The Political Economy of Protection explains why countries, especially developing countries, change their trade policies over the course of history. It does so through an interdisciplinary approach, which borrows analyses from both political science and economics. While the central focus of this book is to explain historical changes in trade policy in one country, Chile, it is broadly relevant for students, scholars, and trade specialists interested in gaining a deeper understanding of the politics and economics of international trade. Given the intensifying public debates about the benefits of globalization, the author provides a uniquely rigorous yet interdisciplinary analysis of the forces that shape trade policy decisions, not just in Chile, but throughout the world.

This clear, concise summary of the in-depth analyses presented in The Political Economy of American Trade Policy examines the level, form, and evolution of American trade protection. In case studies of trade barriers imposed during the 1980s to help the steel, semiconductor, automobile, lumber, wheat, and textile and apparel industries, the contributors trace the evolution of efforts to obtain protection, protectionist measures, and their results. A chapter assessing the common themes that emerge from the studies concludes that the focus of current trade law is exclusively on the individual protection-seeking industries, with little regard for indirect effects on using industries or for consumers. Reform could usefully take these effects into account. This volume will interest policymakers, business executives, and anyone interested in trade policy formulation and practice.

Drawing together leading scholars, the book provides a revealing new map of the US political economy in cross-national perspective.

Why do nations so frequently abandon unrestricted international commerce in favor of trade protectionism? David A. Lake contends that the dominant explanation, interest group theory, does not adequately explain American trade strategy or address the contradictory elements of cooperation and conflict that shape the international economy. Power, Protection, and Free Trade offers an alternative, systemic approach to trade strategy that builds on the interaction between domestic and international factors. In this innovative book, Lake maintains that both protection and free trade are legitimate and effective instruments of national policy, the considered responses of nations to varying international structures.

The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Theory, Evidence and Applications is a collection of sole-authored and co-authored papers by Devashish Mitra that have been published in various scholarly journals over the last two decades. It covers diverse topics in the political economy of trade policy, ranging from the role of modeling lobby formation in the context of trade policy determination to its applications to the question of unilateralism versus reciprocity and trade agreements. It also includes the theory and the empirics of the choice of policy instruments. Finally, the book presents the empirical investigation of the Grossman-Helpman “Protection for Sale” model as well as the Mayer “Median-Voter” model of trade policy determination.

This collection of papers by former students and colleagues celebrates the profound impact that Jagdish Bhagwati has had on the field of international economics over the past three decades. Bhagwati, who is the Arthur Lehman Professor of Economics at Columbia University, has made pathbreaking contributions to the theory of international trade and commercial policy, including immiserizing growth, domestic distortions, economic development, and political economy. His success and influence as a teacher and mentor is widely recognized among students at both MIT and Columbia, and as founder of the Journal of International Economics, he has encouraged research on many questions of theoretical and policy relevance. The political economy of trade policy, Bhagwati's most recent area of interest, is the theme of this collection which addresses salient topics including market distortions, income distribution, and the political process of policy-making. Sections and Contributors Market Distortions, T. N. Srinivasan. Paul A. Samuelson. Paul R. Krugman * Trade and Income Distribution, Douglas A. Irwin. Richard A. Brecher and Ehsan U. Choudri. Robert C. Feenstra and Gordon H. Hanson. Earl L. Grinols * Perspectives on Political Economy, Robert E. Baldwin. Peter Diamond * Models of Political Economy and Trade, Gene M. Grossman and Elhana Helpman. John Douglas Wilson. B. Peter Rosendorff. Arvind Panagariya and Ronald Findlay

"Political economy themes have - directly and indirectly - been a central concern of law and legal scholarship ever since political economy emerged as a concept in the early seventeenth century, a development which was re-inforced by the emergence of political economy as an independent area of scholarly enquiry in the eighteenth century, as developed by the French physiocrats. This is not surprising in so far as the core institutions of the economy and economic exchanges, such as property and contract, are legal institutions.In spite of this intrinsic link, political economy discourses and legal discourses dealing with political economy themes unfold in a largely separate manner. Indeed, this book is also a reflection of this, in so far as its core concern is how the law and legal scholarship conceive of and approach political economy issues"--

Over the past two decades there has been a gradual but fundamental change in the nature of trade protection. Even as international negotiation has succeeded in reducing tariffs to low levels, national governments have resorted to a range of increasingly intricate policies to protect their domestic industries from foreign competition. Direct quantitative restrictions on international trade have become particularly widespread. Such nontariff barriers often have very different effects from tariffs and require careful analysis in their own right. This book presents a systematic overview of the modern theory of trade protection. The material in the book divides naturally into four sections. The first section covers trade restrictions in competitive markets, the second trade restrictions and imperfect competition, the third the political economy of trade protection, and the fourth the theory of policy reform. The presentation makes extensive use of diagrams, with the more difficult mathematics included in six appendixes.

Despite numerous policy reforms since the 1980s, farm product prices remain heavily distorted in both high-income and developing countries. This book seeks to improve our understanding of why societies adopted these policies, and why some but not other countries have undertaken reforms. Drawing on recent developments in political economy theories and in the generation of empirical measures of the extent of price distortions, the present volume provides both analytical narratives of the historical origins of agricultural protectionism in various parts of the world and a set of political econometric analyses aimed at explaining the patterns of distortions that have emerged over the past five decades. These new studies shed much light on the forces affecting incentives and those facing farmers in the course of national and global economic and political development. They also show how those distortions might change in the future.