The conclusion of a war typically signals the beginning of a flood of memoirs and instant campaign histories, many presenting the purported, but often dubious lessons of the recent conflict. Cordesman is careful to avoid such pitfalls in this detailed and closely reasoned analysis, and helps us to begin to understand the implications of this dramatic conflict on its own terms. Based on a combination of official and unofficial (but always authoritative) sources, he builds a thorough case for the true lessons of NATO's first battle fought within Europe. After consideration of the historical, major political, and strategic factors that set the stage for the Kosovo campaign, Cordesman critically examines the actual effectiveness of the NATO air campaigns, both in Kosovo and Serbia proper. Operations in this rugged part of Europe were difficult, and compounding the challenges of terrain and weather were the conflicting national agendas within the Allied coalition that seriously hampered focused and decisive action by NATO. Although Milosevic ultimately conceded defeat, all of these factors played an important role in limiting the intensity and shaping the military outcome of the campaign, and the likely political and strategic results were far from certain. Cordesman unflinchingly concludes, that the air campaign over Kosovo exposed deep fault lines within and among the NATO countries and fundamental flaws in the way the West wages war.

This book offers a thorough appraisal of Operation Allied Force, NATO's 78-day air war to compel the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, to end his campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The author sheds light both on the operation's strengths and on its most salient weaknesses. He outlines the key highlights of the air war and examines the various factors that interacted to induce Milosevic to capitulate when he did. He then explores air power's most critical accomplishments in Operation Allied Force as well as the problems that hindered the operation both in its planning and in its execution. Finally, he assesses Operation Allied Force from a political and strategic perspective, calling attention to those issues that are likely to have the greatest bearing on future military policymaking. The book concludes that the air war, although by no means the only factor responsible for the allies' victory, certainly set the stage for Milosevic's surrender by making it clear that he had little to gain by holding out. It concludes that in the end, Operation Allied Force's most noteworthy distinction may lie in the fact that the allies prevailed despite the myriad impediments they faced.

An assessment of the Kosovo campaign, setting out the background to the crisis, explaining why the UK and NATO had to intervene, assessing the performance of the UK effort, and giving details of lessons learned with regard to defence capability and equipment capability.

The war in Kosovo was a turning point: NATO deployed its armed forces in war for the first time, and placed the controversial doctrine of 'humanitarian intervention' squarely in the world's eye. It was an armed intervention for the purpose of implementing Security Council resolutions-but without Security Council authorization.This report tries to answer a number of burning questions, such as why the international community was unable to act earlier and prevent the escalation of the conflict, as well as focusing on the capacity of the United Nations to act as global peacekeeper.The Commission recommends a new status for Kosovo, 'conditional independence', with the goal of lasting peace and security for Kosovo-and for the Balkan region in general. But many of the conslusions may be beneficially applied to conflicts the world-over.

International law makes it explicit that states shall not intervene militarily of otherwise in the affairs of other states; it is a central principle of the charter of the United Nations. But international law also provides an exception; when a conflict within a state poses a threat to international peace, military intervention by the UN may be warranted. (Indeed, the UN Charter provides for an international police force, though nothing has ever come of this provision.) The Charter and other UN documents also assert that human rights are to be protected—but in the past the responsibility for the protection of human rights has for the most part been allowed to rest on the government of the state where the violation of rights occurs. Not surprisingly in this context, the question of what protection (if any) should be provided by the UN or otherwise to individuals when their human rights are violated by their governments or with the complicity of their governments remains a contentious issue. Should the principle of respect for state sovereignty trump the principle of respect for human rights? In this volume contributors grapple with a specific case: was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Kosovo legally or morally acceptable? The contributors all have doubts on this score, and several argue strongly that the intervention was both legally and morally unjustified. A companion volume, Humanitarian Intervention: Moral and Philosophical Issues focuses on the philosophical principles involved in this sort of question; this volume, on the other hand, focuses as much or more on the political as on the philosophical.

Civil military unity of effort has been an essential yet frustrating elusive requiem for success in post cold war peace operations.

First published in 2003. The NATO-led Operation Allied Force was fought in 1999 to stop Serb atrocities against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. This war, as noted by the distinguished military historian John Keegan, "marked a real turning point . . . and proved that a war can be won by airpower alone." Colonels Haave and Haun have organized firsthand accounts of some of the people who provided that airpower-the members of the 40th Expeditionary Operations Group. Their descriptions-a new wingman's first combat sortie, a support officer's view of a fighter squadron relocation during combat, and a Sandy's leadership in finding and rescuing a downed F-117 pilot-provide the reader with a legitimate insight into an air war at the tactical level and the airpower that helped convince the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, to capitulate.

The U.S. armed forces are not the only military that has sought to discern the lessons of the Kosovo campaign in the spring of 1999. The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has also analyzed the conflict and drawn its own conclusions. In fact, as Dr. June Teufel Dreyer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami in Florida, observes, rather than reach a single set of conclusions, different groups within the Chinese military drew different judgments. Dr. Dreyer argues that these differences of opinion reflect the considerable diversity of thinking about defense modernization and future war that exists within the PLA today. The analysis that follows provides an opportunity for readers to learn about the different strands in Chinese strategic thinking as that country enters the 21st century. The different views that Dr. Dreyer identifies reminds us of the dangers of treating the PLA as a single monolithic entity. Only through careful study and analysis can we anticipate trends in the future direction of the PLA.