Peter Fishburn has had a splendidly productive career that led to path-breaking c- tributions in a remarkable variety of areas of research. His contributions have been published in a vast literature, ranging through journals of social choice and welfare, decision theory, operations research, economic theory, political science, mathema- cal psychology, and discrete mathematics. This work was done both on an individual basis and with a very long list of coauthors. The contributions that Fishburn made can roughly be divided into three major topical areas, and contributions to each of these areas are identi?ed by sections of this monograph. Section 1 deals with topics that are included in the general areas of utility, preference, individual choice, subjective probability, and measurement t- ory. Section 2 covers social choice theory, voting models, and social welfare. S- tion 3 deals with more purely mathematical topics that are related to combinatorics, graph theory, and ordered sets. The common theme of Fishburn’s contributions to all of these areas is his ability to bring rigorous mathematical analysis to bear on a wide range of dif?cult problems.

Peter Fishburn has had a splendidly productive career that led to path-breaking c- tributions in a remarkable variety of areas of research. His contributions have been published in a vast literature, ranging through journals of social choice and welfare, decision theory, operations research, economic theory, political science, mathema- cal psychology, and discrete mathematics. This work was done both on an individual basis and with a very long list of coauthors. The contributions that Fishburn made can roughly be divided into three major topical areas, and contributions to each of these areas are identi?ed by sections of this monograph. Section 1 deals with topics that are included in the general areas of utility, preference, individual choice, subjective probability, and measurement t- ory. Section 2 covers social choice theory, voting models, and social welfare. S- tion 3 deals with more purely mathematical topics that are related to combinatorics, graph theory, and ordered sets. The common theme of Fishburn’s contributions to all of these areas is his ability to bring rigorous mathematical analysis to bear on a wide range of dif?cult problems.

The utility maximization paradigm forms the basis of many economic, psychological, cognitive and behavioral models. However, numerous examples have revealed the deficiencies of the concept. This book helps to overcome those deficiencies by taking into account insensitivity of measurement threshold and context of choice. The second edition has been updated to include the most recent developments and a new chapter on classic and new results for infinite sets.

In Consistency, Choice, and Rationality, economic theorists Walter Bossert and Kotaro Suzumura present a thorough mathematical treatment of Suzumura consistency, an alternative to established coherence properties such as transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or acyclicity. Applications in individual and social choice theory, fields important not only to economics but also to philosophy and political science, are discussed. Specifically, the authors explore topics such as rational choice and revealed preference theory, and collective decision making in an atemporal framework as well as in an intergenerational setting.

One fundamental premise of democratic theory is that social policy, group choice, or collective action should be based on the preferences of the individuals in the society, group, or collective. Using the tools of formal mathematical analysis, Peter C. Fishburn explores and defines the conditions for social choice and methods for synthesizing individuals' preferences. This study is unique in its emphasis on social choice functions, the general position that individual indifference may not be transitive, and the use of certain mathematics such as linear algebra. The text is divided into three main parts: social choice between two alternatives, which examines a variety of majority-like functions; simple majority social choice, which focuses on social choice among many alternatives when two-element feasible subset choices are based on simple majority; and a general study of aspects and types of social choice functions for many alternatives. Originally published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

In this book, Professor Kreps presents a first course on the basic models of choice theory that underlie much of economic theory. This course, taught for several years at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, gives the student an introduction to the axiomatic method of economic analysis, without placing too heavy a demand on mathematical sophistication.The course begins with the basics of choice and revealed preference theory and then discusses numerical representations of ordinal preference. Models with uncertainty come next: First is von Neumann?Morgenstern utility, and then choice under uncertainty with subjective uncertainty, using the formulation of Anscombe and Aumann, and then sketching the development of Savage's classic theory. Finally, the course delves into a number of special topics, including de Finetti's theorem, modeling choice on a part of a larger problem, dynamic choice, and the empirical evidence against the classic models.

In conventional mathematical programming, coefficients of problems are usually determined by the experts as crisp values in terms of classical mathematical reasoning. But in reality, in an imprecise and uncertain environment, it will be utmost unrealistic to assume that the knowledge and representation of an expert can come in a precise way. The wider objective of the book is to study different real decision situations where problems are defined in inexact environment. Inexactness are mainly generated in two ways – (1) due to imprecise perception and knowledge of the human expert followed by vague representation of knowledge as a DM; (2) due to huge-ness and complexity of relations and data structure in the definition of the problem situation. We use interval numbers to specify inexact or imprecise or uncertain data. Consequently, the study of a decision problem requires answering the following initial questions: How should we compare and define preference ordering between two intervals?, interpret and deal inequality relations involving interval coefficients?, interpret and make way towards the goal of the decision problem? The present research work consists of two closely related fields: approaches towards defining a generalized preference ordering scheme for interval attributes and approaches to deal with some issues having application potential in many areas of decision making.

Mathematics of Social Choice is a fun and accessible book that looks at the choices made by groups of people with different preferences, needs, and interests. Divided into three parts, the text first examines voting methods for selecting or ranking candidates. A brief second part addresses compensation problems wherein an indivisible item must be assigned to one of several people who are equally entitled to ownership of the item, with monetary compensation paid to the others. The third part discusses the problem of sharing a divisible resource among several people. Mathematics of Social Choice can be used by undergraduates studying mathematics and students whose only mathematical background is elementary algebra. More advanced material can be skipped without any loss of continuity. The book can also serve as an easy introduction to topics such as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, Arrow's theorem, and fair division for readers with more mathematical background.

This monograph is devoted to a rigorous presentation of results about the representation of preference orderings by real-valued order isomorphisms ("utility functions"). The authors have gathered together, from sources scattered throughout a wide range of the literature of mathematics and economics, the most significant theorems and methods in their field. The book will be a valuable resource for theoretical economists, mathematicians, and all interested in partial orders and their representation. It could also be used as the text for an advanced graduate course in mathematical economics.

This book offers an essential review of central theories, current research and applications in the field of numerical representations of ordered structures. It is intended as a tribute to Professor Ghanshyam B. Mehta, one of the leading specialists on the numerical representability of ordered structures, and covers related applications to utility theory, mathematical economics, social choice theory and decision-making. Taken together, the carefully selected contributions provide readers with an authoritative review of this research field, as well as the knowledge they need to apply the theories and methods in their own work.