High public debt often produces the drama of default and restructuring. But debt is also reduced through financial repression, a tax on bondholders and savers via negative or belowmarket real interest rates. After WWII, capital controls and regulatory restrictions created a captive audience for government debt, limiting tax-base erosion. Financial repression is most successful in liquidating debt when accompanied by inflation. For the advanced economies, real interest rates were negative 1⁄2 of the time during 1945–1980. Average annual interest expense savings for a 12—country sample range from about 1 to 5 percent of GDP for the full 1945–1980 period. We suggest that, once again, financial repression may be part of the toolkit deployed to cope with the most recent surge in public debt in advanced economies.

We consider public debt from a long-term historical perspective, showing how the purposes for which governments borrow have evolved over time. Periods when debt-to-GDP ratios rose explosively as a result of wars, depressions and financial crises also have a long history. Many of these episodes resulted in debt-management problems resolved through debasements and restructurings. Less widely appreciated are successful debt consolidation episodes, instances in which governments inheriting heavy debts ran primary surpluses for long periods in order to reduce those burdens to sustainable levels. We analyze the economic and political circumstances that made these successful debt consolidation episodes possible.

The global economy has experienced four waves of rapid debt accumulation over the past 50 years. The first three debt waves ended with financial crises in many emerging market and developing economies. During the current wave, which started in 2010, the increase in debt in these economies has already been larger, faster, and broader-based than in the previous three waves. Current low interest rates mitigate some of the risks associated with high debt. However, emerging market and developing economies are also confronted by weak growth prospects, mounting vulnerabilities, and elevated global risks. A menu of policy options is available to reduce the likelihood that the current debt wave will end in crisis and, if crises do take place, will alleviate their impact.

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"The Sovereign Debt Crisis," 2012 edition, looked at how governments ran up substantial deficits in order to avert a worldwide depression and their subsequent attempts to rebalance their budgets. This updated edition concentrates on the delicate balancing act the economies of the United States, Japan, and the eurozone face between the present need to boost sluggish economic growth by providing sufficiently cheap, low-risk credit and the longer-term challenges of cutting massive debt and returning to a sustainable fiscal policy. The authors argue that many of the euro area economies, having noticeable difficulty paying their international debts, are in a sovereign debt crisis, while America and Japan are, for now, holding steady but in real danger of slipping into crisis. The book shows how the process has evolved in these three major developed economies and how their policy choices impact global financial markets.

High public debt often produces the drama of default and restructuring. But debt is also reduced through financial repression, a tax on bondholders and savers via negative or belowmarket real interest rates. After WWII, capital controls and regulatory restrictions created a captive audience for government debt, limiting tax-base erosion. Financial repression is most successful in liquidating debt when accompanied by inflation. For the advanced economies, real interest rates were negative 1⁄2 of the time during 1945–1980. Average annual interest expense savings for a 12—country sample range from about 1 to 5 percent of GDP for the full 1945–1980 period. We suggest that, once again, financial repression may be part of the toolkit deployed to cope with the most recent surge in public debt in advanced economies.

This paper reviews empirical and theoretical work on the links between banks and their governments (the bank-sovereign nexus). How significant is this nexus? What do we know about it? To what extent is it a source of concern? What is the role of policy intervention? The paper concludes with a review of recent policy proposals.

The Bank of England and the Government Debt recounts the surprising history of the Bank of England's activities in the government securities market in the mid-twentieth century. The Bank's governor, Montagu Norman, had a decisive influence on government debt management policy until he retired in 1944, and established an auxiliary market in government securities outside the Stock Exchange during the Second World War. From the early 1950s, the Bank, concerned about inadequate market liquidity, became an increasingly active market-maker in government securities, rescuing the commercial market-makers in the Stock Exchange several times. The Bank's market-making activities often conflicted with its monetary policy objectives, and in 1971, it curtailed them substantially, while avoiding the damaging effects on liquidity in the government securities market that it had feared. Drawing heavily on archival research, William A. Allen sheds light on little-known aspects of central banking and monetary policy.