The author gives a critical and comprehensive study of the fundamental problem of universals in Indian Philosophy. The centre of the study is the controversy between the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Mimamsa realists on the one hand and the Buddhist nominalists on the other. The author discusses not only the epistemological and metaphysical approach to the problem of universals but also the semantic approach made by the various systems of Indian Philosophy. In this context the view of the Grammarions with special reference to Bhartrhari has been discussed in some detail. A brief but critical analysis of some of the main trends of thought on universals in Western Philosophy--beginning from Pluto to the contemporary philosophers--has also been given. Besides his scholarly and eminently readable treatment of fundamental problem of universals, the author has attempted to give his own solution of the problem. It is based on the recurrent identities and similarities which are the principles of grouping and which form the foundation of our thought and speech.

When we understand that something is a pot, is it because of one property that all pots share? This seems unlikely, but without this common essence, it is difficult to see how we could teach someone to use the word "pot" or to see something as a pot. The Buddhist apoha theory tries to resolve this dilemma, first, by rejecting properties such as "potness" and, then, by claiming that the element uniting all pots is their very difference from all non-pots. In other words, when we seek out a pot, we select an object that is not a non-pot, and we repeat this practice with all other items and expressions. Writing from the vantage points of history, philosophy, and cognitive science, the contributors to this volume clarify the nominalist apoha theory and explore the relationship between apoha and the scientific study of human cognition. They engage throughout in a lively debate over the theory's legitimacy. Classical Indian philosophers challenged the apoha theory's legitimacy, believing instead in the existence of enduring essences. Seeking to settle this controversy, essays explore whether apoha offers new and workable solutions to problems in the scientific study of human cognition. They show that the work of generations of Indian philosophers can add much toward the resolution of persistent conundrums in analytic philosophy and cognitive science.

This book offers a major reassessment of the philosophy of Peter Abelard (1079-1142) which shows that he was a far more constructive and wider-ranging thinker than has usually been supposed. It combines detailed historical discussion, based on published and manuscript sources, with philosophical analysis which aims to make clear Abelard's central arguments about the nature of things, language and the mind, and about morality. Although the book concentrates on these philosophical questions, it places them within their theological and wider intellectual context.

Induction is a basic method of scientific and philosophical inquiry. The work seeks to show against the skeptical tide that the method is secure and reliable. The problem of induction has been a hotly debated issue in modern and contemporary philosophy since David Hume. However, long before the modern era Indian philosophers have addressed this problem for about two thousand years. This work examines some major Indian viewpoints including those of Jayarasi (7th century), Dharmakirti (7th century), Prabhakara (8th century), Udayana (11th century) and Prabhacandra (14th century). It also discusses some influential contemporary positions including those of Russell, Strawson, Popper, Reichenbach, Carnap, Goodman and Quine. The main focus is on the Nyaya view developed by Gangesa (13th century). A substantial part of the work is devoted to annotated translation of selected chapters from Gangesa's work dealing with the problem of induction with copious references to the later Nyaya philosophers including Raghunatha (15th century), Mathuranatha (16th century), Jagadisa (17th century) and Gadadhara (17th century). An annotated translation of selections from Sriharsa (12th century) of the Vedanta school, Prabhacandra of the Jaina school and Dharmakirti of the Buddhist school is also included. A solution is presented to the classical problem of induction and the Grue paradox based on the Nyaya perspective. The solution includes an argument from counterfactual reasoning, arguments in defense of causality, analyses of circularity and logical economy, arguments for objective universals and an argument from belief-behavior contradiction.

For many of us, the term 'medieval philosophy' conjures up the figure of Thomas Aquinas, and is closely intertwined with religion. In this Very Short Introduction John Marenbon shows how medieval philosophy had a far broader reach than the thirteenth and fourteenth-century universities of Christian Europe, and is instead one of the most exciting and diversified periods in the history of thought. Introducing the coexisting strands of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish philosophy, Marenbon shows how these traditions all go back to the Platonic schools of late antiquity and explains the complex ways in which they are interlinked. Providing an overview of some of the main thinkers, such as Boethius, Abelard, al-Fârâbî, Avicenna, Maimonides, and Gersonides, and the topics, institutions and literary forms of medieval philosophy, he discusses in detail some of the key issues in medieval thought: universals; mind, body and mortality; foreknowledge and freedom; society and the best life. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.

Are there universal properties grounding our sense of resemblance or qualitative identity among a number of distinct things or events which appear to form a class, a type or a kind of some other sort? Do universals such as humanness, triangularity, or being an oak exist? Is being a laptop computer a universal which has only recently come into existence? Do predicate expressions, adjectives or abstract nouns refer to objective properties or cognitive contents called concepts? The problem of universals has been at the centre of ancient, medieval, Western and Indian metaphysics. After the logico-linguistic turn in philosophy, this problem re-surfaced in the discourse on the meaning of predicate expressions on the one hand and in the theories of concepts on the other. By introducing newly commissioned essays written by the leading metaphysicians, epistemologists, philosophers of language and philosophers of mathematics, this anthology evinces current analytic philosophy's healthy re-engagement with this perennial problem. Issues raised include: Do properties and other abstract entities exist independently of human language and thought? Can we be in direct perceptual touch with properties or particular qualities? Is a higher order quantification over predicated properties intelligible or indispensable? Insights from current Western thought are compared with recent work in analytic Indian philosophy on such issues. No serious researcher or teacher of contemporary and comparative analytical metaphysics can afford to ignore the essays of this collection.

Thematically structured, wide-ranging and philosophically rigorous, including details of Indian arguments and their theoretical motivations. An essential resource for undergraduate students.

An Introduction to Indian Philosophy offers a profound yet accessible survey of the development of India’s philosophical tradition. Beginning with the formation of Brāhmaṇical, Jaina, Materialist, and Buddhist traditions, Bina Gupta guides the reader through the classical schools of Indian thought, culminating in a look at how these traditions inform Indian philosophy and society in modern times. Offering translations from source texts and clear explanations of philosophical terms, this text provides a rigorous overview of Indian philosophical contributions to epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, and ethics. This is a must-read for anyone seeking a reliable and illuminating introduction to Indian philosophy. Key Updates in the Second Edition Reorganized into seven parts and fifteen chapters, making it easier for instructors to assign chapters for a semester-long course. Continues to introduce systems historically, but focuses on new key questions and issues within each system. Details new arguments, counter-arguments, objections, and their reformulations in the nine schools of Indian philosophy. Offers expanded discussion of how various schools of Indian philosophy are engaged with each other. Highlights key concepts and adds new grey boxes to explain selected key concepts. Includes a new section that problematizes the Western notion of "philosophy." New Suggested Readings sections are placed at the end of each chapter, which include recommended translations, a bibliography of important works, and pertinent recent scholarship for each school. Adds a new part (Part III) that explains the difficulties involved in translating from Sanskrit into English, discusses fundamental concepts and conceptual distinctions often used to present Indian philosophy to Western students, and reviews important features and maxims that most darśanas follow. Provides new examples of applications to illustrate more obscure concepts and principles.

First Published in 2001. Part of the Indian Philosophy collection of readings, this volume focuses on Metaphysics. The complement to pramdna theory is prameya theory. Wherea s th e pramdnas are the means of knowledge, the prameyas are the knowables. cognizable entities which constitute the world. With respect to the number and kinds of such entities, there was a very wide variety of opinion among classical Indian philosophers. Moreover, since according to most Indian systems knowledge of reality is at least a necessary condition for liberation , these metaphysical disputes were taken to be of practical as well as theoretical import.