During the early 1970s a 'revival' took place of the philosophy of Max Stirner, born Johann Caspar Schmidt (1806-1856), whose book Der Einzige und Sein Eigentum has been called a 'revolutionary anarchist manual', a 'Banker's Bible', a 'structural model of petit-bourgeois self-consciousness' and other names since its appearance in 1844. The revival produced the most comprehensive study of Stirner in English to that date, R. W. K. Paterson's 1971 The Nihilistic Egoist: Max Stirner. While Paterson undertook to review Der Einzige as substantive philosophical discourse, paradoxically, and theologically, he would conclude that Stirner was doing metaphysics, to the point of a solipsistic frivolity. This study examines the fascinating but ultimately unsuccessful, if not buffoonish, case against Stirner by Paterson. I conclude that we should rethink Stirner not as metaphysician but as social critic and educator, a "root," ground-level or primal thinker, more relevant today than ever. And that his ideas and principles are ready to be spread and put to work now in criticism, current events and art. In this revision my purpose is to de-trivialize Stirner, tweak the paradigm further and introduce new material, with a view to reviving Saint Max where he belongs - in the company of heretics such as Chamfort, Nietzsche, Mark Twain, Ambrose Bierce, George Orwell, Joseph Heller and George Carlin, to name a few.

A major essay on the basis of individualist thought, with reference to the major influence of Stirner.

The first English translation (by Graham Parker, with Setsuko Aihara) of a forty-year-old Japanese classic--Nishitani's treatment of the problem of nihilism, with particular reference to Nietzsche's philosophical ideas, and from a perspective influenced by Buddhist thought. Paper edition (unseen), $14.95. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Max Stirner’s The Unique and Its Property (1844) is the first ruthless critique of modern society. In All Things are Nothing to Me, Jacob Blumenfeld reconstructs the unique philosophy of Max Stirner (1806–1856), a figure that strongly influenced—for better or worse—Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, Emma Goldman as well as numerous anarchists, feminists, surrealists, illegalists, existentialists, fascists, libertarians, dadaists, situationists, insurrectionists and nihilists of the last two centuries. Misunderstood, dismissed, and defamed, Stirner’s work is considered by some to be the worst book ever written. It combines the worst elements of philosophy, politics, history, psychology, and morality, and ties it all together with simple tautologies, fancy rhetoric, and militant declarations. That is the glory of Max Stirner’s unique footprint in the history of philosophy. Jacob Blumenfeld wanted to exhume this dead tome along with its dead philosopher, but discovered instead that, rather than deceased, their spirits are alive and quite well, floating in our presence. All Things are Nothing to Me is a forensic investigation into how Stirner has stayed alive throughout time.

"John F. Welsh provides us with a superb distillation of the thought of Max Stirner and the dialecticalegoist paradigm he developed. Througth this brilliant study. Welsh demonstrates the power and breadth of dialectics as a radical mode of analysis and social transformation--Chris Matthew Sciabarra author of Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism.

Max Stirner's The Ego and Its Own is striking and distinctive in both style and content. First published in 1844, Stirner's distinctive and powerful polemic sounded the death-knell of left Hegelianism, with its attack on Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno and Edgar Bauer, Moses Hess and others. It also constitutes an enduring critique of both liberalism and socialism from the perspective of an extreme eccentric individualism. Karl Marx was only one of many contemporaries provoked into a lengthy rebuttal of Stirner's argument. Stirner has been portrayed, variously, as a precursor of Nietzsche (both stylistically and substantively), a forerunner of existentialism and as an individualist anarchist. This edition of his work comprises a revised version of Steven Byington's much praised translation, together with an introduction and notes on the historical background to Stirner's text.

The period leading up to the Revolutions of 1848 was a seminal moment in the history of political thought, demarcating the ideological currents and defining the problems of freedom and social cohesion which are among the key issues of modern politics. This 2006 anthology offers research on Hegel's followers in the 1830s and 1840s. With essays by philosophers, political scientists, and historians from Europe and North America, it pays special attention to questions of state power, the economy, poverty, and labour, as well as to ideas on freedom. The book examines the political and social thought of Eduard Gans, Ludwig Feuerbach, Max Stirner, Bruno and Edgar Bauer, the young Engels, and Marx. It places them in the context of Hegel's philosophy, the Enlightenment, Kant, the French Revolution, industrialization, and urban poverty. It also views Marx and Engels in relation to their contemporaries and interlocutors in the Hegelian school.

A reassessment of the controversial, yet still influential nineteenth-century German philosopher that explores the contentious issue of whether he was, as his critics frequently claim, a nihilist.Max Stirner (1806-1856) is often regarded as an enfant terrible of nineteenth-century German philosophy, but he has continued to exert an influence despite his marginalization as a nihilist. This study is the first to tackle head-on the question of whether Stirner can indeed reasonably be described as a nihilist. Although he is not known ever to have used the word "nihilism" or any of its derivatives, he was first accused of being a nihilist immediately after the publication of his magnum opus Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (translated in most English editions as The Ego and His Own) in 1844. Since then, the allegation has been repeated by well over a hundred writers and critics, with the result that it has become something of a truism. The book aims, first, to establish a clear understanding of the multifarious meanings of the term nihilism; second, to examine the accusations leveled at Stirner in the light of those meanings; and third, to assess not only the fairness and accuracy of the imputation of nihilism but also its usefulness in understanding Stirner as a thinker. It thus provides new insights into Stirner's thought, challenges the orthodox view of him as a philosophical pariah, reassesses his ideas and their place in the history of philosophy, and addresses the recurrent issue of his contemporary relevance.ngs of the term nihilism; second, to examine the accusations leveled at Stirner in the light of those meanings; and third, to assess not only the fairness and accuracy of the imputation of nihilism but also its usefulness in understanding Stirner as a thinker. It thus provides new insights into Stirner's thought, challenges the orthodox view of him as a philosophical pariah, reassesses his ideas and their place in the history of philosophy, and addresses the recurrent issue of his contemporary relevance.ngs of the term nihilism; second, to examine the accusations leveled at Stirner in the light of those meanings; and third, to assess not only the fairness and accuracy of the imputation of nihilism but also its usefulness in understanding Stirner as a thinker. It thus provides new insights into Stirner's thought, challenges the orthodox view of him as a philosophical pariah, reassesses his ideas and their place in the history of philosophy, and addresses the recurrent issue of his contemporary relevance.ngs of the term nihilism; second, to examine the accusations leveled at Stirner in the light of those meanings; and third, to assess not only the fairness and accuracy of the imputation of nihilism but also its usefulness in understanding Stirner as a thinker. It thus provides new insights into Stirner's thought, challenges the orthodox view of him as a philosophical pariah, reassesses his ideas and their place in the history of philosophy, and addresses the recurrent issue of his contemporary relevance.