Leading scholars examine the links between domestic politics, defense spending and the economics of the US defense industry.

This is a timely collection of essays utilizing the political economy approach to military spending, primarily by the United States. The articles deal specifically with the relationships between defense spending and: (a) political-business cycles, public opinion and the US-Soviet relationship; (b) military action - i.e. war; (c) economic performance - the trade deficit, guns versus butter issues and fiscal policy.

This timely and wide-ranging study covers both the economic and the political aspects of defense spending—first by providing a theoretical framework and then by explaining, in a political economy context, the results of decisions to allocate scarce resources to defense. In doing so, the authors provide a comprehensive picture of the interaction between defense spending and the economic and political structure of the United States, complementing their exploration of topical concerns such as SDI with analysis of long-term trends and issues of timeless importance in the defense debate. Because of the politicizing of defense planning and procurement, there have been few significant applications of optimization techniques to high-level defense issues over the past decade. As a result, there has been a rapid decline in the importance of those techniques—historically the focus of books on defense economics. Like its predecessors, this book presents optimization techniques applicable to a wide variety of defense problems, but it also illustrates what happens in actual practice and why defense decisions are often not economically efficient. The authors discuss alternatives for cases when political constraints make efficient solutions unlikely and explore changes in the defense establishment and political structures that would make economically efficient resource allocations a reality.

The purpose of this book is to analyse world military expenditure at the end of the 1980s, and to discuss its political and economic implications. After a decade of unprecedented expansion of international military spending, its level is falling, though modestly. Political developments in Europe and the success of arms control negotiations raise hopes for further reductions. In addition, technological and economic structural disarmament is adding to the pressure for reductions. However, performance has not matched up to promises, and formidable obstacles to defence spending limitations still remain. Military Expenditure surveys recent events and describes the process of change that characterizes international military expenditure, and its determinants, at this time of transformation.

This wide-ranging, interdisciplinary analysis blends history, economics, and politics to challenge the prevailing accounts of the rise of U.S. militarism. While acknowledging the contributory role of some of the most widely-cited culprits, this study explores the bigger, but largely submerged, picture: the political economy of war and militarism.

How is it that the United States—a country founded on a distrust of standing armies and strong centralized power—came to have the most powerful military in history? Long after World War II and the end of the Cold War, in times of rising national debt and reduced need for high levels of military readiness, why does Congress still continue to support massive defense budgets? In The American Warfare State, Rebecca U. Thorpe argues that there are profound relationships among the size and persistence of the American military complex, the growth in presidential power to launch military actions, and the decline of congressional willingness to check this power. The public costs of military mobilization and war, including the need for conscription and higher tax rates, served as political constraints on warfare for most of American history. But the vast defense industry that emerged from World War II also created new political interests that the framers of the Constitution did not anticipate. Many rural and semirural areas became economically reliant on defense-sector jobs and capital, which gave the legislators representing them powerful incentives to press for ongoing defense spending regardless of national security circumstances or goals. At the same time, the costs of war are now borne overwhelmingly by a minority of soldiers who volunteer to fight, future generations of taxpayers, and foreign populations in whose lands wars often take place. Drawing on an impressive cache of data, Thorpe reveals how this new incentive structure has profoundly reshaped the balance of wartime powers between Congress and the president, resulting in a defense industry perennially poised for war and an executive branch that enjoys unprecedented discretion to take military action.

A contemporary and comprehensive analysis of national and supranational defence governance in an uncertain and increasingly dangerous world. This book will appeal to policymakers, analysts, graduate students and academics interested in defence economics, political economy, public economics and public policy.

With the end of the Cold War, one question that interests both scholars and policy makers alike is how defence cutbacks will affect economic performance. This text provides a review of the existing literature and addresses the issue of the peace dividend in an empirical analysis of 80 countries

A selection of revised papers originally presented at the Second Conference on Political Economy, held Oct. 22-23, 1987, at Lafayette College in Easton, Pa. Includes bibliographical references and index.