The aim of The Legal Foundations of Micro-Institutional Performance is to introduce the reader to a different way of thinking about economics that will allow them to both understand and apply legal concepts to economic analysis. To this end, it adopts and further develops Wesley Hohfeld’s legal framework of jural (legal) relations as a tool of analysis. This analytical tool, as built into the Legal-Economic Performance framework, provides specific direction in identifying and describing interdependence among economic agents (including rights, duties, liberties and exposure to various acts).

What is the relationship between internal development and integration into the global economy in developing countries? How and why do state–market relations differ? And do these differences matter in the post-cold war era of global conflict and cooperation? Drawing on research in China, India, and Russia and examining sectors from textiles to telecommunications, Micro-institutional Foundations of Capitalism introduces a new theory of sectoral pathways to globalization and development. Adopting a historical approach, the book's Strategic Value Framework shows how state elites perceive the strategic value of sectors in response to internal and external pressures. Sectoral structures and organization of institutions further determine the role of the state in market coordination and property rights arrangements. The resultant dominant patterns of market governance vary by country and sector within country. These national configurations of sectoral models are the micro-institutional foundations of capitalism, which mediate globalization and development.

Agency theory is ubiquitous in company law. This book explores (a) the limits of such deployment, and (b) the logic of how to deploy it. The book makes five linked arguments in respect of the limits of agency theory in company law. First, it argues that agency theory has become so broad that it can be used to analyse most human relationships. Such breadth, though, comes at the expense of legal clarity: as agency relationships cover such a broad range of relationships, there are no normative legal conclusions that can be drawn merely from identifying such a relationship. Second, it argues that we need to differentiate more specific concepts with clearer legal implications, such as externalities, and the particular manifestation of moral hazard that appears in insurance dynamics. Third, it argues that considerable amounts of existing company law theory - which is ostensibly built from agency theory - is in fact based on a series of hidden value judgments at each stage of the analysis. Fourth, it argues that company law theory should use agency theory less to rebalance the discipline: agency theory has become hegemonic, which is dangerous for the discipline, obscures company law’s role in establishing incentives, undermines accountability, and reduces company law’s autonomy. The book then moves to the logic of agency theory and makes three arguments. First, it argues that we need to factor in the company, only apply agency theory to voluntary interactions, and foreground our value judgments when identifying agency relations to do it properly. Second, it argues that it is rational to incur agency costs when we perceive the benefits of doing so to outweigh the costs, meaning that agency costs can be facilitative and we should look to front-end them rather than universally minimise them. Third, it argues that this needs to be undertaken through mandatory laws. Exploring the external limits and internal logic of agency cost analysis, this book will be of interest to academics, students, and researchers of corporate and company law.

This publication examines issues of water sector reform and performance from the perspectives of institutional economics and political economic studies. The authors develop an alternative quantitative assessment methodology based on the principle of 'institutional ecology', as well as data collected from 127 water experts from 43 countries and regions around the world using a cross-country review of recent water sector reforms within an institutional transaction cost framework.

The notion of microfoundations has received growing interest in neo-institutional theory along with an increasing interest in microfoundational research in disciplines such as strategic management and organizational economics.

In this book, Stephen Copp has brought together some of the world's leading figures in the field of law and economics to discuss questions that are central to our understanding of how a free-market economy operates. Though most people accept that a free economy cannot exist in a legal vacuum, important questions about how systems of law come into being and what form they should take remain in dispute. The authors shed light on some of these issues, such as whether common law systems are better than codified law systems; the relationship between natural law and government law; whether systems of law evolve within societies or are imposed from above by government; and, the role of human rights, as guaranteed by constitutions.After examining these questions, the authors then proceed to look at specific problems that are frequently disputed by economists - such as the role of competition law; the relationship between law, regulation and economics; and, how the law can protect the environment without onerous regulation. This collection is an important contribution to the literature in the field of law and economics. It is important both for economists who wish to understand more about the origins and purposes of law and regulation, and for lawyers who need to understand more about the economic foundations of sound legal systems.

Applying the new economics of organisation and relational theories of the firm to the problem of understanding cross-national variation in the political economy, this volume elaborates a new understanding of the institutional differences that characterise the 'varieties of capitalism' worldwide.

Since the early 1980s there has been an explosion of auditing activity in the United Kingdom and North America. In addition to financial audits there are now medical audits, technology audits, value for money audits, environmental audits, quality audits, teaching audits, and many others. Why has this happened? What does it mean when a society invests so heavily in an industry of checking and when more and more individuals find themselves subject to formal scrutiny? The Audit Society argues that the rise of auditing has its roots in political demands for accountability and control. At the heart of a new administrative style internal control systems have begun to play an important public role and individual and organizational performance has been increasingly formalized and made auditable. Michael Power argues that the new demands and expectations of audits live uneasily with their operational capabilities. Not only is the manner in which they produce assurance and accountability open to question but also, by imposing their own values, audits often have unintended and dysfunctional consequences for the audited organization.

'Everyone wants good government, but how do we know when we have it? The path-breaking Quality of Government Institute cuts through the tiresome ideological debate with theoretically grounded empirical analyses of the components, measures, and outcomes of good government. The book's contributors demonstrate the relevance of political science, and they do so with arguments and evidence that should improve policy and, ultimately, peoples' lives.' – Margaret Levi, University of Washington, US 'All too often today research in political science is irrelevant and uninspiring, shying away from the "big" questions that actually matter in people's lives. Good Government shows that this does not have to be the case. Tackling some of the "biggest" questions of the contemporary era – What is good government? Where does it come from? How can it be measured and how does it matter? – this book will prove invaluable to academics and policy makes alike.' – Sheri Berman, Barnard College, US 'What is "Good Government?" Few doubt that it is better to have a "good government" than a "bad" one, but few of us have thought carefully about what makes for good government vs. bad. Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein's excellent volume helps fill in this gap. Though the book is more than this, the focus on corruption is particularly fascinating. We know that corruption is "bad" but where does it come from? Why are some legislatures more corrupt than others? Why does the media sometimes collude? Why are women less easily corrupted than men? These are just a few of the many fascinating questions this volume explores. By bridging democratic theory, public policy and institutional analysis, it is one of the first to give us some practical insight into the obviously important question: what makes some governments "better" than others?' – Sven Steinmo, European University Institute, Italy In all societies, the quality of government institutions is of the utmost importance for the well-being of its citizens. Problems like high infant mortality, lack of access to safe water, unhappiness and poverty are not primarily caused by a lack of technical equipment, effective medicines or other types of knowledge generated by the natural or engineering sciences. Instead, the critical problem is that the majority of the world's population live in societies that have dysfunctional government institutions. Central issues discussed in the book include: how can good government be conceptualized and measured, what are the effects of 'bad government' and how can the quality of government be improved? Good Government will prove invaluable for students in political science, public policy and public administration. Researchers in political science and the social sciences, as well as policy analysts working in government, international and independent policy organizations will also find plenty to interest them in this resourceful compendium.

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