Mel is living the pampered lifestyle of a banker's wife, but she is far from content. Are her children normal? Is her husband having an affair? What enormous creature did the cat dismember all over the kitchen floor? However, it's not until the banking crisis hits and her husband's world implodes that reality dawns.

In spite of its key role in creating the ruinous financial crisis of 2008, the American banking industry has grown bigger, more profitable, and more resistant to regulation than ever. Anchored by six megabanks whose assets amount to more than 60 percent of the country’s gross domestic product, this oligarchy proved it could first hold the global economy hostage and then use its political muscle to fight off meaningful reform. 13 Bankers brilliantly charts the rise to power of the financial sector and forcefully argues that we must break up the big banks if we want to avoid future financial catastrophes. Updated, with additional analysis of the government’s recent attempt to reform the banking industry, this is a timely and expert account of our troubled political economy.

Post-crisis dynamics show a shrinkage in the overall amount of crossborder bank lending, which has been interpreted in the literature as a retreat in financial globalization. In this paper, we argue that aggregate figures are not sufficient to support such a claim in terms of the overall structure of the global banking network. Based on a systematic approach to measuring, mapping and analyzing financial interconnectedness among countries using network theory, we show that, despite the decline in aggregate lending volumes, the structure of the network has developed increased connections in some dimensions. Some parts of the network are currently more interlinked regionally than before the crisis, and less dependent on major global lenders. In this context, at a more disaggregate level, we document the characteristics of the increasing regionalization of lending flows, the different evolution of linkages through bank affiliates and direct cross-border claims, as well as the shift in the importance of key borrower and lender nodes. These changes in the banking network have important insights in terms of policy implications since they indicate that the global banking network has evolved, but it has not undergone a generalized retrenchment in financial linkages.

This report examines the failure of the UK banks. The Committee begins by examining how the present position came about. After looking at the economic situation the report addresses the fate of those banks now partly or wholly owned by the Government, comparing their experiences with those of the building societies. This analysis identifies several key factors as triggering this crisis. First, the growth of risk and complexity, with a concomitant growth in profit, meant that too few people (including many of those in charge) had a clear idea of what was on the banks' books. Second, the banking sector became over-reliant on wholesale funding and discounted any possibility that the wholesale market would dry up; third, rapid growth in the sector was facilitated by increased leverage. The Committee praises the response of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme which had to cope with a dramatic surge in its workload to help compensate those savers in failing institutions. The package of measures the Government has taken to address the problems in the banking sector is then examined and the Committee offers its initial view on these measures. The Government's multi-billion pound stake in the banking sector is being managed by UK Financial Investments Limited (UKFI) and the next section looks at its early work. Finally the report looks at the future of the banking sector, to see if structurally steps can be taken to limit the possibility of another banking crisis.

Most American adults easily recognize the following description of the 2008 financial crisis. Unregulated Wall Street firms (so-called shadow banks) made too many risky bets with derivatives, causing the housing bubble to burst. The contagious run through the financial system was only stopped by bailouts from the federal government and major regulatory changes. But what if the record demonstrates that the core of this story is misleading and that the resulting regulations are misguided? Now, almost 15 years later, the Biden administration is using this same story to promote more regulations for money market mutual funds (a key part of the supposedly dangerous shadow banking system) and even to justify allowing only federally insured banks to issue stablecoins (a type of cryptocurrency that didn’t exist in 2008). But most of the post-2008 regulatory efforts were concentrated in the traditional banking sector—not the shadow banking sector—which warrants skepticism toward the conventional story of the 2008 crisis and any new regulations based on that story. This book explores the main problems with the conventional story about the 2008 crisis and explains why it does not justify expanding bank-like regulations throughout financial markets to mitigate systemic risks.

The EU and the US responded to the global financial crisis by changing the rules for the functioning of financial services and markets and by establishing new oversight bodies. With the US Dodd–Frank Act and numerous EU regulations and directives now in place, this book provides a timely and thoughtful explanation of the key elements of the new regimes in both regions, of the political processes which shaped their content and of their practical impact. Insights from areas such as economics, political science and financial history elucidate the significance of the reforms. Australia's resilience during the financial crisis, which contrasted sharply with the severe problems that were experienced in the EU and the US, is also examined. The comparison between the performances of these major economies in a period of such extreme stress tells us much about the complex regulatory and economic ecosystems of which financial markets are a part.

Although cross-border bank lending has fallen sharply since the crisis, extending our bank ownership database from 1995-2009 up to 2013 shows only limited retrenchment in foreign bank presence. While banks from OECD countries reduced their foreign presence (but still represent 89% of foreign bank assets), those from emerging markets and developing countries expanded abroad and doubled their presence. Especially advanced countries hit by a systemic crisis reduced their presence abroad, with far flung and relatively small investments more likely to be sold. Poorer and slower growing countries host fewer banks today, while large investments less likely expanded. Conversely, faster host countries’ growth and closeness to potential investors meant more entry. Lending by foreign banks locally grew more than cross-border bank claims did for the same home-host country combination, and each was driven by different factors. Altogether, our evidence shows that global banking is not becoming more fragmented, but rather is going through some important structural transformations with a greater variety of players and a more regional focus.

It was one of the gravest challenges faced by any British government in peacetime. The banking system, taken for granted by most of the population to pay for life's essentials, came close to collapse. Yet nobody going about their business in October 2008 had any inkling how vulnerable the nation's financial infrastructure was. Nobody, that is, bar a small group of policymakers and ministers working frantically in Whitehall and the City of London. Royal Bank of Scotland, larger than the entire annual output of the UK economy, had toppled. Another banking giant Halifax/Bank of Scotland was in desperate need of a bailout. A staggeringly large bill had to be paid to stave off disaster. But could Britain afford it? Might foreign investors conclude that the UK's public finances could not take the strain and the game was up? Yet doing nothing might have seen cash machines closed, depositors panicking and troops on the streets. These were the appalling dilemmas facing Downing Street, the Treasury and financial regulators in the darkest hours of the crisis triggered by the crash of the US bank Lehman Brothers. As political leaders in the United States confronted challenges to their own system, their British counterparts could rely on nobody for help. A solution had to be found and fast. To their immense credit, a rescue package was unveiled and markets were reassured. But saving the banks was one thing – securing their future to the benefit of taxpayers and customers was another. Decisions made since the traumatic weeks of October 2008 have cast a long shadow. The UK economy is still bearing the scars. RBS is not repaired, some small businesses are struggling to get credit and public appetite for explanations of what happened remains high. This book is the definitive insider's guide to the UK banking crisis, the drama and characters involved in the collapse of some of the major pillars of British banking and the commitment of £66 billion of taxpayers' money. This as yet untold story is informed by conversations with highly placed policymakers, including many of the key players, and explains what really happened behind closed doors in Downing Street and the City.

A full account of the rise and fall of British banking stability which sheds new light on why banking systems crash.