A narrative history and assessment of the early years of Robert McNamara's tenure as Secretary of Defense, including McNamara's relationship with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the transformation of the Department of Defense as a part of Kennedy's New Frontier, and the Pentagon's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Bay of Pigs episode, and onset of the Vietnam War along with other major national security events and developments during a turbulent and momentous period of the Cold War. (Fuller description is on the dust jacket flaps.)

McNamara, Clifford and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965-1969, volume VI in the newly named Secretaries of Defense Historical Series, covers the incumbency of Robert S. McNamara, as well as the brief, but significant, tenure of Clark M. Clifford. McNamara's key role in the ever-deepening U.S. involvement in Vietnam between 1965 and 1968 forms the centerpiece of the narrative. During these years, Vietnam touched every aspect of Lyndon B. Johnson's administration, determining budget priorities, provoking domestic unrest, souring relations with NATO, and complicating negotiations with the Soviet Union.McNamara's early miscalculations about Vietnam became the source of deep disappointments. Relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, never good, frayed almost to the breaking point as McNamara repeatedly rejected military advice in favor of his civilian experts. McNamara's carefully crafted plans failed, his frustrations grew, and he became estranged from the President. His private attempts to check the war's momentum contradicted his public statements supporting the military effort and tarred McNamara as a hypocrite. McNamara's successor, Clark Clifford, arrived with a reputation as a hawk, but focused most of his effort on extricating the United States from Vietnam.McNamara and Clifford presided over the Department of Defense during momentous and dangerous times. Vietnam was one of a series of wars, emergencies, and interventions involving U.S. interests. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, declining U.S. prestige and power in Europe and NATO, war in the Middle East, heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula, arms control talks with the Soviet Union, and violent protests at home competed for attention. Overseeing the Vietnam War and contending with these complex policy issues taxed even McNamara's enormous energy and brilliant intellect as he struggled to manage DoD programs. His long-cherished cost-cutting programs fell by the wayside; his favored weapons systems were swept aside; his committed efforts to limit strategic arms faltered; and his reputation was permanently tarnished.McNamara, Clifford and the Burdens of Vietnam highlights the interaction of McNamara and Clifford with the White House, Congress, the JCS, the State Department, and other federal agencies involved in policy formulation. The two secretaries attempted to impose order while fighting a war whose cost of winning became as morally prohibitive as the price of losing.

In this first of a two-volume study, Dr. Futrell presents a chronological survey of the development of Air Force doctrine and thinking from the beginnings of powered flight to the onset of the space age. He outlines the struggle of early aviation enthusiasts to gain acceptance of the airplane as a weapon and win combat-arm status for the Army Air Service (later the Army Air Corps and Army Air Force). He surveys the development of airpower doctrine during the 1930s and World War II and outlines the emergence of the autonomous US Air Force in the postwar period. Futrell brings this first volume to a close with discussions of the changes in Air Force thinking and doctrine necessitated by the emergence of the intercontinental missile, the beginnings of space exploration and weapon systems, and the growing threat of limited conflicts resulting from the Communist challenge of wars of liberation. In volume two, the author traces the new directions that Air Force strategy, policies, and thinking took during the Kennedy administration, the Vietnam War, and the post-Vietnam period. Futrell outlines how the Air Force struggled with President Kennedy's redefinition of national security policy and Robert S. McNamara's managerial style as secretary of defense. He describes how the Air Force argued that airpower should be used during the war in Southeast Asia. He chronicles the evolution of doctrine and organization regarding strategic, tactical, and airlift capabilities and the impact that the aerospace environment and technology had on Air Force thinking and doctrine.

Author Edward Keefer chronicles and analyses the tenure of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, who worked to counter the Soviet Union's growing military strength during the administration of President Jimmy Carter. Flush with cash from oil and gas development, the Soviets came closest to matching the United States in strategic power than at any other point in the Cold War, threatening to make the U.S. land-based missile force vulnerable to a first strike. By most reckonings the Kremlin also surpassed the West in conventional arms and forces in Central Europe, creating a direct threat to NATO. In response, Brown, a nuclear physicist, advocated for the development of more technologically advanced weapon systems to offset the Soviet military advantage, but faced Carter's efforts to reign in the defense budget. Eventually the secretary, backed by the JCS, the national security adviser, and key members of Congress, persuaded a reluctant Carter to increase defense spending for the last two years of his term. As a result weapons development such as stealth technology, precision-guided bombs, and cruise missiles went forward. These initiatives and more provided a head start for the acclaimed Ronald Reagan revolution in defense. As the author points out, there was more continuity than contrast in defense policy between Carter and Reagan. The book also highlights Brown's policymaking efforts and his influence on Carter as the administration responded to international events such as the Middle East peace process, the Iran revolution and hostage crisis, the rise of radical Islam, negotiations with the Soviets over arms limitations, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the creation of a new security framework in the Persian Gulf region. Other topics cover policy toward Latin America Africa, China, and Southeast Asia. The book is also a history of the Defense Department, including the continual development of the All-Volunteer Force and the organizational changes that saw improved policy formulation and acquisition decisions. Political strategists, political scientists, international relations scholars, foreign policy advocates, historians, and political economists may be interested in this comprehensive historical reference for United States defense and foreign policy under the James (Jimmy) Carter administration. High school students pursuing research for essays and term papers for Government, Modern World History, and United States History may be interested in this resource. Additionally, undergraduate and graduate level students may be interested in this authoritative resource for research relating to international relations, public administration, military science, public policy economics, and introduction to political theory courses. Related products: Presidential History resources collection is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/presidential-history Other resources relating to the President James (Jimmy) Carter administration can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/39-jimmy-carter Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series resources can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/foreign-relations-united-states-series-frus Other published works by the US Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/office-secretary-defense

Dr. Donald J. Mrozeks research sheds considerable light on how the use of air power evolved in the Vietnam War. Much more than simply retelling events, Mrozek analyzes how history, politics, technology, and the complexity of the war drove the application of air power in a long and divisive struggle. Mrozek delves into a wealth of original documentation, and his scholarship is impeccable. His analysis is thorough and balanced. His conclusions are well reasoned but will trouble those who have never seriously considered how the application of air power is influenced by factors far beyond the battlefield. Wether or not the reader agrees with Mrozek, the quality of his research and analysis makes his conclusions impossible to ignore. John C. Fryer, Jr. Brigadier General, United States Air Force Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education

Concentrates on the pivotal role of President John F. Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara. This study particularly focuses on the greater role McNamara played in foreign affairs than any previous Secretary of Defense.

This biography examines the former Congressman Melvin Laird's efforts to reconstitute the Department of Defense during the last years of the Vietnam war.

Established during World War ii to advise the President on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council is essential to an understanding of the current work of the Chairman and the Joint Staff. A history of their activities, both in war and peacetime, also provides important insights into the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history of their activities be kept for the record. its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies is self-apparent. Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1991 follows in the tradition of volumes previously prepared by the Joint History Office dealing with JCS involvement in national policy, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Adopting a broader view than earlier volumes, it surveys the JCS role and contributions from the early days of World War ii through the end of the Cold War. Written from a combination of primary and secondary sources, it is a fresh work of scholarship, looking at the problems of this era and their military implications. The main prism is that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but in laying out the JCS perspective, it deals also with the wider impact of key decisions and the ensuing policies.