Pt. 1: This volume describes those JCS activities related to developments in Vietnam during the period 1960-1963, when the United States expanded its initial military commitment to Southeast Asia. In 1960, the United States increased its military advisory strength in South Vietnam in response to increased Communist infiltration and to more sustained guerrilla attacks in the south and its contingency planning effort to deploy regular US forces to both Laos and South Vietnam to counter any threat by Communist Army units from the north or from China. President Kennedy's called for a new emphasis upon guerrilla warfare at first received only lukewarm support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the failed Bay of Pigs episode very early in the Kennedy administration, the President lost faith in the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointed General Maxwell Taylor to serve as his intermediary with the Joint Chiefs, until he assumed the Chairman responsibilities in October 1962. The Kennedy administration's policy was marked by clashes between factions in the Defense Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and the White House. By 1963, these differences involved the support the US should provide for the Republic of Vietnam under its President, Ngo Dinh Diem. The history ends with the killing of Diem by a coup followed by the coincidental murder of President Kennedy a short time later.

Pt. 1: This volume describes those JCS activities related to developments in Vietnam during the period 1960-1963, when the United States expanded its initial military commitment to Southeast Asia. In 1960, the United States increased its military advisory strength in South Vietnam in response to increased Communist infiltration and to more sustained guerrilla attacks in the south and its contingency planning effort to deploy regular US forces to both Laos and South Vietnam to counter any threat by Communist Army units from the north or from China. President Kennedy's called for a new emphasis upon guerrilla warfare at first received only lukewarm support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the failed Bay of Pigs episode very early in the Kennedy administration, the President lost faith in the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointed General Maxwell Taylor to serve as his intermediary with the Joint Chiefs, until he assumed the Chairman responsibilities in October 1962. The Kennedy administration's policy was marked by clashes between factions in the Defense Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and the White House. By 1963, these differences involved the support the US should provide for the Republic of Vietnam under its President, Ngo Dinh Diem. The history ends with the killing of Diem by a coup followed by the coincidental murder of President Kennedy a short time later.

This is the second volume in a series of chronological histories prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam War. This volume details the Marine activities during 1965, the year the war escalated and major American combat units were committed to the conflict. The narrative traces the landing of the nearly 5,000-man 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its transformation into the ΙII Marine Amphibious Force, which by the end of the year contained over 38,000 Marines. During this period, the Marines established three enclaves in South Vietnam’s northernmost corps area, I Corps, and their mission expanded from defense of the Da Nang Airbase to a balanced strategy involving base defense, offensive operations, and pacification. This volume continues to treat the activities of Marine advisors to the South Vietnamese armed forces but in less detail than its predecessor volume, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964; The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era.

This is the first of a series of chronological histories prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam conflict. This particular volume covers a relatively obscure chapter in U.S. Marine Corps history—the activities of Marines in Vietnam between 1954 and 1964. The narrative traces the evolution of those activities from a one-man advisory operation at the conclusion of the French-Indochina War in 1954 to the advisory and combat support activities of some 700 Marines at the end of 1964. As the introductory volume for the series this account has an important secondary objective: to establish a geographical, political, and military foundation upon which the subsequent histories can be developed.

This book was donated as a part of the David H. Hugel Collection, an archival collection of the Special Collections & Archives, University of Baltimore.

“A terrific book, lively and brisk . . . a must read for anyone who tries to understand the Vietnam War.” —Thomas E. Ricks Is it possible that the riddle of America’s military failure in Vietnam has a one-word, one-man answer? Until we understand Gen. William Westmoreland, we will never know what went wrong in the Vietnam War. An Eagle Scout at fifteen, First Captain of his West Point class, Westmoreland fought in two wars and became Superintendent at West Point. Then he was chosen to lead the war effort in Vietnam for four crucial years. He proved a disaster. Unable to think creatively about unconventional warfare, Westmoreland chose an unavailing strategy, stuck to it in the face of all opposition, and stood accused of fudging the results when it mattered most. In this definitive portrait, prize-winning military historian Lewis Sorley makes a plausible case that the war could have been won were it not for General Westmoreland. An authoritative study offering tragic lessons crucial for the future of American leadership, Westmoreland is essential reading. “Eye-opening and sometimes maddening, Sorley’s Westmoreland is not to be missed.” —John Prados, author of Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945–1975