased all around, regardless of the interests of consumers and exporters. After Herbert Hoover signed the bill, U.S. imports fell sharply and other countries retaliated by increasing tariffs on American goods, leading U.S. exports to shrivel as well. While Smoot-Hawley was hardly responsible for the Great Depression, Irwin argues, it contributed to a decline in world trade and provoked discrimination against U.S. exports that lasted decades. Peddling Protectionism tells a fascinating story filled with valuable lessons for trade policy today.

The global financial crisis of 2008/9 is the Great Depression of the 21st century. For many though, the similarities stop at the Wall Street Crash as the current generation of policymakers have acted quickly to avoid the mistakes of the past. Yet the global crisis has made room for mistakes all of its own. While governments have apparently kept to their word on refraining from protectionist measures in the style of 1930s tariffs, there has been a disturbing rise in "murky protectionism." Seemingly benign, these crisis-linked policies are twisted to favour domestic firms, workers and investors. This book, first published as an eBook on VoxEU.org in March 2009, brings together leading trade policy practitioners and experts - including Australian Trade Minister Simon Crean and former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo. Initially its aim was to advise policymakers heading in to the G20 meeting in London, but since the threat of murky protectionism persists, so too do their warnings.

This biography, focused on McKinley''s unusual view of protectionism, a labor-business alliance, and American exceptionalism, offers striking parallels to today as the US struggles to define its international role and to determine the best blend of free trade, protectionism, and immigration. William McKinley was the first US president to address globalization; his legacy in protectionism and immigrant labor offer lessons for the current era. He orchestrated an alliance between big business and the American worker that ushered in one of the greatest periods of growth ever known in the US economy. Yet McKinley has been in the shadow of his successor Theodore Roosevelt for over a hundred years. As Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, McKinley had forged a tariff bill in 1888 that united a nation that was still divided between North and South, East and West. His continued efforts to support free trade, protected by managed markets in the tradition of Henry Clay, and worker benefits like those provide by George Westinghouse, led to a great economic compromise. Further, with revolutionary, visionary rhetoric laden with America''s economic manifest destiny he appealed to everyone from the steelworkers of Pittsburgh to the New York bankers. He articulated a uniting philosophy: Free trade in the United States is founded upon a community of equalities and reciprocities...[F]ree foreign trade admits the foreigner to equal privileges with our citizens. It invites the product of foreign cheap labor to this market in competition with the domestic, representing better paid labor [albeit with tariffs to protect that domestic product]. McKinley''s vision built the industrial base of the nation. By the end of his presidency the American steel, glass, rubber, oil, machinery and electrical appliance industries dominated the world. He was one of America''s most popular presidents. As his funeral train crossed the nation in 1901, factory workers and captains of industry alike stood along the rails to mourn him. Never since has such a political alliance between labor and management been forged. He was the last president to build a voting alliance between laborers, immigrant workers, and capitalists. That alliance was marred by famous labor strikes and the building of great trusts, yet he still managed to sweep the labor votes in the great industrial centers due to his belief in reciprocity and protectionism. McKinley''s role as a dinner pail Republican offers insights into how America can approach today''s globalization with the best interests of the home team in mind.