A bold reexamination of U.S. influence in the Middle East during the Cold War. The Arab Spring, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the Iraq war, and the Syrian civil war—these contemporary conflicts have deep roots in the Middle East’s postwar emergence from colonialism. In The Pragmatic Superpower, foreign policy experts Ray Takeyh and Steven Simon reframe the legacy of U.S. involvement in the Arab world from 1945 to 1991 and shed new light on the makings of the contemporary Middle East. Cutting against conventional wisdom, the authors argue that, when an inexperienced Washington entered the turbulent world of Middle Eastern politics, it succeeded through hardheaded pragmatism—and secured its place as a global superpower. Eyes ever on its global conflict with the Soviet Union, America shrewdly navigated the rise of Arab nationalism, the founding of Israel, and seminal conflicts including the Suez War and the Iranian revolution. Takeyh and Simon reveal that America’s objectives in the region were often uncomplicated but hardly modest. Washington deployed adroit diplomacy to prevent Soviet infiltration of the region, preserve access to its considerable petroleum resources, and resolve the conflict between a Jewish homeland and the Arab states that opposed it. The Pragmatic Superpower provides fascinating insight into Washington’s maneuvers in a contest for global power and offers a unique reassessment of America’s cold war policies in a critical region of the world. Amid the chaotic conditions of the twenty-first century, Takeyh and Simon argue that there is an urgent need to look back to a period when the United States got it right. Only then will we better understand the challenges we face today.

This edited volume re-assesses the relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union and key regional players in waging and halting conflict in the Middle East between 1967 and 1973. These were pivotal years in the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the effects still very much in evidence today. In addition to addressing established debates, the book opens up new areas of controversy, in particular concerning the inter-war years and the so-called ‘War of Attrition’, and underlines the risks both Moscow and Washington were prepared to run in supporting their regional clients. The engagement of Soviet forces in the air defence of Egypt heightened the danger of escalation and made this one of the hottest regional conflicts of the Cold War era. Against this Cold War backdrop, the motives of both Israel and the Arab states in waging full-scale and lower-intensity conflict are illuminated. The overall goal of this work is to re-assess the relationship between the Cold War and regional conflict in shaping the events of this pivotal period in the Middle East. The Cold War in the Middle East will be of much interest to students of Cold War studies, Middle Eastern history, strategic studies and international history.

Concentrating on the period between 1945 and 1989, The Elusive Balance reevaluates Soviet and U.S. perceptions of the balance of power. William Curti Wohlforth uses a comparative and long-term approach to chart the diplomatic history of relations between the two countries. He offers new interpretations of the onset, course, and end of the Cold War, and the motivations behind Soviet behavior.

From "the foremost U.S. historian of the modern Middle East" ("L.A. Times") comes a powerful argument that the global conflicts now playing out explosively in the Middle East were significantly shaped by the Cold War era.

Few studies of Middle East wars go beyond a narrative of events and most tend to impose on this subject the rigid scheme of superpower competition. The Gulf War of 1991, however, challenges this view of the Middle East as an extension of the global conflict. The failure of the accord of both superpowers to avoid war even once regional superpower competition in the Middle East had ceased must give rise to the question: Do regional conflicts have their own dynamic? Working from this assumption, the book examines local-regional constraints of Middle East conflict and how, through escalation and the involvement of extra-regional powers, such conflicts acquire an international dimension. The theory of a regional subsystem is employed as a framework for conceptualising this interplay between regional and international factors in Tibi's examination of the Middle East wars in the period 1967-91. Tibi also provides an outlook into the future of conflict in the Middle East in the aftermath of the most recent Gulf War.

The Middle Eastern problem is suffused with emotion and ignorance. It is both good and important to have Cobban's perceptive and cool dissection of a truly complex issue. Zbigniew Brezezinski Counselor, Center for Strategic and International Studies Former National Security Adviser Middle East analyst Cobban's 'historical case study of how things were in the Israel-Syria theater during the years 1978-1989' was largely completed before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, but the events of the past year make this book more, rather than less, relevant. . . . Cobban's focus, then, on these two heavily armed nations and their superpower relationships could hardly be more timely. Booklist In the coalition war against Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait, the participation of Syria in the U.S.-led coalition and the restraint of Israel were important elements in the quick and successful conclusion of the war. The United States' diplomatic and military resolve, as well as the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the international arena, helped put Syria and Israel on the same side in this effort. This was a surprising development in light of the strained state of Syrian-Israeli relations in the years leading up to 1990. Helena Cobban investigates the evolution of the military balance between Israel and Syria from 1978 through 1990, focusing on the effects of the close strategic ties that developed between these states and their respective superpower partners. The fighting in Lebanon in 1982 is closely examined, since it proved to be a key turning point for Israel and Syria--and for the superpowers parrying for influence in the Middle East region. After an up-to-the-minute preface analyzing the effects of the Persian Gulf War on the Syrian-Israeli relationship, Cobban explores the immunity this area showed in the late 1980s to diplomatic efforts that were resolving regional conflicts elsewhere in the world, as well as the surprising overall stability of this theatre even in the absence of effective diplomacy. The arsenals of Israel and Syria, now the preeminent military powers in the Middle East after the defanging of Iraq, are still formidable. Cobban presents a formula for careful diplomacy in the 1990s that could lead to a lasting peace. This book is essential reading for political scientists, students of military engagements, and others who have an interest in the worldwide consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

A perceptive and provocative history of Henry Kissinger's diplomatic negotiations in the Middle East that illuminates the unique challenges and barriers Kissinger and his successors have faced in their attempts to broker peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. “A wealth of lessons for today, not only about the challenges in that region but also about the art of diplomacy . . . the drama, dazzling maneuvers, and grand strategic vision.”—Walter Isaacson, author of The Code Breaker More than twenty years have elapsed since the United States last brokered a peace agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians. In that time, three presidents have tried and failed. Martin Indyk—a former United States ambassador to Israel and special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in 2013—has experienced these political frustrations and disappointments firsthand. Now, in an attempt to understand the arc of American diplomatic influence in the Middle East, he returns to the origins of American-led peace efforts and to the man who created the Middle East peace process—Henry Kissinger. Based on newly available documents from American and Israeli archives, extensive interviews with Kissinger, and Indyk's own interactions with some of the main players, the author takes readers inside the negotiations. Here is a roster of larger-than-life characters—Anwar Sadat, Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, Hafez al-Assad, and Kissinger himself. Indyk's account is both that of a historian poring over the records of these events, as well as an inside player seeking to glean lessons for Middle East peacemaking. He makes clear that understanding Kissinger's design for Middle East peacemaking is key to comprehending how to—and how not to—make peace.