Much of today's Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) literature subscribes to the idea that the information age will witness a transformation in the very nature of war. In this book, David Lonsdale puts that notion to the test.

There has been a great deal of speculation recently concerning the likely impact of the 'Information Age' on warfare. In this vein, much of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) literature subscribes to the idea that the Information Age will witness a transformation in the very nature of war. In this book, David Lonsdale puts that notion to the test. Using a range of contexts, the book sets out to look at whether the classical Clausewitzian theory of the nature of war will retain its validity in this new age. The analysis covers the character of the future battlespace, the function of command, and the much-hyped concept of Strategic Information Warfare. Finally, the book broadens its perspective to examine the nature of 'Information Power' and its implications for geopolitics. Through an assessment of both historical and contemporary case studies (including the events following September 11 and the recent war in Iraq), the author concludes that although the future will see many changes to the conduct of warfare, the nature of war, as given theoretical form by Clausewitz, will remain essentially unchanged.

The information revolution--which is as much an organizational as a technological revolution--is transforming the nature of conflict across the spectrum: from open warfare, to terrorism, crime, and even radical social activism. The era of massed field armies is passing, because the new information and communications systems are increasing the lethality of quite small units that can call in deadly, precise missile fire almost anywhere, anytime. In social conflicts, the Internet and other media are greatly empowering individuals and small groups to influence the behavior of states. Whether in military or social conflicts, all protagonists will soon be developing new doctrines, strategies, and tactics for swarming their opponents--with weapons or words, as circumstances require. Preparing for conflict in such a world will require shifting to new forms of organization, particularly the versatile, hardy, all-channel network. This shift will prove difficult for states and professional militaries that remain bastions of hierarchy, bound to resist institutional redesign. They will make the shift as they realize that information and knowledge are becoming the key elements of power. This implies, among other things, that Mars, the old brute-force god of war, must give way to Athena, the well-armed goddess of wisdom. Accepting Athena as the patroness of this information age represents a first step not only for preparing for future conflicts, but also for preventing them.

Militaries with state-of-the-art information technology sometimes bog down in confusing conflicts. To understand why, it is important to understand the micro-foundations of military power in the information age, and this is exactly what Jon R. Lindsay's Information Technology and Military Power gives us. As Lindsay shows, digital systems now mediate almost every effort to gather, store, display, analyze, and communicate information in military organizations. He highlights how personnel now struggle with their own information systems as much as with the enemy. Throughout this foray into networked technology in military operations, we see how information practice—the ways in which practitioners use technology in actual operations—shapes the effectiveness of military performance. The quality of information practice depends on the interaction between strategic problems and organizational solutions. Information Technology and Military Power explores information practice through a series of detailed historical cases and ethnographic studies of military organizations at war. Lindsay explains why the US military, despite all its technological advantages, has struggled for so long in unconventional conflicts against weaker adversaries. This same perspective suggests that the US retains important advantages against advanced competitors like China that are less prepared to cope with the complexity of information systems in wartime. Lindsay argues convincingly that a better understanding of how personnel actually use technology can inform the design of command and control, improve the net assessment of military power, and promote reforms to improve military performance. Warfighting problems and technical solutions keep on changing, but information practice is always stuck in between.

We are beginning to realize the emergence of a new age--the information age. On the one hand, the full dimensions of this new age, if indeed it is such, are unknown. On the other hand, the authors argue that enough is known to conclude that the conduct of war in the future will be profoundly different. Paradoxically, however, they claim that the nature of war will remain basically the same. In this monograph, General Sullivan and Colonel Dubik examine that paradox and draw some inferences from it. When societies and states changed from an agrarian base to an industrial base, the way they made war also changed. Industrial nations furnished their armies with tools very different from those produced by agrarian nations: the machine gun, steam and petroleum powered engines, the railroad, telegraph, radios, aircraft, and much more. Furthermore, industrial armies changed in organization. Their leadership requirements were different and they developed new operational concepts. The nature of war, however, did not change. In spite of the "new" industrial technology, war remained a human endeavor and very much as Carl von Clausewitz described it in the early 18th century; subject to emotion and characterized by death and destruction. Human fears, bravery, sacrifice and courage operated within the realm of fog, friction and uncertainty. Great captains were masters of both the science and art of war. The root causes of war also stayed the same. People, whether heads of states or leaders of other kinds of groups, still started wars as a result of fear, hatred, greed, ambition, revenge or a host of other "nonrational" considerations. The authors of this study suggest that today we stand at what many consider the threshold of the information age, an age that has already begun to transform the conduct of warfare just as the industrial age did earlier. New weapons systems, organizations, and operational concepts will emerge, just as they did in response to industrialism. No one knows the full details of what the information age will bring, but the authors demonstrate that the future is sufficiently clear to move the Army in the right direction. Also clear is the fact that Clausewitz is still relevant to the study of war because while the conduct of war will change, the nature of war will be the same. This monograph explains the governing concepts of the industrial age and how they affected the concept of war. Then it describes the concepts emerging to govern the information age and suggests ways in which these concepts may affect the conduct of war. Finally, the monograph discusses those steps that the Army is taking to position itself to exploit what are becoming the dominant military requirements of the information age: speed and precision. Specifically, the authors discuss the ways in which the Army has changed its strategic systems over the past several years so that the Army operational and tactical forces will be able to "see" a situation, decide, adapt, and act faster and more precisely than their opponent. These changes will give strategic planners, and operational and tactical commanders, a new set of information age tools to use in theater and on the battlefield. The net result: more flexibility, more versatility, faster decision making, and broader scope of weapons systems at their immediate disposal.

The crisis is upon us: We have no viable doctrine for tomorrow's wars. Now that the world has entered the information age, principles that have served to enlighten the art of war no longer work. Born of agrarian times and honed during the industrial age, the classical principles of war are, in large part, hopelessly outdated. Radical change is needed now. The Principles of War for the Information Age provides a prescription for this change.

Today we are in the information age. Many of the principles of the art of war that were born of agrarian times and honed during the industrial age are hopelessly outdated. It is already past time for radical change.

This monograph revises, reexamines, and reevaluates the contemporary military environment. It finds that the environment is a period of relative military stasis, of slow technological development, and of little novelty in broader issues. If anything, it is a return to an older period, of the time before the Cold War, before the fear of nuclear war dominated all other thinking in the field. This monograph is a first step in a broader and more incisive revision of contemporary strategic thought.