The planning and execution of Operation Weserübung was the first major joint operation of its kind in history utilizing naval, ground, air, and airborne forces. Its conduct proves to be one of the most noteworthy applications of operational art and the principles of war during all of World War II. The principles of surprise and security were the most critical in the German success. The German planning taking into account and exploiting the operational factors of time, space and force are another key element in why this operation is worthy of further analysis and study. Additionally, the operational lessons learned that could be applied from the belligerents’ experiences further illustrate several important lessons that can apply today. From the Germans we saw the importance of planning around apparent disadvantages, command and control as it relates to operational objectives and commanders intent, and the importance of initiative in military operations. From the British, the pitfalls of mirror imaging and a lack of decisiveness can prove fatal in military operations. Lastly, from the Norwegian side we see the importance of national defense for maintaining a nations’ own self-determination against outside belligerents.

In April of 1940, the peaceful and neutral country of Norway became a battleground between Germany, France, and England in their desire to control it for their own war objectives. The Battle of Norway and as the Germans called it, Operation Weseruebung, was the first major military operation in history to utilize naval, ground, air, and airborne forces in the assault phase of the attack. The German success in this operation provides an outstanding example of the application of operational art and the principles of war by Germany in the early stages of World War II. The principles of surprise and security were the most critical in this German military success. Operation Weseruebung included both the invasion of Denmark and the invasion of Norway. The first phase of the operation was the invasion of Denmark; its air bases were needed for the invasion of Norway, and it fell in a single day. The focus of this paper will be on the Norwegian portion of Weseruebung. German military planning took into account and exploited the operational factors of time, space and force, another key element in why this operation is worthy of further analysis and study. The operational lessons learned that could be applied from the belligerents' experiences further illustrate several important lessons that are applicable today. From the Germans one learns the importance of planning around apparent disadvantages, command and control as it relates to operational objectives and commander's intent, and the importance of initiative in military operations. From the British one learns the pitfalls of mirror imaging and that a lack of decisiveness can prove fatal in military operations. Lastly, from the Norwegians, one can see the importance of national defense for maintaining a nation's self-determination against outside belligerents.

A ground-breaking study that looks at why European nations sent troops to take part in Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union.

Adolf Hitler had high hopes for his conquest of Norway, which held both great symbolic and great strategic value for the Fuhrer. Despite early successes, however, his ambitious northern campaign foundered and ultimately failed. Adam Claasen for the first time reveals the full story of this neglected episode and shows how it helped doom the Third Reich to defeat. Hitler and Raeder, the chief of the German navy, were determined to take and keep Norway. By doing so, they hoped to preempt Allied attempts to outflank Germany, protect sea lanes for German ships, access precious Scandinavian minerals for war production, and provide a launchpad for Luftwaffe and naval operations against Great Britain. Beyond those strategic objectives, Hitler also envisioned Norway as part of a pan-Nordic stronghold—a centerpiece of his new world order. But, as Claasen shows, Hitler's grand expectations were never realized. Gring's Luftwaffe was the vital spearhead in the invasion of Norway, which marked a number of wartime firsts. Among other things, it involved the first large-scale aerial operations over sea rather than land, the first time operational objectives and logistical needs were fulfilled by air power, and the first deployment of paratroopers. Although it got off to a promising start, the German effort, particularly against British and arctic convoys, was greatly hampered by flawed strategic thinking, interservice rivalries between the Luftwaffe and navy, the failure to develop a long-range heavy bomber, the diversion of planes and personnel to shore up the German war effort elsewhere, and the northern theater's harsh climate and terrain. Claasen's study covers every aspect of this ill-fated campaign from the 1940 invasion until war's end and shows how it was eventually relegated to a backwater status as Germany fought to survive in an increasingly unwinnable war. His compelling account sharpens our picture of the German air force and widens our understanding of the Third Reich's way of war.

This anthology discusses the converging operational issues of air base defense and counterinsurgency. It explores the diverse challenges associated with defending air assets and joint personnel in a counterinsurgency environment. The authors are primarily Air Force officers from security forces, intelligence, and the office of special investigations, but works are included from a US Air Force pilot and a Canadian air force officer. The authors examine lessons from Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other conflicts as they relate to securing air bases and sustaining air operations in a high-threat counterinsurgency environment. The essays review the capabilities, doctrine, tactics, and training needed in base defense operations and recommend ways in which to build a strong, synchronized ground defense partnership with joint and combined forces. The authors offer recommendations on the development of combat leaders with the depth of knowledge, tactical and operational skill sets, and counterinsurgency mind set necessary to be effective in the modern asymmetric battlefield.

This study compares the policies and attitudes toward the health consequences of World War II in eleven European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, East Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and West Germany. It shows the remarkably asynchronous development in these countries of health care financing and treatment for war survivors, and of the patients’ perception of their own health. Using an innovative and multidisciplinary approach, Withuis and Mooij analyze postwar health care in the context of the European political climate at that time.

In the history of modern warfare, Weserübung Nord, the German invasion of Norway in 1940, occupies a distinguished station as the first campaign “jointly” planned and executed by ground, sea, and air forces. This paper examines the origins, concept, and planning of Weserübung Nord, as well as the execution of the landings. Brief attention is given to the defense of the landings against Allied counterstrokes and to issues associated with unified planning and direction. The origins of the campaign are found in the German naval experience in the First World War, interwar naval strategy debates, and the persona of Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, who was determined to secure a decisive role for the German Navy in the Second World War. Raeder capitalized on the fortuitous opportunities the Russo-Finnish War and the Norwegian traitor Vidkun Quisling presented to win Hitler over to his naval plans. Raeder and the Navy heavily influenced the concept development and planning of the campaign in concert with the High Command of the (German) Armed Forces, which also had a vested organizational interest in a military solution of the Norwegian issue. In executing Weserübung Nord, the German Armed Forces encountered major problems only at Oslo and Narvik. However, the operational-level success of the campaign tends to draw attention away from fundamental problems regarding unified planning and direction which emerged during the preparation and execution of the campaign. “When the first [German] mountain troops in parachutes were dropped behind Narvik, it occurred that one fell directly in the water. The General [Dietl] came up to him as a petty officer was pulling him out of the water.” “So soldier, how do you end up here?” “With the help of the three branches of the Armed Forces, Herr General,” shouted the man quick-wittedly, “the Army sent me up here, the Air Force transported me, and the Navy pulled me out of the water.”-General Dietl: das Leben eines Soldaten

War is often described as an extension of politics by violent means. With contributions from twenty-eight eminent historians, Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of the Second World War examines the relationship between ideology and politics in the war's origins, dynamics and consequences. Part I examines the ideologies of the combatants and shows how the war can be understood as a struggle of words, ideas and values with the rival powers expressing divergent claims to justice and controlling news from the front in order to sustain moral and influence international opinion. Part II looks at politics from the perspective of pre-war and wartime diplomacy as well as examining the way in which neutrals were treated and behaved. The volume concludes by assessing the impact of states, politics and ideology on the fate of individuals as occupied and liberated peoples, collaborators and resistors, and as British and French colonial subjects.

A detailed account of Germany’s groundbreaking Operation Weserübung, the first three dimensional—land, sea, air—strategic invasion in history. The German invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 brought a sudden and shocking end to the “Phoney War” in the West. In a single day, multiple seaborne and airborne landings established German forces ashore in Norway, overwhelming the unprepared Norwegian forces and catching the Allied Powers completely by surprise. Their belated response was ill-thought-out and badly organized, and by June 9 all resistance had formally ended. The strategic importance of Scandinavian iron ore, shipped through the port of Narvik to Germany, was the main cause of the campaign. The authors show how Allied attempts to interdict these supplies provoked German plans to secure them, and also how political developments in the inter-war years resulted in both Denmark and Norway being unable to deter threats to their neutrality despite having done so successfully in the First World War. The German attack was their first “joint” air, sea, and land operation, making large-scale use of air-landing and parachute forces, and the Luftwaffe’s control of the air throughout the campaign would prove decisive. Although costly, particularly for the Kriegsmarine, it was a triumph of good planning, improvisation and aggressive, determined action by the troops on the ground. Making full use of Norwegian, Danish, and German sources, this book is a full and fascinating account of this highly significant campaign and its aftermath both for the course of the Second World War and the post-war history of the two countries conquered with such unprecedented speed.