First published in 1975, this book is concerned with the facts and implications of the case of Lin Piao and his army, as well as with the broader question of military intervention in the authoritarian polity of developing countries. A wide range of materials is presented, including "top-secret" documents of the CCP Central Committee, Lin Piao’s own writings and speeches from the 1966-1970 period, pertinent material from the Tenth Party Congress, and press criticism. In their introduction, the author provides a thorough critical analysis of the case of Lin Piao and of the dynamic of power politics that emerged from the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s.

First published in 1975, this book is concerned with the facts and implications of the case of Lin Piao and his army, as well as with the broader question of military intervention in the authoritarian polity of developing countries. A wide range of materials is presented, including "top-secret" documents of the CCP Central Committee, Lin Piao’s own writings and speeches from the 1966-1970 period, pertinent material from the Tenth Party Congress, and press criticism. In their introduction, the author provides a thorough critical analysis of the case of Lin Piao and of the dynamic of power politics that emerged from the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s.

In 1971, Lin Biao, Mao Zedong's closest comrade-in-arms and chosen successor, was killed in a mysterious plane crash in Mongolia. This book challenges the official explanation that Lin was fleeing to the Soviet Union after an unsuccessful coup attempt.

The Lin Biao affair, which saw the Minister of Defence dramatically rise to become Mao Zedong's designated successor at the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 and, even more dramatically, die in a plane crash while fleeing his country in September 1971, remains the least understood of all Chinese Communist Party elite conflicts of the Maoist era. Despite the pivotal importance of Lin's rise and fall in the history of contemporary China, his career has received little scholarly attention. In this pathbreaking study Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun offer an interpretation which radically undermines the standard view of Lin Biao as an ambitious politician who manoeuvred his way to the top, adopted a radical position during the Cultural Revolution to promote his own interests, and eventually came undone by seeking to consolidate his own power and military dominance over the polity, thus leading to a vicious power struggle with Mao. They reveal Lin as someone basically uninterested in power or even politics, who was thrust into leading positions and the successor role by Mao against his wishes; who never opposed Mao politically but instead attempted to follow his wishes in every way to the extent that they could be determined; who had no policy programme, whose rare initiatives were on the side of moderation; and whose political decline was due to Mao's reaction to complex factors unconnected with either a bid by Lin for personal aggrandizement or an effort to entrench army power. In this Teiwes and Sun refute both the official Chinese verdict on Lin Biao and the prevailing Western interpretation.