The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahadeen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War is a 1998 non-fiction book written by former Afghan Army Colonel Ali Ahmad Jalali and American military scholar Lester W. Grau. The book was commissioned by the United States Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division to complement Grau's previous book, "The Bear Went Over the Mountain." Jalali and Grau had planned travel into Afghanistan to interview Mujahideen fighters in late 1996, but were forced to remain in Pakistan when a Taliban offensive campaign started to seize major portions of Afghanistan, eventually capturing Kabul on September 27. Jalali interviewed approximately 40 Mujahideen during the month which the authors spent in Pakistan and an associate, Major Nasrullah Safi, conducted interviews inside Afghanistan for two months to collect additional data.

counterinsurgency punctuated by moments of heady excitement and terror. Colonel Grau, the editor and translator, has added his own commentary to produce a useful guide for commanders to meet the challenges of this kind of war and to help keep his fellow soldiers alive. This book will also be of interest to the historian and general reader, who will discover that advances in technology have had little impact on this kind of war, and that many of the same tactics the British Army used on the Northwest Frontier still apply today.

DIVWhen the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, few experts believed the fledgling Mujahideen resistance movement had a chance of withstanding the modern, mechanized onslaught of the Soviet Army. But somehow, the Mujahideen prevailed against a larger and decisively better equipped foe. No one predicted the Soviet Union would withdraw in defeat in 1989. With more than 100 first-hand reports from Mujahideen combat veterans and maps illustrating locations and disposition of forces, this book is a tactical look at a decentralized army of foot-mobile guerrillas as they wage war against a superior force. Learn about Mujahideen ambushes, raids, shelling attacks, fights against heliborne insertions, attacks on Soviet strong points, and urban combat in this rare look at the Soviet-Afghan conflict./div

Offers a candid view of a war that played a significant role in the ultimate demise of the Soviet Union. Presents analysis absolutely vital to Western policymakers, as well as to political, diplomatic, and military historians and anyone interested in Russian and Soviet history. Provides insights regarding current and future Russian struggles in ethnic conflicts both at and within their borders, struggles that could potentially destroy the Russian Federation.

Originally published: [London]: C. Hurst & Co., 2011.

The most comprehensive analysis of the current Afghanistan War yet published, by bestselling writer and legendary war reporter Sandy Gall

Nearly ten years of bloodshed and political turmoil have followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Soviet occupation not only proved a major trauma for the people of Afghanistan; invasion ended the growth in superpower dentents that had characterised the late 1970s; and in the Soviet Union the effects of escalating military costs and over 13,000 young military casualties have been felt at every level of society. The decision to withdraw combat forces under the provisions of the Geneva Accords of April 1988 is one of the most dramatic developments in the international system since the end of the Second World War. The effects of this decision will be felt not only in Afghanistan, but in the Soviet Union, in Southwest Asia, and in the wider world. The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan has been designed to explore the background to the decision to withdraw and its broader implications. The authors, all established specialists, examine the Geneva Accords; the future for post-withdrawal Afghanistan; and the impact of withdrawal on regional states, Soviet foreign and domestic policies, the Soviet armed forces, Sino-Soviet relations and world politics. They write from diverse disciplinary traditions, while bringing together a shared sensitivity to the issues which complicate the Afghan question.

[This book] explores ... how has a seemingly anachronistic band of religious zealots managed to retain a tenacious foothold in the struggle for Afghanistan's future ... [It] investigates ... questions relating to the character of the Taliban, its evolution over time, and its capacity to affect the future of the region.--Dust jacket.

This is the story of the defeat of Soviet Russia's forces in Afghanistan by a guerrilla force known as the Mujahideen, heavily backed by Pakistan and the USA. The Mujahideen paved the way for the Taliban regime, to exist having all but defeated the Russian Army in the late 80's.The author, Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, was head of the Afghan Bureau of Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence and as such was effectively the Mujahideen's commander-in-chief. He controlled the flow of thousands of tons of arms across Pakistan and into its occupied neighbor, arms that were bought with CIA and Saudi Arabian funds from the USA. One of the Mujahideen's close allies was none other than Osama Bin Laden.This compelling book was put together with great skill the by military historian, Mark Adkin in conjunction with Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and is essential reading for anyone interested in the truth behind the Afghanistan War which led to the conditions that exist there today.A hardback edition of this book was published by Casemate in 2001 under the title Afghanistan: The Bear Trap.

Diplomatic efforts to resolve the Afghanistan crisis began almost immediately after the Soviet Union's military intervention in that country in December 1979. Untying the Afghan Knot offers the first detailed account of the diplomatic process set in motion by that intervention and culminating in the April 1988 Geneva Accords--a milestone in multilateralism and United Nations (UN) peacemaking. Riaz M. Khan, a senior Pakistani diplomat, participated actively in all meetings on Afghanistan in the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and in all of the Geneva negotiating rounds (1882-1988). Drawing upon his personal experience, official documents, scholarly literature, and press accounts, he provides a unique insider's view of these precedent-setting negotiations, which were often shrouded in secrecy and misperceptions. Khan examines the interests, positions, and behind-the-scenes maneuverings of the major players--Afghan governments and resistance groups, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and UN mediators--and assesses the impact of military and political developments inside Afghanistan and elsewhere, including the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev. Khan's authoritative account of these critical diplomatic initiatives sheds important light on the internal dynamics of the multilateral Afghanistan negotiations.