Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, an Irishman who in June 1922 was assassinated on his doorstep in London by Irish republicans, was one of the most controversial British soldiers of the modern age. Before 1914 he did much to secure the Anglo-French alliance and was responsible for the planning which saw the British Expeditionary Force successfully despatched to France after the outbreak of war with Germany. A passionate Irish unionist, he gained a reputation as an intensely'political' soldier, especially during the 'Curragh crisis' of 1914 when some officers resigned their commisssions rather than coerce Ulster unionists into a Home Rule Ireland. During the war he played a major role in Anglo-French liaison, and ended up as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, professionalhead of the army, a post he held until February 1922.After Wilson retired from the army, he became an MP and was chief security adviser to the new Northern Ireland government. As such, he became a target for nationalist Irish militants, being identified with the security policies of the Belfast regime, though wrongly with Protestant sectarian attacks on Catholics. He is remembered today in unionist Northern Ireland as a kind of founding martyr for the state.Wilson's reputation was ruined in 1927 with the publication of an official biography, which quoted extensively and injudiciously from his entertaining, indiscreet, and wildly opinionated diaries, giving the impression that he was some sort of Machiavellian monster. In this first modern biography, using a wide variety of official and private sources for the first time, Keith Jeffery reassesses Wilson's life and career and places him clearly in his social, national, and political context.

Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, an Irishman who in June 1922 was assassinated on his doorstep in London by Irish republicans, was one of the most controversial British soldiers of the modern age. Before 1914 he did much to secure the Anglo-French alliance and was responsible for the planning which saw the British Expeditionary Force successfully despatched to France after the outbreak of war with Germany. A passionate Irish unionist, he gained a reputation as an intensely 'political' soldier, especially during the 'Curragh crisis' of 1914 when some officers resigned their commisssions rather than coerce Ulster unionists into a Home Rule Ireland. During the war he played a major role in Anglo-French liaison, and ended up as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, professional head of the army, a post he held until February 1922. After Wilson retired from the army, he became an MP and was chief security adviser to the new Northern Ireland government. As such, he became a target for nationalist Irish militants, being identified with the security policies of the Belfast regime, though wrongly with Protestant sectarian attacks on Catholics. He is remembered today in unionist Northern Ireland as a kind of founding martyr for the state. Wilson's reputation was ruined in 1927 with the publication of an official biography, which quoted extensively and injudiciously from his entertaining, indiscreet, and wildly opinionated diaries, giving the impression that he was some sort of Machiavellian monster. In this first modern biography, using a wide variety of official and private sources for the first time, Keith Jeffery reassesses Wilson's life and career and places him clearly in his social, national, and political context.

Field Marshal Lord Cavan (1865-1946) was one of the most distinguished commanders of the modern British army, but he divided opinion among his contemporaries. Some senior soldiers were disdainful. Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson described him as ‘ignorant, pompous and vain’ and Brigadier General Sir James Edward Edmonds commented that Cavan ‘was bone from the neck upwards’. Yet many of Cavan’s subordinates praised him, saying ‘I had never seen Lord Cavan before and I was filled with admiration by the calm and quiet self-confidence of his manner’ and ‘Our new General, Lord Cavan, is simply A1 and the whole show runs like a well-oiled machine.’ So what were the real qualities and achievements of this remarkable but hitherto neglected officer who in a long career served in the Boer War and the First World War and then presided over the post-war reduction of the British army? Michael Senior, in the first full biography of Cavan, assesses him as a leader, a corps commander and an administrator, and places him among the front rank of the soldiers of his generation. He also explores Cavan’s personal life, his personality and how his aristocratic background, his wealth and his love of fox hunting affected his conduct in both war and peace.

The years 1909-1918 can be regarded as formative for MI5, an era in which it developed from a small counterespionage bureau into an established security intelligence agency. MI5 had two main roles during this period; counterespionage, and advising the War Office on how to deal with the police and the civilian population, particularly foreign nationals in Britain. Using hitherto neglected documents from official archives, this study examines how MI5 foiled the spies of the Kaiser during the First World War, paying particular attention to the preventive measures the organization instituted to ‘frustrate’ espionage and how its investigations to ‘cure’ espionage were conducted. In so doing, intelligence specialist, Chris Northcott, also delivers an appreciation of how MI5 saw its work as being divided between preventive measures and investigative work, providing an informative and intriguing insight into MI5’s development during its first ten years. MI5 began as a one-man affair in 1909, tasked with the limited remit of ascertaining the extent of German espionage in Britain amidst an uncertain future. By the armistice MI5’s role had expanded considerably and it had begun to develop into an established security intelligence agency, with hundreds of personnel spread over six branches covering the investigation of espionage, records, ports and travelers and alien workers at home and overseas. This book offers an original and important contribution to our knowledge of the origins of Britain’s security services. In using the example of MI5’s contest against German spies during the First World War era, it forms a groundbreaking study of counterespionage strategy and tactics, and it poses the stimulating question of ‘how to measure’ the effectiveness of a counterespionage agency. It also sets out probably the most detailed description of MI5’s organizational structure available.

The pursuit of stability drove British foreign policy even before 1865. These papers assess the implications of such a policy during the following 100 years when Britain slid from being the only global power to a regional European state.

A comprehensive biography of General Sir Alexander Godley, presenting for the first time a fair and balanced look at his time as commander of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) and II ANZAC Corps during World War I. While Godley is generally remembered as being a poor field commander, Terry Kinloch argues that he was in fact a capable one who had little or no ability to influence the failed battles at Gallipoli and Passchendaele that he is often seen as responsible for. Kinloch also presents, for the first time, a detailed account of Godley’s long pre- and post-World War I career in the British Army. After the war Godley returned to the British Army, eventually reaching the rank of general before retiring in 1933. During his 48-year military career, he also served on operations in Rhodesia and South Africa, as a mounted infantry instructor, in the post-war British occupation force in Germany, and as the Governor of Gibraltar.

During the crucial period of 1917-1918, the United States superseded Great Britain as the premier power in the world. The differing strategic perspectives of London and Washington were central to the tensions and misunderstandings that separated the two dominant powers in 1918 and determined how these two countries would interact following the Armistice. David R. Woodward traces the projection of American military power to western Europe and analyzes in depth the strategic goals of the American political and military leadership in this first comprehensive study of Anglo-American relations in the land war in Europe. Based on extensive research in British and American archives, the study focuses on Woodrow Wilson and David Lloyd George, whose relationship was poisoned by the mutual suspicion and hostility generated by their disagreements over strategy and military policy. President Wilson sought to use his country's military effort in western Europe as a tool to gain acceptance for his "new diplomacy." The British, anxious over the Turko-German threat to Asia and their worsening manpower situation, sought to utilize American military intervention for their own political/military purposes. Woodward's use of unpublished sources provides new perspectives on war leadership, and his analysis of the British-American interaction serves as a case study of the inevitable tension between national self-interest and efforts at collective security, even among nations that share many cultural and political values. For historians and anyone interested in military history and World War I, Trial by Friendship fills a gap in the study of Anglo-American relations by providing a strong, well- written study on an area of American history that has received scant attention from scholars.

Victory Without Peace concentrates on the U.S. Navy in European and Near Eastern waters during the post-World War I era. As participants in the Versailles peace negotiations, the Navy was charged with executing the naval terms of the Armistice as well as preserving stability and peace. U.S. warships were deploying into the Near East, Baltic, Adriatic, and Northern Europe, while simultaneously withdrawing its demobilized forces from European waters. This signifies the first time the U.S. Navy contributed to peacetime efforts, setting a precedent continues today. Conversely, Congressional appropriations handicapped this deployment by demobilization, general naval policy and postwar personnel, and operating funds reductions. Though reluctant to allocate postwar assets into seemingly unimportant European and Near Eastern waters, the Navy was pressured by the State Department and the American Relief Administration's leader, Herbert Hoover, to deploy necessary forces. Most of these were withdrawn by 1924 and the European Station assumed the traditional policy of showing the flag.