In a dynamic setting, housing is both an asset and a consumption good. But should it be taxed like other forms of consumption or like other forms of saving? We consider the optimal taxation of the imputed rent from owner housing within a version of the neoclassical growth model. We find that the optimal tax rate on the imputed rent is quite sensitive to the constraints imposed on the other available tax rates. In general, it is not optimal to tax the imputed rent at the same rate as the business capital income.

This paper quantitatively investigates the optimal capital income taxation in the general equilibrium overlapping generations model, which incorporates characteristics of housing and the U.S. preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing. Housing tax policy is found to have a substantial effect on how capital income should be taxed. Given the U.S. preferential tax treatment for owner-occupied housing, the optimal capital income tax rate is close to zero, contrary to the high optimal capital income tax rate implied by models without housing. A lower capital income tax rate implies a narrowed tax wedge between housing and non-housing capital, which indirectly nullifies the subsidies (taxes) for homeowners (renters) and corrects the over-investment to housing.

One of the best known results in modern public finance is the Chamley-Judd result showing that the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero in the long-run. In this paper, we reexamine this result by analyzing a series of generalizations of the Chamley-Judd formulation. We show that in a model with human capital, if the tax code is sufficiently rich and there are no pure profits from accumulating human capital, then all distorting taxes are zero in the long-run under the optimal plan. In this sense, income from physical capital is not special. To gain a better understanding of these two conditions, we study examples in which they are not satisfied and show that the optimal tax rate on income from physical capital does not go to zero. In those cases where the limiting tax rate is non-zero, we calculate its value for alternative specifications of the marginal welfare cost of taxation. Our results indicate that even for conservative specifications, tax rates of 10% and higher are possible under the optimal code.

This paper analyzes the theoretical and quantitative implications of optimal capital taxation in the neoclassical growth model with aggregate shocks and incomplete markets. The model features a representative-agent economy with proportional taxes on labor and capital. I first consider the case that the only asset the government can trade is a real risk-free bond. Taxes on capital are set one period in advance, reflecting inertia in tax codes and ruling out replication of the complete markets allocation. Because capital income varies with the state of the economy, capital taxation provides a state contingent source of revenues. I thus identify a novel potential role for capital taxation as a risk sharing instrument between the government and private agents. However, this benefit must be weighted again the distortionary cost of capital taxation. For a baseline case, the optimal policy features a zero tax on capital. Moreover, numerical simulations show that the baseline case provides an excellent benchmark. I next allow the government to hold a non trivial position in capital. Capital ownership provides the same benefit or risk sharing but without the cost of tax distortions. In a variety of quantitative exercises, I show that capital ownership allows the government to realize about 90% of the welfare gains from moving to complete markets. Large positions are typically required for optimality. But smaller positions achieve substantial benefits. In a business-cycle simulation, I show that a 15% short equity position achieves over 40% of the welfare gains from completing markets.

Real Estate Economics: A point-to-point handbook introduces the main tools and concepts of real estate (RE) economics. It covers areas such as the relation between RE and the macro-economy, RE finance, investment appraisal, taxation, demand and supply, development, market dynamics and price bubbles, and price estimation. It balances housing economics with commercial property economics, and pays particular attention to the issue of property dynamics and bubbles – something very topical in the aftermath of the US house-price collapse that precipitated the global crisis of 2008. This textbook takes an international approach and introduces the student to the necessary ‘toolbox’ of models required in order to properly understand the mechanics of real estate. It combines theory, technique, real-life cases, and practical examples, so that in the end the student is able to: • read and understand most RE papers published in peer-reviewed journals; • make sense of the RE market (or markets); and • contribute positively to the preparation of economic analyses of RE assets and markets soon after joining any company or other organization involved in RE investing, appraisal, management, policy, or research. This book should be particularly useful to third-year students of economics who may take up RE or urban economics as an optional course, to postgraduate economics students who want to specialize in RE economics, to graduates in management, business administration, civil engineering, planning, and law who are interested in RE, as well as to RE practitioners and to students reading for RE-related professional qualifications.

Available online: https://pub.norden.org/nord2021-022/ This issue of Nordic Economic Policy Review is devoted to Nordic housing markets and housing policies. Nordic housing markets face more or less the same problems and challenges, but the way policies and regulations deal with them differs in many respects. A comparison of policies, regulations and results across countries yields valuable lessons for policymakers. The work has been led and edited by Professor emeritus Harry Flam and Professor emeritus Peter Englund.