The blame game, with its finger-pointing and mutual buck-passing, is a familiar feature of politics and organizational life, and blame avoidance pervades government and public organizations at every level. Political and bureaucratic blame games and blame avoidance are more often condemned than analyzed. In The Blame Game, Christopher Hood takes a different approach by showing how blame avoidance shapes the workings of government and public services. Arguing that the blaming phenomenon is not all bad, Hood demonstrates that it can actually help to pin down responsibility, and he examines different kinds of blame avoidance, both positive and negative. Hood traces how the main forms of blame avoidance manifest themselves in presentational and "spin" activity, the architecture of organizations, and the shaping of standard operating routines. He analyzes the scope and limits of blame avoidance, and he considers how it plays out in old and new areas, such as those offered by the digital age of websites and e-mail. Hood assesses the effects of this behavior, from high-level problems of democratic accountability trails going cold to the frustrations of dealing with organizations whose procedures seem to ensure that no one is responsible for anything. Delving into the inner workings of complex institutions, The Blame Game proves how a better understanding of blame avoidance can improve the quality of modern governance, management, and organizational design.

Analyses and compares political blame games in Western democracies to show how democratic political systems manage policy controversies.

From coping with Covid-19 through to manging climate change, from Brexit through to the barricading of Congress, from democratic disaffection to populist pressures, from historical injustices to contemporary social inequalities, and from scapegoating through to sacrificial lambs... the common thread linking each of these themes and many more is an emphasis on blame. But how do we know who or what is to blame? How do politicians engage in blame-avoidance strategies? How can blaming backfire or boomerang? Are there situations in which politicians might want to be blamed? What is the relationship between avoiding blame and claiming credit? How do developments in relation to machine learning and algorithmic governance affect blame-based assumptions? By focusing on the politics and governance of blame from a range of disciplines, perspectives, and standpoints this volume engages with all these questions and many more. Distinctive contributions include an emphasis on peacekeeping and public diplomacy, on source-credibility and anthropological explanations, on cultural bias and on expert opinions, on polarisation and (de)politicisation, and on trust and post-truth politics. With contributions from the world's leading scholars and emerging research leaders, this volume not only develops the theoretical, disciplinary, empirical, and normative boundaries of blame-based analyses but it also identifies new research agendas and asks distinctive and original questions about the politics and governance of blame.

This book analyzes whether citizens blame and credit European Union (EU) institutions for policy failures and successes, and how that matters when people make decisions about those institutions.

Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.

Being the first casualty of the international financial crisis, Iceland was, in many ways, turned into a laboratory when it came to responding to one of the largest corporate failures on record. This edited volume offers the most wide-ranging treatment of the Icelandic financial crisis and its political, economic, social, and constitutional consequences. Interdisciplinary, with contributions from historians, economists, sociologists, legal scholars, political scientists and philosophers, it also compares and contrasts the Icelandic experience with other national and global crises. It examines the economic magnitude of the crisis, the social and political responses, and the unique transitional justice mechanisms used to deal with it. It looks at backward-looking elements, including a societal and legal reckoning – which included the indictment of a Prime Minister and jailing of leading bankers for their part in the financial crisis – and forward-looking features, such as an attempt to rewrite the Icelandic constitution. Throughout, it underscores the contemporary relevance of the Icelandic case. While the Icelandic economic recovery has been much quicker than expected; it shows that public faith in political elites has not been restored. This text will be of key interest to scholars, policy-makers and students of the financial crisis in such fields as European politics, international political economy, comparative politics, sociology, economics, contemporary history, and more broadly the social sciences and humanities.

In American Maelstrom, Michael A. Cohen captures the full drama of this watershed election, establishing 1968 as the hinge between the decline of political liberalism and the ascendancy of conservative populism and the anti-government attitudes that continue to dominate the nation's political discourse, taking us to the source of the politics of division.

Drawing on the best scholars in the field from around the world, this handbook showcases conceptual and normative as well as the empirical approaches in public accountability studies.

Building on recent theories of interactive governance and political leadership, Interactive Political Leadership develops a concept of interactive political leadership and a theoretical framework for studying the role of elected politicians in the age of governance. The purpose of the theoretical framework is to inspire and guide empirical research into how elected politicians perform political leadership in a society where citizens and other stakeholders play an active role in making and implementing political decisions and what barriers, challenges, and dilemmas they encounter in relation to the performance of interactive political leadership. The research framework draws extensively on recent theories of interactive governance and political leadership and other new developments in political science and public administration research. Moreover, it finds inspiration in current tendencies and embryonic examples of interactive political leadership performed by elected politicians operating at different levels of governance in Western liberal democracies. The basic assumption is that political legitimacy is essential for the survival of a political system, and that interactive political leadership stands out as a promising way of securing what political scientists denote as input-, throughput-, output-, and outcome legitimacy in the age of governance. Hence, interactive political leadership aims to establish a bridge between representative democracy and emergent forms of political participation, to promote political learning and accountability, to strengthen the political entrepreneurship of elected politicians, and to advance the political system's implementation capacity through resource mobilization. The book develops 20 propositions that sets the agenda for a new and much needed field of empirical research into political leadership in the age of governance.

Acrimony and hyperpartisanship have seeped into every part of the political process. Congress is deadlocked and its approval ratings are at record lows. America's two main political parties have given up their traditions of compromise, endangering our very system of constitutional democracy. And one of these parties has taken on the role of insurgent outlier; the Republicans have become ideologically extreme, scornful of compromise, and ardently opposed to the established social and economic policy regime.In It's Even Worse Than It Looks, congressional scholars Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein identify two overriding problems that have led Congress -- and the United States -- to the brink of institutional collapse. The first is the serious mismatch between our political parties, which have become as vehemently adversarial as parliamentary parties, and a governing system that, unlike a parliamentary democracy, makes it extremely difficult for majorities to act. Second, while both parties participate in tribal warfare, both sides are not equally culpable. The political system faces what the authors call &"asymmetric polarization," with the Republican Party implacably refusing to allow anything that might help the Democrats politically, no matter the cost.With dysfunction rooted in long-term political trends, a coarsened political culture and a new partisan media, the authors conclude that there is no &"silver bullet"; reform that can solve everything. But they offer a panoply of useful ideas and reforms, endorsing some solutions, like greater public participation and institutional restructuring of the House and Senate, while debunking others, like independent or third-party candidates. Above all, they call on the media as well as the public at large to focus on the true causes of dysfunction rather than just throwing the bums out every election cycle. Until voters learn to act strategically to reward problem solving and punish obstruction, American democracy will remain in serious danger.