This paper proposes a game theoretical model of technocratic government, i.e. cases where a non political technocrat is put in charge by political parties. Based on the literature on post-electoral politics, we show conditions for the existence of a technocratic government equilibrium, where both parties agree to delegate the agenda setting power to technocrats, committed to maximize social welfare. Such an equilibrium exists only if the technocrats have a superior competence with respect to the majority party/coalition, or if the country is in a sufficiently harsh economic crisis. Furthermore, it is more likely to prevail in countries with unstable Parliament (i.e. one where the majority party/coalition is not always able to impose its will in a parliamentary vote) and where governing parties care enough about the common good dimension, vis-a'-vis the ideological one. Finally, we show that polarization has an ambiguous effect on the chances of a technocratic government formation: it decreases them when parliament is unstable and so the government prefers to make an agreement with the opposition, and increases them when the government has a stricter parliamentary control, and so prefers to face a parliamentary fight with the opposition.

Praised by some as islands of efficiency in a sea of unprofessional, politicized, and corrupt states, and criticized by others for removing wide areas of policy making from the democratic arena, technocrats have become prominent and controversial actors in Latin American politics. Through an in-depth analysis of economic and health policy in Colombia from 1958 to 2011 and in Peru from 1980 to 2011, Technocracy and Democracy in Latin America explains the source of these experts' power as well as the leverage they have across state policy sectors in Latin America.

The origins of technocracy are shrouded in controversy, but most of its leaders were inspired by their association with the social critic Thorstein Veblen, between 1919 and 1921. Harold Loeb, an expatriate in Paris in the 1920s, was one of the more accomplished and interesting of the technocrats. In Life in a Technocracy, now a twentieth-century utopian classic, he expounds on the merits of creating a utopian society through technocracy, predicting the future of art, education, religion, and government under the leadership of technical professionals.

This is a book about a contemporary transformation in democratic politics: the rise of a new political field, techno-populism.

The rise of populist parties and movements across the Western hemisphere and their contempt for ‘experts’ has shocked the establishment. This book examines how the ‘post-industrial’ technocratic regime of the 1980’s – of managerialism, depoliticisation and the politics of expertise – sowed the seeds for the backlash against the political elites that is visible today. Populism, Esmark augues, is a sign that the technocratic bluff has finally been called and that technocracy posing as democracy will only serve to exasperate existing problems. This book sets a new benchmark for studies of technocracy, showing that a solution to the challenge of populism will depend as much on a technocratic retreat as democratic innovation.

À la fin du XIXe siècle, les sciences sociales aux États-Unis théorisent la nécessité de restructurer le pouvoir publique en Amérique, en soumettant toute politique à un contrôle « rationnel » et techniquement mesurable sur la base de paramètres précis, qu'on a par la suite développés (ouvrage en langue anglaise).

The major role played by a technocratic elite in Chilean politics was perhaps most controversial when the “Chicago Boys” ran the economic program of Augusto Pinochet’s military regime from 1973 to 1990. But technocrats did not suddenly come upon the scene when Pinochet engineered the coup against Salvador Allende’s government. They had long been important contributors to Chile’s approach to the challenges of economic development. In this book, political scientist and historian Patricio Silva examines their part in the story of twentieth-century Chile. Even before industrialization had begun in Chile, the impact of positivism and the idea of “scientific government” gained favor with Chilean intellectuals in the late nineteenth century. The technocrats who emerged from this background became the main architects designing the industrial policies of the state through the Ibáñez government (1927–31), the state-led industrialization project of the late 1930s and 1940s, the Frei and Allende administrations, Pinochet’s dictatorship, and the return to democracy from the Aylwin administration to the present. Thus, contrary to the popular belief inspired by the dominance of the Chicago Boys, technocrats have not only been the tools of authoritarian leaders but have also been important players in sustaining democratic rule. As Silva shows, technocratic ideology in Chile has been quite compatible with the interests and demands of the large middle classes, who have always defended meritocratic values and educational achievements above the privileges provided by social backgrounds. And for most of the twentieth century, technocrats have provided a kind of buffer zone between contending political forces, thereby facilitating the functioning of Chilean democracy in the past and the present.

American democracy just isn't good enough anymore. A costly election has done more to divide American society than unite it, while trust in government--and democracy itself--is plummeting. But there are better systems out there, and America would be wise to learn from them. In this provocative manifesto, globalization scholar Parag Khanna tours cutting-edge nations from Switzerland to Singapore to reveal the inner workings that allow them that lead the way in managing the volatility of a fast-changing world while delivering superior welfare and prosperity for their citizens. The ideal form of government for the complex 21st century is what Khanna calls a "direct technocracy," one led by experts but perpetually consulting the people through a combination of democracy and data. From a seven-member presidency and a restructured cabinet to replacing the Senate with an Assembly of Governors, Technocracy in America is full of sensible proposals that have been proven to work in the world's most successful societies. Americans have a choice for whom they elect president, but they should not wait any longer to redesign their political system following Khanna's pragmatic vision.

One of the most common and strongest criticisms of the EU is that power is held by a select few who are unaccountable technocrats sitting in Brussels who without consultation formulate policies. A fresh and innovative new series, written by leading authorities, providing students and researchers with a concise analysis of key topics relating to the state of the European Union and its future development. Combining insights from the theoretical literature with brief institutional descriptions, each book in the series focuses on the key questions, 'Where does power lie?', 'What are the likely scenarios for development?', thereby enabling the reader to gain a better sense of the dynamic processes of politics at EU level.