As many formerly authoritarian regimes have been replaced by democratic governments in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere, questions have arisen about the stability and durability of these new governments. One concern has to do with the institutional arrangements for governing bequeathed to the new democratic regimes by their authoritarian predecessors and with the related issue of whether presidential or parliamentary systems work better for the consolidation of democracy. In this book, Peter Siavelis takes a close look at the important case of Chile, which had a long tradition of successful legislative resolution of conflict but was left by the Pinochet regime with a changed institutional framework that greatly strengthened the presidency at the expense of the legislature. Weakening of the legislature combined with an exclusionary electoral system, Siavelis argues, undermines the ability of Chile's National Congress to play its former role as an arena of accommodation, creating serious obstacles to interbranch cooperation and, ultimately, democratic governability. Unlike other studies that contrast presidential and parliamentary systems in the large, Siavelis examines a variety of factors, including socioeconomic conditions and characteristics of political parties, that affect whether or not one of these systems will operate more or less successfully at any given time. He also offers proposals for institutional reform that could mitigate the harm he expects the current political structure to produce.

As many formerly authoritarian regimes have been replaced by democratic governments in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere, questions have arisen about the stability and durability of these new governments. One concern has to do with the institutional arrangements for governing bequeathed to the new democratic regimes by their authoritarian predecessors and with the related issue of whether presidential or parliamentary systems work better for the consolidation of democracy. In this book, Peter Siavelis takes a close look at the important case of Chile, which had a long tradition of successful legislative resolution of conflict but was left by the Pinochet regime with a changed institutional framework that greatly strengthened the presidency at the expense of the legislature. Weakening of the legislature combined with an exclusionary electoral system, Siavelis argues, undermines the ability of Chile's National Congress to play its former role as an arena of accommodation, creating serious obstacles to interbranch cooperation and, ultimately, democratic governability. Unlike other studies that contrast presidential and parliamentary systems in the large, Siavelis examines a variety of factors, including socioeconomic conditions and characteristics of political parties, that affect whether or not one of these systems will operate more or less successfully at any given time. He also offers proposals for institutional reform that could mitigate the harm he expects the current political structure to produce.

How was Chile transformed both politically and economically during the two decades of center-left coalition (Concertación) government that followed the country¿s return to democracy in 1990? How did the coalition manage to hold on to power for so long¿but not longer? And were its policies in fact substantially different from those that preceded them? Addressing these questions, the authors of this landmark volume critically assess the successes and failures of Concertación politics and policies in post-Pinochet Chile.

This book identifies sources of power that help business and economic elites influence policy decisions.

Universal human rights standards were adopted in 1948, but in the 1970s and 1980s, violent dictatorships in Argentina and Chile flagrantly defied the new protocols. Chilean general Augusto Pinochet and the Argentine military employed state terrorism in their quest to eradicate Marxism and other forms of “subversion.” Pinochet constructed an iron shield of impunity for himself and the military in Chile, while in Argentina, military pressure resulted in laws preventing prosecution for past human rights violations. When democracy was reestablished in both countries by 1990, justice for crimes against humanity seemed beyond reach. Thomas C. Wright examines how persistent advocacy by domestic and international human rights groups, evolving legal environments, unanticipated events that impacted public opinion, and eventual changes in military leadership led to a situation unique in the world—the stripping of impunity not only from a select number of commanders of the repression but from all those involved in state terrorism in Chile and Argentina. This has resulted in trials conducted by national courts, without United Nations or executive branch direction, in which hundreds of former repressors have been convicted and many more are indicted or undergoing trial. Impunity, Human Rights, and Democracy draws on extensive research, including interviews, to trace the erosion and collapse of the former repressors’ impunity—a triumph for human rights advocates that has begun to inspire authorities in other Latin American countries, including Peru, Uruguay, Brazil, and Guatemala, to investigate past human rights violations and prosecute their perpetrators.

This book analyzes Chile's political economy and its attempt to build a market society in a highly inegalitarian country.

This book uses a multi-method approach to examine the impact of truth commissions on subsequent human rights protection and democratic practice and features cross-national case studies on South Africa, El Salvador, Chile and Uganda.

What explains variance in presidential power between countries? In Presidential Power in Latin America, Dan Berbecel provides a general, systematic theory for explaining presidential power in practice as opposed to presidential power in theory. Using expert survey data from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) alongside interviews with high-level figures in politics, the judiciary, the public administration, NGOs, and academia in Argentina and Chile, Berbecel argues that constitutional presidential power (formal power) is a very poor predictor of presidential power in practice (informal power). Given the poor predictive value of formal rules, he provides an explanation why hyperpresidentialism emerges in some countries but not in others. Berbecel attributes the root causes of hyperpresidentialism to three independent variables (the strength of state institutions, the size of the president’s party in congress, and whether or not the country has a history of economic crises) which together determine how likely it is that a president will be able to concentrate power. Presidential Power in Latin America will be of key interest to scholars and students of executive politics, Latin American politics, and more broadly, comparative politics.

Examines the tragic development and resolution of Latin America's human rights crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. Focusing on state terrorism in Chile under General Augusto Pinochet and in Argentina during the Dirty War (1976-1983), this book offers an exploration of the reciprocal relationship between Argentina and Chile and human rights movements.

Michele Bachelet, Chile's first female president, was elected with an explicit gender agenda in 2006 and then reelected in 2013. This volume focuses on Bachelet's efforts to introduce progressive measures and the constraints that she has faced in a context where both formal and informal political institutions can act as barriers to change.