First Published in 1991. This book addresses a critical aspect of Soviet maneuver theory that has been almost totally neglected in Western analysis, specifically, Soviet concern for tactical maneuver. Since the 1930s, the Soviets have consistently argued that operational maneuver can be successful only if conducted in conjunction with equally successful tactical maneuver, carried out primarily by forward detach­ments. Forward detachments, the primary tactical maneuver forces tasked with performing critical combat functions, emerged in theory in the 1930s and flourished on the basis of virtually untested concepts until the initial phases of Operation Barbarossa, when the Soviet mobile force structure was destroyed in a matter of weeks. Forward detachments again emerged after the Stalin­ grad Operation in 1943, when the Soviet General Staff required their use to spearhead all operations by mobile forces. After mid-1943, forward detach­ments led the operations of all tank armies and tank and mechanized corps, particularly during exploitation operations. By war's end all forces, mobile and rifle alike, employed forward detachments to lead their operations during the exploitation stage of operations. Forward detachments preempted enemy defenses and collectively formed a coordinated network of forward mobile units which provided coherence to the vast array of advancing Soviet mobile and rifle forces. In the late 1960s, the forward detachment received renewed attention as a critical element which could assist in the conduct of operational maneuver. Today, the Soviets believe that forward detachment operations are the key to conducting successful operations on a battlefield increasingly threatened by deadly high-precision weaponry. Tailored, flexible, battalion-size forward detachments, along with their operational counterparts (corps and brigades), may, in fact, be the model upon which the future Soviet force structure will be based. This volume surveys in detail the conceptual and organizational evolution of the forward detachment as the premier Soviet tactical maneuver force. It vividly demonstrates why forward detachments are suited by their versatile nature to be a precursor of future restructured Soviet units in general.

I bogen undersøges Sovjets deltagelse og rolle i militariseringen af det ydre rum fra den første sputnik i okt. 1957 til anti-satellit-systemer og ripost på USAs SDI.

During the Cold War, Westerners were obsessed with the military policies of the Soviet Union. Until the demise of the Soviet Union, however, few details of Moscow's thinking on military matters were available. In this book, Andrei Kokoshin reveals how Soviet military theorists developed and debated the concepts that provided the basis for the Kremlin's defense policies. Drawing on Soviet-era archives and unpublished materials, he sheds light on this important chapter in the history of Russia and the world.The book covers three main themes: the relationship between politics and military strategy in the Soviet Union; how the Soviet political and military leadership assessed threats to Soviet security, the nature of future wars, and methods of warfare; and the relationship between offense and defense in Soviet military strategy. Kokoshin places the strategic concepts behind Moscow's military policies in the context of internal and international struggles for power, and assesses the future role of military power in Russia's national security strategy.

David Glantz examines the Soviet study of war, the re-emergence of the operation level, the evolution of the Soviet theory of operations in depth before 1941, and its application in the European theatre and the Far East between 1941 and 1945.

This study of Soviet military strategy is based upon the relationship between the army and politicians as well as Soviet writings on the subject of military strategy. Thanks to the policy of glasnost, it incorporates Soviet materials hitherto unavailable in the West. It should not be considered simply as a retrospective account of what was; it forms at least part of the context for what will be in the future.

No other nation has invested as much intellectual capital in the study of war as has the Soviet Union over the last six decades, and the doctrine, strategy, and tactics that have been developed by Soviet theoreticians are bound to guide any future Soviet military action. The Soviet Art of War makes available to Western readers selections from the most significant and influential Soviet military writings from 1917 to the present. The Scotts have examined thousands of Soviet military publications, including the restricted journal of the Soviet General Staff, Voyennaya Mysl', to make this book the most comprehensive account of Soviet military theory and practice yet published. The papers they have chosen thoroughly illustrate the development of the basic features of Soviet military art, from the days of trench warfare to the era of the nuclear battlefield. These documents demonstrate the emphasis on surprise, on deception, on mass deep penetration of enemy defenses, and on a unified strategy for all services. They also show the forms of military action—destruction and attrition, defense and offense, maneuver and position-as seen through the eyes of leading Soviet marshals, generals, and admirals. The usefulness of this material is further enhanced by the Scotts' commentary and their analysis of each group of readings.

Describes the Reagan administration's covert campaign against the Soviet Union that increased stress on the Soviet economy.

This book analyzes the evolution of Russian military thought and how Russia's current thinking about war is reflected in recent crises. While other books describe current Russian practice, Oscar Jonsson provides the long view to show how Russian military strategic thinking has developed from the Bolshevik Revolution to the present. He closely examines Russian primary sources including security doctrines and the writings and statements of Russian military theorists and political elites. What Jonsson reveals is that Russia's conception of the very nature of war is now changing, as Russian elites see information warfare and political subversion as the most important ways to conduct contemporary war. Since information warfare and political subversion are below the traditional threshold of armed violence, this has blurred the boundaries between war and peace. Jonsson also finds that Russian leaders have, particularly since 2011/12, considered themselves to be at war with the United States and its allies, albeit with non-violent means. This book provides much needed context and analysis to be able to understand recent Russian interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, how to deter Russia on the eastern borders of NATO, and how the West must also learn to avoid inadvertent escalation.