Preemption and prevention are different concepts. To preempt is to attempt to strike first against an enemy who is in the process of preparing, or is actually launching, an attack against you. Preemption is not controversial. The decision for war has been taken out of your hands. Prevention, however, is a decision to wage war, or conduct a strike, so as to prevent a far more dangerous context maturing in the future. To decide on preventive war is to elect to prevent a particular, very threatening strategic future from coming to pass. Despite much legal argument, there is no legal difficulty with either concept. The UN Charter, with its recognition of the inherent right of sovereign states to self-defense, as generally interpreted around the world does not require a victim or target state to suffer the first blow. To strike preventively in self-defense is legal, though it will usually be controversial. Preventive war is simply war, distinguishable only by its timing, and possibly its motivation.

Preemption has been, and remains, a leading concept of this decade. But despite its ubiquity in public discourse and its policy relevance, it is a source of great confusion. The term is misused, in some cases deliberately one suspects, but it must be admitted that strategic theorists have offered very little worthwhile reading on the subject. This monograph clarifies the meaning of preemption and distinguishes it from prevention and precaution. It critically reviews the principal charges leveled against preventive warfare and uses that analysis to provide at least the bare bones of strategic theory, more strictly of an alternative to theory relevant to such warfare. The analysis concludes with a set of policy and strategy relevant implications for the United States. Preemption is not controversial; legally, morally, or strategically. To preempt means to strike first (or attempt to do so) in the face of an attack that is either already underway or is very credibly imminent. The decision for war has been taken by the enemy. The victim or target state can try to disrupt the unfolding assault, or may elect to receive the attack before reacting. In truth, military preemption will not always be feasible.

Preemption has been, and remains, a leading concept of this decade. But despite its ubiquity in public discourse and its policy relevance, it is a source of great confusion. The term is misused, in some cases deliberately one suspects, but it must be admitted that strategic theorists have offered very little worthwhile reading on the subject. This monograph clarifies the meaning of preemption and distinguishes it from prevention and precaution. It critically reviews the principal charges leveled against preventive warfare and uses that analysis to provide at least the bare bones of strategic theory, more strictly of an alternative to theory relevant to such warfare. The analysis concludes with a set of policy and strategy relevant implications for the United States. Preemption is not controversial; legally, morally, or strategically. To preempt means to strike first (or attempt to do so) in the face of an attack that is either already underway or is very credibly imminent. The decision for war has been taken by the enemy. The victim or target state can try to disrupt the unfolding assault, or may elect to receive the attack before reacting. In truth, military preemption will not always be feasible.

If RMA (revolution in military affairs) was the acronym and concept of choice in the U.S. defense community in the 1990s, so preemption has threatened to supercede it in the 2000s. The trouble is that officials and many analysts have confused preemption, which is not controversial, with prevention, which is. In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray draws a sharp distinction between preemption and prevention, and explains that the political, military, moral, and strategic arguments have really all been about the latter, not the former. Dr. Gray provides definitions, reviews the history of the preventive war option, and considers the merit, or lack thereof, in the principal charges laid against the concept when it is proclaimed to be policy. Dr. Gray concludes that there is a place for preventive war in U.S. strategy, but that it is an option that should be exercised only very occasionally. However, there are times when only force seems likely to resolve a maturing danger.

With issues of war and peace at the forefront of current events, an informed Christian response is needed. This timely volume answers 104 questions from a just-war perspective, offering thoughtful yet succinct answers. Ranging from the theoretical to the practical, the volume looks at how the just-war perspective relates to the philosopher, historian, statesman, theologian, combatant, and individual—with particular emphases on its historical development and application to contemporary geopolitical challenges. Forgoing ideological extremes, Charles and Demy give much attention to the biblical teaching on the subject as they provide moral guidance. A valuable resource for considering the ethical issues relating to war, Christians will find this book's user-friendly format a helpful starting point for discussion.

In today's information era, the use of specific words and language can serve as powerful tools that incite violence—or sanitize and conceal the ugliness of war. This book examines the complex, "twisted" language of conflict. Why is the term "collateral damage" used when military strikes kill civilians? What is a "catastrophic success"? What is the difference between a privileged and unprivileged enemy belligerent? How does deterrence differ from detente? What does "hybrid warfare" mean, and how is it different from "asymmetric warfare"? How is shell shock different from battle fatigue and PTSD? These are only a few of the questions that Talking Conflict: The Loaded Language of Genocide, Political Violence, Terrorism, and Warfare answers in its exploration of euphemisms, "warspeak," "doublespeak," and propagandistic terms. This handbook of alphabetically listed entries is prefaced by an introductory overview that provides background information about how language is used to obfuscate or minimize descriptions of armed conflict or genocide and presents examples of the major rhetorical devices used in this subject matter. The book focuses on the "loaded" language of conflict, with many of the entries demonstrating the function of given terms as euphemisms, propaganda, or circumlocutions. Each entry is accompanied by a list of cross references and "Further Reading" suggestions that point readers to pertinent sources for further research. This book is ideal for students—especially those studying political science, international relations, and genocide—as well as general readers.

In the twenty-first century, the United States confronts an international system of great complexity and shifting security challenges. Among these challenges are those posed by nuclear weapons. Instead of becoming obsolete or being marginalized by the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons have become more important to present and future international stability and peace but the relationship is paradoxical. On one hand, the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states with unsettled grievances or hegemonic ambitions threatens to destabilize local balances of power and set off regional arms races. In addition, the possible acquisition by terrorists of nuclear weapons or fissile materials creates a threat that may be ’beyond deterrence’ according to hitherto accepted concepts. On the other hand, nuclear weapons in the hands of other states can contribute to stable deterrence and help to prevent nuclear proliferation to international miscreants. Certain cases loom large in the short run that highlight this book’s relevance, including the possible acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons by Iran and the continuing tensions created by North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. The Obama ’pivot’ of national security and defense emphasis to Asia reflects not only the growing economic importance of that region, but also the growing number of security dilemmas in a region that is already awash in nuclear forces. The management of nuclear crises and even the possible need to terminate nuclear wars before they expand beyond a single region are among the possible challenges facing future U.S. and allied policy makers and military leaders.

In today's information age, the coexistence of nuclear weapons with advanced conventional weapons and information-based concepts of warfare is a military contradiction. Nuclear deterrence was initially predicated on geopolitical, military, and technical assumptions. These were based on Cold War politics, rational deterrence theory, the concept of mutual vulnerability, and the fact that information and technology diffusion were limited. Today, however, far from being obsolete, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction have not only survived, but have become weapons for states that face security threats, including perceived threats of nuclear blackmail, or expectation of conflicts. This study focuses on this unplanned coexistence of two distinct arts of war, including the possibility that states like the U.S. may be held hostage to nuclear blackmail by "outlier" regimes or terrorists, such as North Korea. It shows that restricting nuclear proliferation should still be on the agenda of policymakers, and calls for a revitalized global nonproliferation regime. This unique survey by a leading expert will appeal to anyone interested in arms control, nuclear proliferation, and defense policy.