"A conference sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research"--Page i. Includes bibliographical references and index.

Should the United States ask its military to guarantee the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf? If the US security commitment is in fact strategically sound, what posture should the military adopt to protect Persian Gulf oil? Charles L. Glaser and Rosemary A. Kelanic present a collection of new essays from a multidisciplinary team of political scientists, historians, and economists that provide answers to these questions. Contributors delve into a range of vital economic and security issues: the economic costs of a petroleum supply disruption, whether or not an American withdrawal increases the chances of oil-related turmoil, the internal stability of Saudi Arabia, budgetary costs of the forward deployment of US forces, and the possibility of blunting the effects of disruptions with investment in alternative energy resources. The result is a series of bold arguments toward a much-needed revision of US policy toward the Persian Gulf during an era of profound change in oil markets and the balance of power in the Middle East.

GAO examined the Federal Government's ability to cope with oil import disruptions, reported on the adequacy of the Department of Energy's (DOE) current contingency programs and organization for dealing with oil shortages, and suggested ways to strengthen the Nation's energy emergency preparedness. In order to examine present emergency preparedness, GAO examined emergency programs for quickly increasing oil supplies, substituting other fuels for oil, restraining oil demand, and allocating short supplies both nationally and internationally. GAO also analyzed the contingency programs provided by the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act since Congress might choose to renew or otherwise extend the authority of one or more of those programs. With the exception of the recent buildup of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), the United States is no better prepared to deal with significant disruptions in oil imports than it was during the 1973 oil embargo. The Nation's almost total lack of emergency preparedness requires immediate attention. GAO found that the Nation is grossly unprepared to cope with a large shortfall because: (1) no plan has been prepared for emergency surge oil production; (2) there is no adequate plan for using SPR; (3) the Government has no plans for managing private oil stock drawdown; (4) both crude oil and petroleum product allocation programs are in disarray; (5) Federal and State plans for restraining oil demand are totally inadequate; (6) emergency oil reserves both here and in other industrialized countries are not adequate; and (7) the international oil sharing mechanism is too narrowly focused and may not work effectively. Government energy supply programs should be developed before any shortages occur so that government at all levels will not have to enact measures in the confusion and political pressures generated by a disruption of supplies. Programs are needed which: will yield significant benefits when applied, are fully developed and kept ready for use, can be implemented in a timely manner, can coordinate the actions of the public and private sectors, can be enforced, and are fully tested before use.