Economics is widely regarded as a social science. In this ground-breaking new study, Paul Fudulu crosses the divide between natural and social science to introduce a new theory of natural economic science, based on one of the most important causal laws of physics: the entropic degradation of the universe.

The Nature and Method of Economic Sciences: Evidence, Causality, and Ends argues that economic phenomena can be examined from five analytical levels: a statistical descriptive approach, a causal explanatory approach, a teleological explicative approach, a normative approach and, finally, the level of application. The above viewpoints are undertaken by different but related economic sciences, including statistics and economic history, positive economics, normative economics, and the 'art of political economy'. Typically, positive economics has analysed economic phenomena using the second approach, causally explaining and often trying to predict the future evolution of the economy. It has not been concerned with the ends selected by the individual or society, taking them as given. However, various new economic currents have emerged during the last 40 years, and some of these do assign a fundamental role to ends within economics. This book argues that the field of positive economics should adapt to deal with the issues that arise from this. The text attempts to discern the nature of economic phenomena, introducing the different approaches and corresponding economic sciences. It goes on to analyse the epistemological characteristics of these in the subsequent chapters, as well as their disciplinary interrelations. This book is a valuable resource for students and scholars of the social sciences, philosophy, and the philosophy of economics. It will also be of interest to those researching political economy and the development of economic thought.

This volume, explores the nature of economics as a science, including classic texts and newer essays.

From humans to hermit crabs to deep water plankton, all living things compete for locally limiting resources. This universal truth unites three bodies of thought--economics, evolution, and history--that have developed largely in mutual isolation. Here, Geerat Vermeij undertakes a groundbreaking and provocative exploration of the facts and theories of biology, economics, and geology to show how processes common to all economic systems--competition, cooperation, adaptation, and feedback--govern evolution as surely as they do the human economy, and how historical patterns in both human and nonhuman evolution follow from this principle. Using a wealth of examples of evolutionary innovations, Vermeij argues that evolution and economics are one. Powerful consumers and producers exercise disproportionate controls on the characteristics, activities, and distribution of all life forms. Competition-driven demand by consumers, when coupled with supply-side conditions permitting economic growth, leads to adaptation and escalation among organisms. Although disruptions in production halt or reverse these processes temporarily, they amplify escalation in the long run to produce trends in all economic systems toward greater power, higher production rates, and a wider reach for economic systems and their strongest members. Despite our unprecedented power to shape our surroundings, we humans are subject to all the economic principles and historical trends that emerged at life's origin more than 3 billion years ago. Engagingly written, brilliantly argued, and sweeping in scope, Nature: An Economic History shows that the human institutions most likely to preserve opportunity and adaptability are, after all, built like successful living things.

This is a new release of the original 1962 edition.

The beauty of science may be pure and eternal, but the practice of science costs money. And scientists, being human, respond to incentives and costs, in money and glory. Choosing a research topic, deciding what papers to write and where to publish them, sticking with a familiar area or going into something new—the payoff may be tenure or a job at a highly ranked university or a prestigious award or a bump in salary. The risk may be not getting any of that. At a time when science is seen as an engine of economic growth, Paula Stephan brings a keen understanding of the ongoing cost-benefit calculations made by individuals and institutions as they compete for resources and reputation. She shows how universities offload risks by increasing the percentage of non-tenure-track faculty, requiring tenured faculty to pay salaries from outside grants, and staffing labs with foreign workers on temporary visas. With funding tight, investigators pursue safe projects rather than less fundable ones with uncertain but potentially path-breaking outcomes. Career prospects in science are increasingly dismal for the young because of ever-lengthening apprenticeships, scarcity of permanent academic positions, and the difficulty of getting funded. Vivid, thorough, and bold, How Economics Shapes Science highlights the growing gap between the haves and have-nots—especially the vast imbalance between the biomedical sciences and physics/engineering—and offers a persuasive vision of a more productive, more creative research system that would lead and benefit the world.

How did modern man come to believe in the object of the economy? What hopes made us accept scientific authority about this illusive thing? What kinds of persons were attracted by objective knowledge in economic discourse? And how does this knowledge guide our economic life? The Making of the Economy tackles such questions surrounding the modern notion of the economy with a fresh look from phenomenological philosophy. In a historical narrative of economic discourses, Till D ppe shows that only due to the scientific culture of economics we speak of an economy. Economic science made the economy. Our economic experiences alone do not trigger an interest in the economy--which makes Husserl's case for the "forgetfulness of the life-world." D ppe's historical narrative focuses on the emergence of formal economic analysis out of a series of successive life-worlds, or concrete historical situations, an approach which generates a new substantive understanding of both the history of economics and the current discourse of crisis surrounding economics. The book will appeal to historians and philosophers of the social sciences, as well as scholars of history, philosophy, and economics.

This book argues that Lionel Robbins’s construction of the economics field’s organizing cornerstone, scarcity—and all that has been derived from it from economists in Robbins’s time to today—no longer can generate general consent among economists. Since Robbins’ Essay, economists have learned more than Robbins and his cohorts could have imagined about human decision making and about the human brain that is the lynchpin of human decision making. This book argues however that behavioral economists and neuroeconomists, in pointing to numerous ways people fall short of perfectly rational decisions (anomalies, biases, and downright errors), have saved conventional economics from such self-contradictions in what could be viewed as a wayward approach. This book posits that the human brain is the ultimate scarce resource, and that a focus on the brain can bring a new foundation for economics and can save the discipline from hostile criticisms from a variety of non-economists (many psychologists).

The essays in this volume were a challenge to me to write. I am an economist to the core, inclined to evaluate most observed behavior and public policies with conventional neoclassical theory. The essays represent my attempt to come to grips with the meaning and importance of what I try to do as a professional economist. They reflect my attempt to acquire a new and improved understanding of the usefulness and limitations of the writings of professional economists, especially my own. In this regard, although I hope others will find the thoughts useful, the volume represents a personal statement of how one economist views his and others' work. For that reason the discussion is often openly normative, tinged with the conviction that social discourse is more than costs and benefits and that economics cannot be fully evaluated by the methods - economic methods - that are the subject of the evaluation. These essays could not have been written without considerable encouragement and help from colleagues and friends. The following people are recognized for having read one or more chapters and for having contributed critical, substantive comments: Diana Bailey, Wilfred Beckerman, Geoffrey Brennan, William Briet, James Buchanan, Delores Martin, David Maxwell, Mary Ann McKenzie, Warren Samuels, Robert Staaf, Richard Wagner, Karen Vaughn, and Bruce Yandle. I am very much in their debt. However, they should not be held accountable for any of the positions taken and any errors that may remain.

Joseph A. Schumpeter was a monumental figure in the history and development of economics. This work brings together his brilliant lectures, delivered more than a century ago, in its first English-language paperback edition. Here, readers will discover Schumpeter's search for an economic science devoid of moral or political dogma. The Nature and Essence of Economic Theory works out what people should think of pure economics, what its nature is, what its methods and findings are, and where thought takes off from there. The book shows the limitations and weaknesses of nineteenth-century economics and how the field could be and was improved by establishing a fundamental differentiation between 'statistics' and 'dynamics'. To convey his arguments, Schumpeter uses certain axioms that form a consistent, self-contained system and show how sound economic science is based on facts and events rather than presuppositions or definitions. Schumpeter's larger aim, beyond a pedagogic tool, was to deduce changes in the market, trade, and exchange of goods and services. He defined the task of economy as the description of the system and its change tendencies. If that can be achieved unequivocally, without resorting to doctrine or dogma, then the field can be considered self-contained.