The Inordinance of Time develops an account of the experience of time at the intersection of three approaches: phenomenology, cognitive science, and post-structuralism. Using insights developed in both the phenomenological and cognitive traditions Gallagher explores the inadequacies of the existing models, the limitations imposed by introspective reflection, concepts of intentionality and embodied existence, and the extra-intentional processes that govern the operations of consciousness and memory.

Winner of the 2000 The Edward Goodwin Ballard Prize in Phenomenology In the rigorous and highly original Self-Awareness and Alterity, Dan Zahavi provides a sustained argument that phenomenology, especially in its Husserlian version, can contribute something decisive to the analysis of self-awareness. Taking on recent discussions within both analytical philosophy (Shoemaker, Castaneda, Nagel) and contemporary German philosophy (Henrich, Frank, Tugendhat), Zahavi argues that the phenomenological tradition has much more to offer when it comes to the problem of self-awareness than is normally assumed. As a contribution to the current philosophical debate concerning self-awareness, the book presents a comprehensive reconstruction of Husserl's theory of pre-reflective self-awareness, thereby criticizing a number of prevalent interpretations and a systematic discussion of a number of phenomenological insights related to this issue, including analyses of the temporal, intentional, reflexive, bodily, and social nature of the self.

The question of the existence and the properties of time has been subject to debate for thousands of years. This considered and complete study offers a contrastive analysis of phenomenologies of time from the perspective of the problematics of the visibility of time. Is time perceptible only through the veil of change? Or is there a naked presence of 'time itself'? Or has time always effaced itself? McClure's new work also stages confrontations between phenomenology of time and analytical philosophy of time. By doing so he explores ancient issues from a fresh perspective, such as whether time passes, whether experimental time is 'real time', and whether the very concept of time is contradictory.

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, Second Edition is an invaluable guide and major reference source to the key topics, problems, concepts, and debates in philosophy of psychology and is the first companion of its kind. A team of renowned international contributors provide forty-eight chapters, organized into six clear parts: Historical background to philosophy of psychology Psychological explanation Cognition and representation The biological basis of psychology Perceptual experience Personhood. The Companion covers key topics, such as the origins of experimental psychology; folk psychology; behaviorism and functionalism; philosophy, psychology and neuroscience; the language of thought, modularity, nativism, and representational theories of mind; consciousness and the senses; dreams, emotion, and temporality; personal identity; and the philosophy of psychopathology. For the second edition, six new chapters have been added to address the following important topics: belief and representation in nonhuman animals; prediction error minimization; contemporary neuroscience; plant neurobiology; epistemic judgment; and group cognition. Essential reading for all students of philosophy of mind, science, and psychology, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology will also be of interest to anyone studying psychology and its related disciplines.

Encompasses a summary of major research and scientific thought regarding the nature of consciousness, the neural circuitry involved, how the brain, body, and world interact, and our understanding of subjective states.

This volume explores Husserl’s theory of sensibility and his conceptualization of spatial and temporal constitution. The author maps the linkages between Husserl’s ‘transcendental aesthetic’, the theory of pure experience in empirio-criticism, as well as Immanuel Kant’s transcendental philosophy. The core argument in this analysis centers on the relationship between spatiality and temporality in Husserl’s philosophy. The study interrogates Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between spatiality and temporality in terms of stratifications, analogies and parallelisms. It incorporates a discussion of the potentialities and limitations of such an understanding. It concludes that such limits can be overcome by adopting an understanding of spatiality and temporality as interwoven moments of sensible experience—a ‘spatio-temporal intertwining’. This ‘intertwining’ is made explicit in a thorough inquiry into three central topics in the phenomenological analysis of sensible experience: spatio-temporal individuation, perspectival givenness and bodily experience. The book shows how such an inquiry can form the bedrock of a dynamic and relational understanding of experience as a whole.

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